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ABSTRACT
U.S.S. NEW IRONSIDES:
THE SEAGOING IRONCLAD IN THE UNION NAV7
William Howard Roberts 
Old Dominion University, 1992 
Director: Dr. Harold L. Wilson
Of the ironclads completed by the Union during the 
Civil War, only the U.S.S. New Ironsides was a seagoing, 
high-freeboard design. Her seagoing qualities and heavy 
battery made her uniquely valuable to the Union in combat. 
Although New Ironsides was highly successful and her high- 
freeboard design squarely in the European mainstream, she 
represented the last of her direct line in the U.S. Navy.
The lessons learned from her construction and wartime ser­
vice, which should have provided invaluable instruction for 
U.S. designers, were not followed up. By failing to develop 
the seagoing ironclad the United States forfeited the advan­
tages it might have gained over European navies from its 
extensive combat experience. The Navy was unable to con­
vince Congress that money for ironclads would be well spent, 
and the U.S. Navy's best opportunity to build a seagoing 
ironclad fleet was lost for a generation.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION: THE NEGLECTED IRONCLAD
I have never yet seen a vessel that came up to my ideas 
of what is required for offensive operations as much as 
the Ironsides.1
Admiral David Porter's words elicit little modern rec­
ognition. To most, "ironclad" is synonymous with "monitor," 
and scholars give New Ironsides but a few lines.2 Yet this 
seagoing broadside ironclad presented one of the earliest 
instances in which the U.S. Navy's tacticians and strate­
gists were forced to adapt to technological change. The new 
technology of iron and steam, pressed into service with 
neither precedent, wartime experience, nor sound theory to 
guide the designers, yielded both unanticipated strengths 
and unforeseen weaknesses.
New Ironsides participated in more engagements and 
fired more shots than any other Civil War ironclad. Her 
strategic importance to the blockade of Charleston and her
:Rear Admiral David D. Porter to Secretary of the Navy 
Gideon Welles, January 15, 1865, Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion 28 
vols. (Washington: GPO, 1894-1922) (hereafter ORN), 11: 602. 
All references are to Series One unless otherwise noted.
2James Phinney Baxter III, The Introduction of the 
Ironclad Warship (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933; 
reprinted Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1968), 268-69. This, 
his most extensive discussion of the ship, is 23 lines.
1
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contributions to the bombardments of Charleston and Fort 
Fisher were unmatched. New Ironsides was in the mainstream 
of ironclad development; while the low freeboard monitors 
were an evolutionary dead end, New Ironsides was of the high 
freeboard line that led to the dreadnought battleship.
Despite her highly successful career, New Ironsides 
herself had no direct descendant in the U.S. Navy. Her 
bright promise was neglected in the post-War reaction, and 
by the time the U.S. Navy again turned to seagoing iron­
clads, she had been forgotten. This is her story.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER TWO 
GENESIS: IMPETUS AND DESIGN
By mid-1861, it was evident that the Union needed iron­
clad warships.1 The impetus was clear: a Confederate iron­
clad program was already underway. The Confederate Navy 
could not hope to challenge the U.S. Navy with conventional 
wooden ships, so Confederate Secretary of the Navy Stephen 
R. Mallory placed his faith not in numbers but in technolo­
gy. As he phrased the idea, "Inequality of numbers may be 
compensated by invulnerability."2
Although there were several Confederate projects un­
derway, the Federals worried most about the conversion of 
the partially destroyed frigate U.S.S. Merrimack into the 
ironclad C.S.S. Virginia.3 Virginia, being rebuilt at the 
Navy Yard at Portsmouth, Virginia, might threaten the Union
JFor a discussion of the plans submitted before Welles 
reported to Congress, Baxter, Ironclad Warship. 238-45.
2Mallory to C. M. Conrad, Chairman of the House Com­
mittee on Naval Affairs, May 10, 1861, ORN ser. 2, 2: 69. A 
detailed discussion of the resulting policy can be found in 
William N. Still, Jr., Iron Afloat: The Story of the Confed­
erate Armorclads (Columbia: University of South Carolina 
Press, 1985), 5-17.
3Mallory approved the conversion plan for the Merri­
mack on July 11, 1861. Baxter, Ironclad Warship. 229. Work 
was in progress by mid-July. Still, Iron Afloat. 19.
3
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capital at Washington, D.C. Official Washington received 
frequent reports of Virginia's progress, as Union Secretary 
of the Navy Gideon Welles wrote in his diary.4
On July 4, 1861, Welles advised the U.S. Congress of 
the problem facing the Navy. There was little time to ex­
periment, he wrote, and Congress should appoint a board to 
investigate the issue.5 Congress went beyond what Welles 
requested. On August 3, 1861, Congress authorized a board 
of Naval officers to inquire into armored ships and appro­
priated $1,500,000 to build "one or more armored or iron or 
steel-clad steamships or floating steam batteries."6
The Navy lost no time. In an advertisement of August 
7, 1861, the Navy requested proposals for "iron-clad steam 
vessels of war," of iron or wood and iron combined, to draw 
between ten and sixteen feet of water. The advertisement, 
which required that the vessel be rigged with two masts, 
stressed, "The smaller draught of water, compatible with 
other requisites, will be preferred."7
Welles appointed a board on August 8, 1861, to examine
4Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles Secretary of 
the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson. Howard K. Beale, ed. 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1960), 1: 65.
5U.S. Congress, House, House Executive Document 69, 
Report of the Secretary of the Navy in Relation to Armored 
Vessels. 38th Congress, 1st Session, 1864, 2 (hereafter Re­
port . . . Armored Vessels).
6Ibid., 1-2.
7Ibid., 2.
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the proposals he expected to receive. The "Ironclad Board" 
consisted of Commodore Joseph Smith, Chief of the Bureau of 
Yards and Docks, Commodore Hiram Paulding, and Commander 
Charles H. Davis.8 Davis, the youngest at fifty-four, was 
the only one of these seagoing officers who had no shipyard 
experience, but since he had just served as a member of the 
Navy's informal blockade strategy board, he had an excellent 
idea of how the ironclads would be employed. Paulding, 
sixty-three years old, commanded the Washington Navy Yard 
from 1851 to 1855, and Smith, the eldest at seventy-one, had 
been Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks since 1846.9 
None of the three was a naval constructor, and no naval 
constructor was available to assist because they were all 
too busy elsewhere. The Board evaluated seventeen proposals 
and recommended the Secretary accept three of them.10
sCommander John A. Dahlgren, inventor of the Dahlgren 
gun, was originally assigned to the Board but was replaced 
at his own request by Davis. Baxter, Ironclad Warship. 247.
9Dumas Malone, ed., Dictionary of American Biography 
(New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1961-64), s.v. "Davis, 
Charles Henry," "Paulding, Hiram," "Smith, Joseph" (hereaf­
ter DAB). James Grant Wilson and John Fiske, eds., Apple­
ton's Cyclopaedia of American Biography (New York: D. Apple­
ton & Company, 1888), s.v. "Davis, Charles Henry," "Paul­
ding, Hiram." National Archives, Record Group 24, Records 
of the Bureau of Personnel, Records of Officers, s.v.
"Smith, Joseph." (National Archives Record Groups hereafter 
"NARG.")
10The board's report ("Report on Iron Clad Vessels") 
is reprinted in Report . . . Armored Vessels. 3-7, and in 
Frank Marion Bennett, The Steam Navy of the United States 
(Pittsburgh: W. T. Nicholson Press, 1896; reprinted West­
port, CT: Greenwood Press, 1974), 264-72. The proposals, 
with comments, may be found in National Archives, Record
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The three proposals recommended by the Board varied 
widely. The first design, which became U.S.S. Galena. was 
proposed by Bushnell & Co. of New Haven, Connecticut. The 
Bushnell ship had a conventionally shaped hull with a novel 
system of interlocking armor. Confederate guns easily pene­
trated this light armor in an engagement at Drewry's Bluff 
in the James River during May 1862, and Galena was not a 
success.11 The design proposed by John Ericsson, a low 
freeboard vessel with a single turret, became the Monitor. 
The third, a fully rigged high freeboard ship with a broad­
side battery on the European model, proposed by the firm of 
Merrick & Sons of Philadelphia, became the New Ironsides.
There were four reasons the Ironclad Board accepted 
only these proposals. First, the Board could not evaluate 
some designs because the proposals lacked detail. Although 
some such proposals were apparently from cranks or self­
anointed inventors, others were from respectable firms. The 
Board members apparently felt they did not have time to 
pursue the authors to get the details which should have been
Group 19, Records of the Bureau of Ships, Plan File, Plan 
80-11-3.
nFlag Officer Louis M. Goldsborough wrote to Assis­
tant Secretary of the Navy Gustavus V. Fox, "The Galena has 
turned out precisely as I expected-beneath Naval criti- 
cismt . . . she is a poor stick for an iron clad." Golds­
borough to Fox, May 21, 1862, in Robert Means Thompson and 
Richard Wainwright, eds., Confidential Correspondence of 
Gustavus Vasa Fox Assistant Secretary of the Navy 1861-1865 
(Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1972; reprint of 
1918-19 edition), 1: 272. Bennett, Steam Navy, 272.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
supplied with each proposal.12
Second, the Board had to pick designs with technical 
merit. While they were not naval constructors, they were 
men of long practical experience and could see that some 
designs were not sound. They rejected, for example, William 
Kingsley's theory that projectiles would bounce off the 
rubber-clad vessel he proposed.
Third, Congress appropriated only $1,500,000 for build­
ing ironclads, and some proposals would have invested too 
much of it in a single ship. Shipbuilder Donald McKay of­
fered to build an ironclad for $1,000,000, and Henry R. 
Dunham's design was to cost $1,200,000.13 While these 
ships were probably feasible and McKay at least had a good 
shipbuilding reputation, concentrating all the Union's re­
sources on one ship would noticeably increase the risk to 
the nation. If the chosen design were a technical failure 
or if construction of an ambitious design took too long, the 
consequences would be grave.
Fourth, the Board had to choose builders who had the 
technical and financial ability actually to build the ships 
they proposed. While many proposals came from men with 
shipbuilding or iron-working backgrounds, others came from 
men who had no experience whatsoever to help them translate
12Examples are proposals of W. Perine, J. C. Le Ferre, 
Benjamin Rathburn, Henry Dunham, John Westwood, Neafie & 
Levy, and A. Beebe. Report . . . Armored Vessels. 5-7.
13Ibid., 6.
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their drawing-board designs into wood and metal. Given the 
urgency of the situation, the Board could not afford to 
subsidize a new builder's errors of inexperience.
The Board fully grasped the important point that the 
immediate demands of the war required "vessels invulnerable 
to shot, of light draught of water, to penetrate our shoal 
harbors, rivers and bayous." They advocated the construc­
tion of such ships "before going into a more perfect system 
of large iron-clad sea-going vessels of war," but recommend­
ed the Navy construct seagoing ships later, building on the 
experience obtained from the smaller ships.14
In great part, the Southern coast shaped the Civil War 
at sea. The coast was long and low, penetrated by many 
rivers, bays and inlets. Because it was so shallow, few of 
the rivers and inlets were navigable. The irregularity of 
the coastline and the limitations of visual surveillance 
meant that many ships would be needed to enforce a blockade, 
and shallow water meant that those ships would require shal­
low draft to patrol close enough to shore to be effective.
The Northern blockade problem was not insurmountable 
since the Southern coastal regions were also economically 
behind the North. Materials brought in through the blockade 
would do only local good if they could not readily be moved
to where they were needed. Only seven Southern seaports had
14Ibid., 5. New Ironsides, while at 3,500 tons the
largest of the three, was much smaller than her European
counterparts Gloire (5,600 tons) and Warrior (9,000 tons).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
interstate rail connections. They were Norfolk, Virginia; 
Wilmington, North Carolina; Charleston, South Carolina; 
Savannah, Georgia; Pensacola, Florida; Mobile, Alabama; and 
New Orleans, Louisiana.15 These cities became prime tar­
gets for the Union since closing seven major ports would be 
easier and have more effect than blockading many lesser 
harbors.
After the fall of Fort Sumter in April 1861, General 
Winfield Scott proposed a plan, known to its detractors as 
the "Anaconda Plan," to blockade the Confederate coast and 
advance along the Mississippi River. This strategy aimed to 
cut the Confederacy in two and strangle the commerce upon 
which its economy depended. The Union Navy was to seize 
bases from which to operate, penetrate the interior on the 
rivers and choke off commerce by blockading or capturing 
seaports. The Confederate strategic challenges were to 
maintain commerce and protect the coastline and rivers.
The Confederacy set out to meet these strategic chal­
lenges by building fortifications to protect the coast, 
ironclads to break the blockade, and commerce raiders to
15Bern Anderson, By Sea and By River: The Naval His­
tory of the Civil War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), 15. 
Anderson states six, Norfolk being the exception, but the 
Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad had interstate connections. 
"Mitchell's New Travellers Guide through the United States 
1860," in National Geographic Society, Historical Atlas of 
the United States (Washington: National Geographic Society, 
1988), 197; United States War Department, An Atlas to Accom­
pany the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Ar­
mies 1861-1865 (Washington: GPO, 1891-95; reprinted New 
York: Fairfax Press, 1978), plate 137.
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take the war to the Union. At first the Confederacy em­
ployed privateers, but when European powers closed their 
ports to Confederate prizes and the blockade kept them from 
being sent into Southern ports, Mallory began to commission 
Confederate States Navy vessels as commerce raiders.16 The 
Confederate Army and state troops were given charge of 
coastal defense and ironclad building began in earnest.
Underlying the U.S. Navy's choice of designs was the 
need for haste, which stemmed from the Confederate program 
of ironclad construction. By late 1861 there was "quite a 
panic" about the Confederate ironclads, with no Union ves­
sels yet built to meet them.17 When submitting his propos­
al, each designer had to estimate how long it would take to 
build.18 John Ericsson's vessel was to be completed within 
one hundred days and the Bushnell vessel in four months, the 
shortest periods of the technically acceptable proposals, 
and short construction time was the key factor in Welles'
16Anderson argues that privateering attacks on Union 
shipping were the direct cause of the blockade. Anderson,
By Sea and By River. 25-26. Privateers had to send captured 
ships to prize courts for adjudication; if they did not, in 
law they were pirates. Warships could destroy their prizes.
17Gustavus V. Fox to Mrs. Fox, October 8, 1861. 
Thompson, Correspondence of Fox. 1: 385. Even after Monitor 
fought Virginia the need for additional ironclads was acute­
ly felt; in a letter to Fox dated March 14, 1852, Major 
General George B. McClellan asked, "How soon will the Mystic 
[Bushnell] iron clad ship be finished?" Ibid., 439.
18Report . . . Armored Vessels. 2.
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decision to build the Monitor.19 The Merrick vessel, 
however, would take nine months. Despite the Board's evi­
dent bias in favor of speedy construction, it accepted Mer­
rick & Sons' proposal as well as Ericsson's and Bushnell's.
Despite the claim that the selection of the Merrick 
design "showed that the old officers valued the sailing ship 
as far superior to the steam vessel," the primary reason for 
choosing Merrick & Sons' design was to reduce technological 
risk and ensure that the Union received a combat-effective 
ship.20 The Bushnell proposal was novel, and the Board 
recommended it only if the contractor guaranteed she would 
"float her armor and load sufficiently high, and have sta­
bility enough for a sea vessel."21 The "Ericsson battery" 
was even more novel. The Board was not confident that the 
ship would be "shot and shell proof" as Ericsson stated and 
recommended a guarantee of this quality. Indeed, the Navy
19Two other proposals stipulated four months but could 
not carry their designed gun batteries. One would have re­
quired sixty to seventy-five days, but was for an unarmored 
iron boat, and A. Beebe's one hundred day ship was "defec­
tive." Ibid., 4-7. Stephen C. Thompson, "The Design and 
Construction of USS Monitor," Warship International 27, no.
3 (1990): 224. "As Mallory had felt he must gamble on iron­
clads, so Welles felt he must gamble on Ericsson." John 
Niven, Gideon Welles: Lincoln's Secretary of the Navy (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 368.
20Stephen C. Thompson, "The Construction of the U.S.S. 
Monitor" (unpublished M.A. Thesis, Old Dominion University, 
1987), 17. Thompson's statement that the Board "was reluc­
tant to try anything new" is not supported by their choice 
of two novel designs, Bushnell's and Ericsson's.
21Report . . . Armored Vessels. 6.
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required that the ship be brought "before an enemy's bat­
tery" as a test before finally accepting her.22
The philosophy behind the Merrick design, however, was 
known to be sound, since the British and French had been 
building ironclads on the high freeboard principle for two 
years. The high freeboard design traded increased construc­
tion time and cost for low technological risk. The Merrick 
ship would take three times as long to build as Ericsson's 
vessel, but there was much greater assurance that the re­
sulting ship would be effective in combat, and combat effec­
tiveness was the most important criterion. Despite the com­
pelling urgency Welles had to balance the risk of failure 
inherent in untried designs; according to a recent biogra­
phy, "Above all, as he [Welles] and [Assistant Secretary 
Gustavus V.] Fox struggled to improvise a Navy, they needed 
the proven rather than the experimental."23
This was especially true in light of the prevailing 
rumors about the Virginia. Many believed the Confederate 
ship could ascend the Potomac River and attack Washington, 
and others feared that she would instead put to sea to 
attack seaboard cities such as New York.24 Although more
22Ibid., 5; Baxter, Ironclad Warship. 259. Monitor 
still belonged to her builders when she fought the Virginia.
23Niven, Gideon Welles. 350.
24Welles, Diary. 1: 62-65, for Secretary of War Edwin 
M. Stanton's "almost frantic" reaction to the news of Hamp­
ton Roads. Welles later called men in New York "the most 
easily terrified and panic-stricken of any community."
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
13
sober minds assessed Virginia's draft and saw that she could 
not reach Washington without going aground, her seagoing 
qualities were untried. Little could be said other than 
that the steam frigate Merrimack, from which Virginia had 
been converted, was a seagoing vessel.25 Since it was en­
tirely plausible that she could be formidable on the open 
sea, a secondary tradeoff for Welles was therefore seagoing 
qualities and draft for risk.26 In seagoing qualities the 
high freeboard but deeper draft broadside design was again 
the known quantity, while shallower draft favored the novel 
and untried Ericsson and Bushnell designs.
Merrick & Sons, who proposed the New Ironsides, was a 
Philadelphia firm well known for building marine steam 
engines. Samuel Merrick first became associated with the 
steam Navy in 1839, when he and his partner John Towne, 
doing business as Merrick & Towne, built the engines for the 
sidewheeler U.S.S. Mississippi. Merrick & Towne also built 
the Ericsson-designed engines for the U.S.S. Princeton. the 
U.S. Navy's first propeller-driven steamer, and later, en­
gines for the screw steamer U.S.S. San Jacinto. The firm
Ibid., entry for September 11, 1862, 1: 123.
25The Merrimack class frigates were well-regarded for 
seagoing qualities. John D. Alden, "Born Forty Years Too 
Soon," American Neptune 22, no. 4 (October 1962): 252-53.
2SWelles received reports that "she could not venture
outside, and was to be used in Hampton Roads, and the river 
Chesapeake." This part of his Diary was written retrospec­
tively and his low opinion of Virginia's seaworthiness may 
have been strengthened by hindsight. Welles, Diary. 1: 65.
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built its first Navy machinery under the Merrick & Son name 
in 1854 for the U.S.S. Wabash. The Merricks continued with 
machinery for the U.S.S. Wyoming in 1858, and in 1861 built 
engines for U.S.S. Miami. Tuscarora. and Mononqahela.27
Since Merrick & Sons had no building ways, the firm 
planned to subcontract the hull to William Cramp and Sons, 
also of Philadelphia.28 Merrick & Sons tendered their pro­
posal to the Navy on September 3, 1861, offering to complete 
their vessel in nine months for $780,000.29
A prime mover of the Merrick proposal was Barnabas H. 
Bartol, Superintendent of the Southwark Foundry. Bartol was 
born in Freeport, Maine, on October 31, 1816. After an 
apprenticeship with the West Point Foundry and an attempt in 
1837 to start his own business, Bartol returned to West 
Point in 1838 and became Superintendent there in 1839. He 
became Superintendent at Southwark in 1847. R. G. Dun
27Bennett, Steam Navy. Appendix B.
28[J. Vaughn Merrick], "Editorial. The U.S.S. Armored 
Frigate New Ironsides," Journal of the Franklin Institute of 
the State of Pennsylvania for the Promotion of the Mechanic 
Arts (hereafter Journal of the Franklin Institute!. 3d ser., 
53, no. 2 (February 1867): 79; Augustus C. Buell, The Mem­
oirs of Charles H. Cramp (Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott 
Company, 1906), 68.
29Merrick & Sons to Smith, September 3, 1861. Nation­
al Archives, Record Group 71, Bureau of Yards and Docks, 
Entry 5, Miscellaneous Letters Received, Box 447, 1: 54̂ . 
September 3 was the deadline. Baxter, Ironclad Warship.
254.
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called Bartol "a man of great practical skill."30
Merrick & Sons later credited Bartol with originating 
the New Ironsides design, but it was quite similar to the 
French ironclad Gloire (Figures 1 and 2).31 The internal 
arrangements were also similar.32 Like Gloire. the Merrick 
design called for a high freeboard wooden hull armored with 
iron, carrying a broadside battery, and equipped with sail 
and steam power.
A comparison shows the close resemblance between New 
Ironsides and Gloire and their British contemporary, H.M.S. 
Warrior, but also shows some of the sacrifices made in the 
New Ironsides design in pursuit of the Navy's requirement 
for shallow draft. Although shallow draft was needed to 
operate in the coastal waters of the Confederacy, as with 
all warship designs the exaggeration of one characteristic 
required the compromise of others. A later analysis noted
30In 1863 Bartol was elected to the Board of Managers 
of the Franklin Institute. He left Merrick & Sons in Janu­
ary 1867 and died February 10, 1888. W. P. Tatham, Wm. Sel­
lers and Washington Jones, "Obituary. Barnabas H. Bartol," 
Journal of the Franklin Institute 125, no. 6 (June 1888): 
499-503. For Dun comment of June 10, 1857, Harvard Univer­
sity, Baker Library, R. G. Dun Collection, Pennsylvania 135: 
138.
31[Merrick], "U.S.S. New Ironsides," 79. It is doubt­
ful that Bartol had the shipbuilding knowledge to do the 
hull design (for which Charles H. Cramp later claimed cred­
it), but he was an excellent choice for arranging the armor.
32Plans of Gloire are reprinted in Andrew Lambert, 
Warrior: The World's First Ironclad Then and Now (Annapolis: 
United States Naval Institute Press, 1987), 42-43, 68-71.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
16
the disadvantages imposed on a shallow-draft vessel:
1st. Her lines must be more full (other things 
being equal), and hence more difficult of propulsion 
and of manageability. 2dly. Her screw must be 
smaller, and therefore less effective as an instru­
ment of propulsion. 3dly. Her hull must be more 
strengthened owing to lack of depth, and must, 
therefore, be heavier. . . .33
Table 1.— Comparison of New Ironsides. Gloire, and 
Warrior












































Sources: New Ironsides from "Statistical Data," ORN 2d ser.
1: 159 and manuscript sources. Gloire and Warrior from 
Robert Gardiner, ed. Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships 
1860-1905. United States Naval Institute Press edition.
(New York: Mayflower Press, 1979), 286, 7. Length is be­
tween perpendiculars; beam is overall; tons are long tons.
33[Merrick], "U.S.S. New Ironsides," 76. See Oscar 
Parkes, British Battleships Warrior to Vanguard: A History 
of Design. Construction and Armament (Hamden, CT: Archon 
Books, 1970), 115-16, for the design compromises forced upon 
the British in a shallow-draft ironclad.
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Figure 1. U.S.S. New Ironsides outboard profile. (From BuShips Plan 107-9-12L, 
redrawn by William J. Jurens.) The lettered stations correspond to the similarly 


















Figure 2. French Ironclad La Gloire outboard profile. (From Transactions of the 
Institution of Naval Architects 2, 1861)
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The proposed vessel was wooden hulled, 230 feet long 
at the water line and 56 feet in extreme beam. Her depth of 
hold was 24 feet 9 inches and her draft exclusive of her 
keel beam was fourteen feet. She was a three-decked vessel, 
with a spar deck (the highest, and the only weather deck), a 
gun deck and a berth deck above her hold (Figures 3 through 
5). She had six feet clear between decks.34
The woodwork of the hull was of white oak, based on a 
keel eighteen inches wide and twelve inches deep. The mas­
sive framing timbers of the sides tapered from fourteen 
inches deep at the turn of the bilge to six inches at the 
edge of the spar deck. The spaces between the frames were 
filled in solidly with wood, and this "filling" was then 
caulked to make it watertight.35 The wooden filling was 
intended to be white pine but was later changed to oak.36
Hull planking was then installed over the outside of
34The Merrick proposal is in NARG 19, Plan 107-9-12-H. 
The specifications "as proposed" are taken therefrom. The 
contract specifications are identical. National Archives, 
Record Group 71, Entry 42, Contracts and Bonds 1861, 269-95, 
is the contract for the New Ironsides.
3sFor a description of wooden shipbuilding of the pe­
riod, see John W. Watson, "The Building of the Ship,"
Harper7s New Monthly Magazine 24 (April 1862): 608-20.
36Charles H. Cramp designed the hull. He later stat­
ed, "With the exception of pine decking every stick of tim­
ber was of white oak." Buell, Cramp. 63. This address was 
apparently made on December 14, 1897, to the Contemporary 
Club of Philadelphia, where George E. Belknap also spoke. A 
typescript of Cramp's address is in the Belknap papers. 
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Naval Historical 
Foundation Collection, Papers of Rear Admiral George E. 
Belknap, Box 2; hereafter "Cramp, [Contemporary Club]."
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Figure 4. U.S.S. New Ironsides Berth Deck and Hold Plans. (From BuShips Plans 















14. Hatch to Magazine Psg
15. Hatch to Shell Room
16. Hatch to Sail Room Psg
17. Hatch to Bread Room Psg
18. Hatch to Hold
19. Chain Pipe
20. Engineers Mess Stores




25. 1st Asst Eng SR
26. Asst Eng SR
27. Chief Eng SR
28. Master SR
2 9. Paymaster SR
30. Surgeon SR
31. Stateroom
32. 4th LT SR
33. 3rd LT SR
34. 2nd LT SR
35. 1st LT SR
36. Midshipmen Berth









46. Hatch to Wardroom Stores
47. Hatch to Captain's Stores
48. Hatch to Magazine Passage
49. Hatch to Shell Room
50. Light
51. Steerage Pantry
52. Hatch to Spirit Room
53. Hatch to Hold
54. Hatch to Paymasters Stores










65. 1200 gallon tank





71. 721 gallon tank
72. 890 gallon tank









82. XI-inch gun carriage
83. Hold
Figure 5. U.S.S. New Ironsides Deck Plans (Key). (William 
J. Jurens.)
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the frames. This planking was also white oak, five inches 
thick. The first plank below the iron plating was nine 
inches thick at the top, tapering to five at the bottom, to 
fair the joint between the iron and the unarmored hull.37 
The total thickness of oak behind the armor, both hull 
planking and filling, varied from eleven inches just under 
the spar deck to about sixteen at the water line.
Inside the filling were two sets of iron braces, com­
monly used in wooden shipbuilding to strengthen the hull.38 
One set, at an angle of 45 degrees, was let flush into the 
frames; the other, at right angles to the first, lay on top 
of them. The braces were bolted to each frame and rivetted 
to each other where they crossed.
The armor arrangement was that later known as "belt 
and battery." It included a belt of iron extending entirely 
around the ship from four feet below to three feet above the 
designed load line, which was the fourteen foot waterline. 
The first plate below the waterline was 4% inches thick, and 
the second, or lower, plate, three inches thick. Above the 
seventeen foot line, the armor extended 170 feet only, or 85
37Cramp's paper stated twelve inches at the top, ta­
pering to five at the turn of the bilge. Buell, Cramp. 65.
38Watson, "Building of the Ship," 612, for description 
and diagram. See also NARG 19, BuShips Plan 80-11-3. The 
braces, made of iron bars 4% inches wide and 3/4 inch thick, 
ran from six inches below the plank sheer to the turn of the 
bilge, with the ends on every third frame.
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feet each way from the center of the ship.39
All the armor above the load line was to be "plates 
forged of best American Scrap iron of 4% inches thickness, 
fifteen feet long and 28 inches wide." Each plate was 
grooved on all four edges, one inch deep and 1\ inches wide; 
as the armor was installed, tongue pieces of iron (Figure 6) 
were placed in these grooves, "so as to connect the several 
plates as one in their resistance to shot."40
Figure 6. Tongued and Grooved Armor (Side View)
Although tonguing and grooving appeared to be a good 
idea, it actually weakened the armor. The interlocking
39Admiral John A. Dahlgren erred when he said, "the 
iron plating is not carried around the stern." Dahlgren to 
Welles, November 5, 1863, ORN 15: 99. The waterline was 
completely armored. George E. Belknap, "Reminiscent of the 
'New Ironsides' Off Charleston," United Service Magazine, 
o.s., 1 (January 1879): 63.
40A sketch appears in a report of the Merrick propos­
al, NARG 19, BuShips Plan 80-11-3.
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plates transmitted the effects of a blow and let a single 
shot damage more than one plate. It also made the replace­
ment of damaged plates very difficult, since to replace a 
plate in a lower tier the plates above it had to be removed. 
J. D. A. Samuda, a prominent British builder of iron ships, 
argued cogently against tonguing and grooving as early as 
March 186l.41 Definitive British experiments were not 
conducted until October 1861 and the report of them not 
issued until March 1862, so the results were probably not 
known in the United States in time to affect the detailed 
armor design for the New Ironsides.42
The armor was attached with screws (Figure 7) with 
countersunk heads, which did not extend through the wooden 
hull.43 On the monitors the armor was attached with bolts 
that passed completely through the "sandwich" of laminated 
armor. British practice employed through bolts, while the
41Lambert, Warrior, 68-69; J. D. A. Samuda, in dis­
cussing J. Scott Russell's paper, March 1, 1861, "On the 
Professional Problem Presented to Naval Architects in the 
Construction of Iron-Cased Vessels of War," Transactions of 
the Institution of Naval Architects (hereafter Transactions 
INA) 2 (1861): 85-86.
42See Edward W. Very, "The Development of Armor for 
Naval Use," Proceedings of the United States Naval Insti­
tute (hereafter Proceedings USNU 9, no. 3 (July 1883): 424- 
26; Baxter, Ironclad Warship. 203. A brief item about the 
experiments ran in London Times. November 29, 1861: 7.
43Belknap, "Reminiscent of the 'New Ironsides'," 63; 
[Merrick], "U.S.S. New Ironsides," 77.
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French used screws.44 The spar deck was made of iron






Figure 7. U.S.S. New Ironsides Midships Section and sec­
tional drawing of armor arrangement. (Merrick & Sons draw­
ing of January 1862; Edward Very drawing from "Development 
of Armor for Naval Use," Proceedings USNI 9 (1883): 390; 
redrawn by William J. Jurens.)
covered with three inches of yellow pine planking.
The battery was located on the gun deck, the middle
44Baxter, Ironclad Warship. 97; Lambert, Warrior. 76; 
Very, "Development of Armor," 380-81, Alvah Folsom Hunter, A 
Year on a Monitor and the Destruction of Fort Sumter, Craig 
L. Symonds, ed. (Columbia: University of South Carolina 
Press, 1987), 51-53. The contract specified screws passing 
from within the hull out into the armor "where there is 
nothing to prevent," but an 1863 sketch confirms the heads 
were outside, and Very's article concurs. Carpenter Thomas 
H. Bishop to Turner, September 9, 1863, ORN 14: 555; Very, 
"Development of Armor," 390-91.
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deck of the three. Charles Cramp later stated that when the 
ship was conceived, he specified that the battery was to 
consist of VUI-inch guns. The Model 1845 VUI-inch shell 
gun, a smoothbore muzzle-loader which was not a Dahlgren 
design, was apparently the gun he intended to use.
By the time Merrick & Sons submitted their proposal to 
the Navy, the VIII-inch guns had been superseded by the much 
more effective IX-inch Dahlgrens. Merrick & Sons proposed 
battery of sixteen IX-inch Dahlgrens weighed 76 tons, com­
pared to 56 tons for an equal number of VUI-inch guns, and 
needed more men than the 165 intended for the VUI-inch bat­
tery. Since the size of the crew allowed for the ship was 
based upon the size and composition of the battery, the 
crew's accommodations were designed for 200 men.45
In her single screw reciprocating engine propulsion 
plant the proposed vessel was little different in broad from 
the European ships. The machinery, duplicating what Merrick 
& Sons built for the 1858 sloop of war Wyoming. was to drive
45[Merrick], "U.S.S. New Ironsides," 78. United States 
Navy Department, Bureau of Ordnance, Ordnance Instructions 
for the United States Navy (Washington: GPO, 1866), Appendix 
A, vi; Warren Ripley, Artillery and Ammunition of the Civil 
War (New York: Promontory Press, 1970), 102-103. In 19th 
Century convention, a Roman numeral designating caliber 
indicated a smoothbore gun, an Arabic numeral a rifled gun. 
For specification of 200 men, NARG 71, Entry 42, 280. Cap­
tain Thomas Turner mentioned "160 men, the complement of the 
ship originally intended." Turner to Welles, August 27,
1862, quoted in Report . . . Armored Vessels. 30.
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the ship at 9% knots.46 New Ironsides had two horizontal 
reciprocating engines, each with a cylinder of fifty inches 
diameter and thirty inches stroke, driving a single shaft of 
ten inches diameter. One double surface condenser mounted 
between the engines served them both. Her brass screw was 
twelve feet in diameter, smaller than normal but all that 
could be accommodated on her limited draft.47 New Iron­
sides had a clutch coupling to permit disconnecting the 
screw propeller from the engines. A disconnecting propeller 
was common since allowing the propeller to turn freely re­
duced its drag when the ship was under sail.48
As was usual at the time, little auxiliary machinery 
was provided.49 There were two boiler feed water pumps, 
two air pumps, two condenser seawater circulating pumps, and
4SThe duplication of Wyoming7s machinery, which Cramp 
found very useful, is explicit in Merrick & Sons7 proposal. 
NARG 19, BuShips Plan 80-11-3; Cramp, [Contemporary Club],
9. Drawings of Wyoming7 s machinery are in NARG 19, BuShips 
Plans, Bureau of Steam Engineering alphabetical file, s.v. 
Wyoming (hereafter "Wyoming plans").
47The screw fitted to H.M.S. Warrior was 2476" in dia­
meter. Lambert, Warrior, 110.
48Some propellers could be hoisted, such as Wyoming7s. 
NARG 19, Wyoming Plans. New Ironsides7 clutch coupling was 
exercised at anchor but never disconnected at sea; with her 
bad sailing characteristics she would have made no headway 
under sail alone even with her full rig. See also Robert 
Murray, Rudimentary Treatise on Marine Engines and Steam 
Vessels. together with Practical Remarks on the Screw and 
Propelling Power, as used in the Royal and Merchant Navy, 
3d. ed. (London: John Weale Architectural Library, 1858).
49Warrior was fitted with steam pumps only. Parkes, 
British Battleships. 20.
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two bilge pumps, one of each driven from each main engine.
In addition, there were two auxiliary engines, each fitted 
to power a forced draft blower via a belt drive. A salt 
water auxiliary pump provided salt water to pump bilges, 
wash decks, extinguish fires, supply the distilling plant 
and furnish emergency feed to the boilers.50
The four boilers (Figure 8) were of the horizontal 
fire-tube type, in which tubes slanting up at a slight angle 
to the horizontal carry the hot gases from the firebox to 
the smoke pipe, thus heating the water which surrounds them. 
They were placed facing each other forward of the main en­
gines. The hydrostatic test pressure was 50 pounds per 
square inch, and the working pressure normally between 20 
and 25 pounds per square inch.51
Each boiler, seventeen feet wide and eleven feet deep, 
had six coal furnaces, and all four boilers were connected
50The contract specified two pumps but only one was 
provided. Commodore Stephen C. Rowan to Dahlgren, August 1, 
1863, Library of Congress, Papers of Stephen Clegg Rowan, 
"Copies of Letters written by S. C. Rowan, U.S. Navy, from 
Feby 22, 1854 to Jan 21, 1880, and transferred, Jany 18/82, 
from various Letter Books," 138; NARG 71, Entry 42, 287.
The pump was to be driven by one of the blower engines, but 
the ship's engineering log and the Wyoming Plans show it had 
its own engine. A second pump was installed in 1864.
51Each steamer in the U.S. Navy kept a "steam log," 
containing pressure and temperature readings for machinery 
and remarks about the Engineering Department. New Iron­
sides' logs show boiler pressures from 10 to 26 pounds. On 
August 31, 1862, 30 and 37 pounds are recorded, the only 
time pressures greater than 26 pounds were logged. National 
Archives, Record Group 19, Entry 1072, Steam Log of the U.S. 
Steamer New Ironsides.
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to the same smoke pipe.52 A single auxiliary boiler could 
be used when the main boilers were secured. The main
Figure 8. Main Boiler of U.S.S. New Ironsides. (Historical 
Society of Pennsylvania, Dr. A. C. Bining Collection.)
boilers could be fed with fresh water, which would dramati­
cally reduce the amount of scale formed in them, decrease
S2The boilers are described in [Merrick], "U.S.S. New 
Ironsides," 77. These dimensions differ from the contract 
but agree with an advertisement of August 1869 (Figure 8) 
which shows a rectangular boiler with the uptake at one end 
of the firing front and six furnace doors; the Steam Log 
confirms six furnaces. The four uptakes together make a 
complete circle to form the base of the smoke pipe. "Adve­
rtisement for One or More (4 in all) Horizontal Tubular 
Boilers," Dr. A. C. Bining Collection, The Historical Soci­
ety of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia; NARG 19, Wyoming Plans.
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the maintenance required and increase their efficiency. In 
service, however, main and auxiliary boilers were fed with 
salt water. The reason appears to be that the distilling 
plant, large by contemporary standards, had a nominal capa­
city of 500 gallons per day. With the ship able to make 500 
gallons per day for a crew of more than 400 men, there was 
little surplus fresh water for the boilers.53
After the Ironclad Board made its report on September 
16, 1861, the Navy began to negotiate with the three firms 
who were recommended. The Bureau of Construction, Equipment 
and Repair was normally responsible for building Navy ships, 
but Welles gave the responsibility for the first ironclads 
to Commodore Smith's Bureau of Yards and Docks, apparently 
due to Smith's connection with the Board.
Joseph Smith was born March 30, 1790, in Hanover, Mas­
sachusetts. He entered the Navy in 1809 and served in the 
Battle of Lake Champlain during the War of 1812. He later 
commanded U.S.S. Ohio, a sailing ship-of-the-line and, from 
1843 to 1845, the Mediterranean Squadron. From 1846 until 
1869 he was Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks.54
Despite his age and long experience in sailing ships, 
Smith proved receptive to new ideas and made many well
S3The salinometer readings confirm that in service the 
main boilers were fed with sea water. NARG 19, Entry 1072, 
Steam Log of New Ironsides, various dates.
54Smith retired in 1869 and died January 17, 1877.
DAB, s.v. "Smith, Joseph."
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considered suggestions during the construction not only of 
New Ironsides but of Monitor and Galena, the other two iron­
clads built by the Bureau of Yards and Docks.55 As Welles 
wrote later about the Monitor. but in terms applicable to 
all three ships, "Admiral Smith beyond any other person is 
deserving of credit, if credit be due any one connected with 
the Navy Department for this vessel."56
Merrick & Sons chose William Cramp's shipbuilding firm 
to build their vessel. The two firms were of similar age 
but had markedly different financial reputations. Merrick & 
Sons' founder, Samuel V. Merrick, was born in Hallowell, 
Maine, on May 4, 1801. During the 1820s he built hand-oper­
ated fire engines with John Agnew under the name of S. V. 
Merrick & Company. By 1835 the firm was called the Franklin 
Works. Merrick and Agnew continued to make fire engines but 
in 1837 they built a foundry and added steam engines to 
their line.
Merrick established the Southwark Foundry in 1839 in 
partnership with John H. Towne, doing business as Merrick & 
Towne until Towne left in 1849. By 1854 Samuel Merrick had 
taken his son into the firm.57 In 1857, the credit rating
55For some of his correspondence with Ericsson, Thomp­
son, "Design and Construction," 224-27.
56Welles, Diary, entry for January 3, 1863, 1: 214.
57DAB: Appleton's Cyclopaedia. s.v. "Merrick, Samuel 
V." Bruce Sinclair, Philadelphia's Philosopher Mechanics: A 
History of the Franklin Institute 1824-1865 (Baltimore and 
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 290-91.
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firm of R. G. Dun noted, "Each department has its efficient 
& reliable foreman, which renders the estate one of the best 
conducted in the country."58
By 1859 Merrick & Son had become Merrick & Sons.59 
Even after Samuel Merrick retired, the business prospered.
In May 1861, R. G. Dun called the company "one of the best 
in the line." Their wharf near the Navy Yard facilitated 
their "great deal of work for the Gov't."60 Merrick & Sons' 
machinery was well known in the pre-Civil War Navy, and this 
cannot have hurt their efforts to secure Government con­
tracts .61
Unlike the Merrick firm, Cramps' establishment had not 
always been sound. William Cramp, born September 22, 1807, 
in Philadelphia, founded his shipbuilding company at 23 and 
took his sons in they came of age.62 The business failed in
SSR. G. Dun Collection, Pennsylvania 135: 138.
“According to DAB. Samuel Merrick retired from the
firm in 1860. The Dun records indicate he withdrew on Janu­
ary 7, 1861. R. G. Dun Collection, Pennsylvania 135: 138.
Samuel Merrick died August 18, 1870.
60Ibid., Pennsylvania 135: 138; 131: 233. By January 
1862, the partners were J. Vaughn Merrick, W. H. Merrick, 
John E. Cope and Hartley Merrick. For a letterhead, Nation­
al Archives, Record Group 19, Entry 61, Letters Received by 
the Bureau of Construction and Repair, Box 1, 2: 54.
“During the Civil War, Merrick built engines for the 
sidewheeler Miami, the monitors Tonawanda and Yazoo, and six 
screw steamers, as well as New Ironsides. Bennett, Steam 
Navy. Appendix B.
“William Cramp remained president of the firm until 
his death July 6, 1879. DAB, s.v. "Cramp, William."
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1855. Cramp and his sons, Charles H. and William M. Cramp, 
continued it, successfully enough that by 1862 they could 
make a 50 percent settlement with William Cramp's old credi­
tors. By 1863, they were doing business as William Cramp 
and Sons, with a capital of $100,000 and, as the Dun firm 
noted, "as much work as they can get through." They made 
$60,000 profit on New Ironsides, the first of their many 
ships for the Navy.63
Charles H. Cramp designed New Ironsides. Born in 
Philadelphia on May 9, 1828, he was William Cramp's eldest 
son. He joined his father's shipyard in 1846 after an ap­
prenticeship in the shipyard of his uncle John Byerly.64 He 
stated after the war, "The design, plans and specifications 
of hull complete had been made by me in connection with Mr. 
B. H. Bartol. ..." He wrote about his extremely conserva­
tive design philosophy when he said he provided against 
exceeding the required fifteen foot draft, "by allowing a 
foot for a margin. The draught was not to exceed fifteen 
feet; I allowed for fourteen feet. . . ."65
63For founding, The William Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine 
Building Company, Cramp's Shipyard founded by William Cramp 
1830 (Philadelphia: The William Cramp and Sons Ship and 
Engine Building Company, 1910), 13. For bankruptcy, recov­
ery and profit, R. G. Dun Collection, Pennsylvania 141: 70.
64Charles H. Cramp became president of the firm in 
1879 and remained as president or chairman until he died 
June 6, 1913. DAB, s.v. "Cramp, Charles Henry."
65Cramp, [Contemporary Club], 6. Cramp said he re­
ceived "much credit and congratulation from the Board and 
others for my foresight in allowing the margin as I did, and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
35
After negotiations in September, Merrick & Sons signed 
the contract for their ship on October 15, and with that act 
took the first step towards the seagoing ironclad United 
States Navy.66
for the correctness of my calculations."
“Smith to Merrick & Sons, September 24, 1861, Na­
tional Archives, Record Group 45, Entry 464, Office of Naval 
Records and Library (ONRL), Subject File, U.S. Navy 1775- 
1910, AD— Design and General Characteristics 1860-1910, 
Ironclads, Box 51, typescript marked Naval War Records 
(NWR), 2634: 28. For execution, Merrick & Sons to Smith, 
October 21, 1861, NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 447, 2: 7. The 
contract imposed a $500 penalty on Merrick & Sons for each 
day the ship's completion was delayed beyond July 15, 1862.
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CHAPTER THREE 
CONSTRUCTION HISTORZ AND DESIGN EVOLUTION
Once the contract was signed, construction of "the 
Merrick vessel" could begin. Though the idea of armor pro­
tection was old, its practical application was still so new 
there was no consensus on how to solve the myriad of de­
tailed construction problems an armored vessel would encoun­
ter.1 Compounding the difficulty of designing a successful 
ironclad was the then-primitive state of hydrodynamics.2 
Since ironclad ships had never engaged in combat, there was 
no way to winnow sound practices of armored construction 
from unsound ones, and seemingly insignificant details could 
have far-reaching impact. It was inevitable there would be 
delays, false starts and second thoughts.
Merrick & Sons subcontracted the hull to William Cramp
Compare the armor arrangements of Galena, New Iron­
sides. Monitor and the later Keokuk. Report . . ♦ Armored 
Vessels. 4-7; Very, "Development of Armor," 389-90, 396-97.
2The design of ships7 hulls and machinery was based on 
experience and rules of thumb. William Froude7s pioneering 
work in model testing did not begin until 1870. New Ency­
clopedia Britannica. 1988 ed., s.v. "Froude, William."
36
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within a week after signing the primary contract.3 The 
Navy participated in the design, since Naval Constructor 
Henry Hoover, the Chief Constructor at the Philadelphia Navy 
Yard, prepared the details of laying the ship down. His 
specifications included some timbers that were only avail­
able at the Navy Yard, and Bartol requested authority for 
Cramp to buy them from the Government.4
Cramps' first challenge was scarcity of timber for the 
hull. Charles Cramp stated that when he contracted for the 
ship, there was no white oak timber available outside of 
Pennsylvania. All the timber "was growing in the forests" 
when the contract was signed. The ship's frames were unusu­
ally heavy and the large trees needed to make them were hard 
to find. In October 1861 Cramps advertised for timber, of­
fering a dollar per running foot for suitable trees. This 
brought in enough heavy timber to construct the ship's 
frame.5 Although haste and shortages dictated the use of 
unseasoned timber, the ship's long-term future was mortgaged 
since green timber decayed faster than seasoned wood.
3Bartol to Smith, no date, received October 19, 1861, 
and marked "Private." NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 5, 2: 78.
4Ibid. Hoover's participation is confirmed in Bartol 
to Smith, October 21, 1861, ibid., 2: 79. This does not 
invalidate Cramp's claim to have designed the hull; Hoover 
probably took Cramp's design and worked out details of what 
piece of wood should go where.
5Curved pieces for the futtocks were also hard to 
locate, and they were made primarily from roots from Dela­
ware. Cramp, [Contemporary Club], 4.
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Smith chose two experienced officers to supervise the 
construction. On November 14, 1861, he appointed Hoover and 
Chief Engineer William W. W. Wood as inspectors. Wood was 
to oversee the engineering plant and the armor while Hoover 
dealt with the remainder. Hoover was already at the Phila­
delphia Navy Yard, and Wood reported for duty November 6.®
The Government made regular progress payments to Mer­
rick & Sons. Despite their solvency, Merrick & Sons' could 
not finance the construction of the vessel from their own 
resources.7 Progress payments (best considered as advances 
against the final contract price) relieved the contractor of 
much of the financial burden of constructing the ship.
The Government paid the Merricks every two weeks be­
ginning in December 1862, and one of the inspectors' duties 
was to certify that the contractor's bills were correct.
The usual increment for payment was $50,000, but the Govern­
ment reserved 25 percent of each, or $12,500, in case the
sSmith to Hoover, November 14, 1861, NARG 45, Entry
464, Subject File, AD— Ironclads, Box 51, typescript, NWR,
2634: 92. Smith to Wood, ibid., 2634: 93. Smith requested 
Wood in October. Smith to Welles, October 9, 1861, National 
Archives, Record Group 45, Microfilm Entry M518, Letters
Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Navy Department
Bureaus, 1861, 3: 62; Wood to Smith, November 6, 1861, NARG
71, Entry 5, Box 445, 14.
7In April 1864 Merrick & Sons were worth $700,000. R. 
G. Dun Collection, Pennsylvania 135: 320. The value of the 
New Ironsides contract was thus more than the firm's entire 
assets during roughly this period. Cramps' firm, with less 
capital, needed its share of the progress payments passed on 
from Merrick & Sons even more.
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vessel did not meet the contract specifications.8 This 25 
percent reservation was normal practice for Government ship 
and engine contracts and did not show unusual concern for 
the success of the ironclads.
Merrick & Sons undoubtedly needed the money from the 
progress payments. When the Navy Agent in Philadelphia re­
fused on a technicality to pay one draft, W. H. Merrick 
wrote Smith, "Excuse me for thus troubling you but in thin 
times money is a desireable [sic] article."9 Merrick &
Sons later claimed the Government's delay in making progress 
payments delayed the ship's completion.10 Their claim is 
believable considering the great increase in the price of 
labor and materials brought about by the War.
Shipbuilders, like all other businessmen, were drama­
tically affected by wartime inflation. Charles Cramp, 
commenting on its effects, said that when the contract was 
made, wages for shipwrights were $1.75 per day, and in less
8For duties, Smith to Hoover, November 14, 1861, NARG 
45, Entry 464, Subject File, AD— Ironclads, Box 51, type­
script, NWR, 2634: 92. Smith to Wood, ibid., 2634: 93. For 
contract provisions, National Archives, Record Group 71, 
Entry 48, Contract Ledger for Iron Clads 1861-62, 11-12; 
NARG 71, Entry 42, 269.
9W. H. Merrick to Smith, January 6, 1862, NARG 71, 
Entry 5, Box 447, 3: 8.
10Smith's endorsement on Merrick & Sons to Welles, No­
vember 13, 1862: "The Contractors aver that the Govm't did
not pay them as provided in the Contract and therefore they 
were delayed in the work." Ibid., Box 448, 2: 159. Late 
payments by the Treasury retarded the Monitor. Baxter,
Ironclad Warship. 267.
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than two months they rose to $3.00 per day. He ordered all 
the copper sheathing and bolts the day after signing the 
contract at 29 cents per pound; in four months copper was up 
to 60 cents per pound. Materials in general, he said, rose 
from 50 to 100 percent before the ship was finished.11
Another of Cramp's problems was hiring enough skilled 
labor. As Charles Cramp later stated, "Nearly all the 
skilled workmen and ship-wrights here had gone into the Navy 
Yard. ..."  Many ship carpenters and other men came from 
Baltimore and Maine.12
The iron armor was forged by two Pennsylvania firms, 
half by Bailey, Brown & Co. of Pittsburgh and half by the 
Bristol Forge Co., of Bristol.13 Bailey, Brown had been 
doing business since at least 1846, and R. G. Dun rated them 
as a "safe good house" with very good credit.14
During this period, large iron plates could be
uCharles H. Cramp, quoted in Buell, Cramp. 69.
“Cramp, [Contemporary Club], 5. Cramp asserts many 
men "left their home to avoid conscription and to secure the 
high rates of wages paid here." Since the draft had not yet 
begun, he apparently confused this with a later period.
“[Merrick], "New Ironsides," 79.
14R. G. Dun Collection, Pennsylvania 5: 90. John H. 
Brown of Bailey, Brown wrote to John Covode, a Pennsylvania 
Republican Congressman, that despite New Ironsides they were 
not invited to bid on plates for Roanoke. He complained, 
"Pennsy* is nowhere, and New York gets the work at an extra­
vagant figure." Brown to Covode, May 17, 1862, in National 
Archives, Record Group 19, Entry 71, Miscellaneous Letters 
Received by the Chief of the Bureau of Construction and 
Repair, 2: 183.
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produced either by rolling or by forging (hammering). In 
each method, the starting point was a red hot stack of iron 
about twice the desired thickness. The stack was pressure- 
welded by rollers or a hammer into a single mass and simul­
taneously compressed to the finished thickness.15 The two 
processes produced a similar product but had different ad­
vantages. Forging was slow, manpower intensive and expen­
sive, but at the time could produce a thicker and larger 
plate.16 Rolling was faster and cheaper and if properly 
done made a more uniform plate, though it required several 
trips through the rollers to reduce the thickness gradually.
Existing rolling machinery was limited. First, wide 
plates required long rollers, which had a tendency to 
"spring" or separate in the middle. The resulting plates 
were uneven, thicker in the middle than at the sides.17 
Second, the wider and thicker the desired plate, the greater 
the total force required from the machine and the more
15Very, "Development of Armor," 560-66. For a de­
scription of forging and iron-clad construction, A. H. 
Guernsey, "Iron-Clad Vessels," Harper's New Monthly Magazine 
25, no. 148 (September 1862): 433-46.
16Isherwood and Lenthall to Welles, March 17, 1862, 
discusses plates. National Archives, Record Group 19, Entry 
49, Letters Sent by the Chief of the Bureau of Construction 
and Repair to the Secretary of the Navy, Book 0144, 377; re­
printed in U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Conduct of 
the War, Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the 
War. "Light Draught Monitors," 38th Cong., 2d Sess., 1865, 
110-12.
17Testimony of Chief Engineer Eben Hoyt before the 
Joint Committee, ibid., 34.
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expensive and specialized it had to be. Since "such masses 
of rolled iron are not used in private business," machinery 
to roll solid four-inch plates was practically nonexistent 
in the United States.18 Charles Cramp stated that the 
plates for the New Ironsides, "which could now [1897] be 
rolled in many mills and be considered light work, were then 
looked upon as marvels of heavy forging."19 Accordingly, 
the plates for which Merrick contracted were forged. Once 
hammered to the correct thickness, the plates were straight­
ened and their sides and ends planed and slotted.20
New Ironsides' solid plates contrasted with the 
laminated armor used by Ericsson in his Monitor design.
There were two reasons for Ericsson's choice of laminated 
armor. First, he could obtain thin (one inch) plates more 
rapidly than thick ones, and speed of construction was a
18Isherwood and Lenthall to Welles, March 17, 1862. 
NARG 19, Entry 49, Book 0144, 377. Several letters attest 
to interest in heavy rolled plating: Smith to A.S. Winslow, 
March 27, 1862, NARG 45, Entry 464, Subject File, AD— Iron­
clads, Box 51, typescript, NWR, 2634: 239; Smith to C.W. 
Whitney, December 6, 1861, ibid., 2634: 124; Brown & Co. to 
Welles, June 6, 1862, National Archives, Record Group 45, 
Microfilm Entry M124, Miscellaneous Letters Received by the 
Secretary of the Navy, Roll 409: 112.
19Cramp, [Contemporary Club], 9.
20Very, "Development of Armor," 562. For tools used, 
James Fletcher, "On Improvements in Heavy Tools for General 
Engineering and Iron Ship-building Work," Journal of the 
Franklin Institute 3d ser. 51, no. 2 (January-July 1866): 
100-110.
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vital factor in the acceptance of his design.21 Second, 
the turret design called for plates bent in an arc, and no
means for bending thick plates were then available.22
At this date there was still some small doubt linger­
ing about the relative effectiveness of laminated and solid 
plating. The minority held that laminated plates would be 
more resistant to shot than solid ones. Chief Engineer 
Alban C. Stimers wrote in his 1863 report of the first at­
tack on Charleston, South Carolina, that although the lami­
nated plates of the monitors "impressed the nonprofessional 
observer with the idea of great injury," their "power to 
resist shot has not been greatly reduced." Notwithstanding 
that the solid plates of the New Ironsides appeared less 
damaged, "the unprejudiced engineer" would perceive that 
laminated plates were more effective.23
Stimers, as the engineer in charge of monitor
construction, was hardly unprejudiced. War experience and
further experimentation proved repeatedly that thick solid
21Ericsson wrote Smith on October 8, 1861, saying the 
only contractor who replied positively to his request for 
four inch thick plates required two months preparations.
"The i inch plate I can have at once . . .  at the rate of 
140 tons per week." NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 447, 2: 50.
22Isherwood and Lenthall to Welles, March 17, 1862. 
NARG 19, Entry 49, Book 0144, 377. Similarly, Roanoke's 
turrets were laminated even though the hull armor was solid. 
Guernsey, "Iron-Clad Vessels," 440. New Ironsides7 round 
pilot house was also laminated.
23Report of Chief Engineer Stimers, April 14, 1863,
ORN 14: 42.
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plates were indeed more resistant and that Stimers was 
engaging in political engineering.24
Experimental confirmation of the superiority of solid 
plates may not have been known in the U.S. when Monitor and 
New Ironsides were designed in 1861, although it was widely 
available by February 1862. In an article reprinted then in 
the Journal of the Franklin Institute. John Brown, a noted 
iron maker from Sheffield, stated that English experience 
and trials favored solid plates.25 In March 1861, in dis­
cussion at the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, J. D. 
A. Samuda, a prominent builder of iron ships, stated, "You 
could resist more effectually with a solid plate than you 
could do with the same weight placed in layers."26
24Very said Stimers showed "absolute blindness to any 
and all imperfections of the monitor . . .  as early as 1854 
it had been definitely established that laminated armor only 
possessed two thirds the resisting power of solid plates of 
the same thickness." Very, "Development of Armor," 399.
25John Brown, "On the Manufacture of Steel Rails and 
Armor Plates" from Newton7s London Journal. February 1862, 
reprinted in Journal of the Franklin Institute 3d ser. 43, 
no. 2 (January-June 1862): 255.
26 J. D. A. Samuda, discussing Russell's "Iron-Cased 
Vessels," Transactions INA 2 (1861): 87. In his example, 
comparing two three-inch plates with one six-inch plate, the 
resistance of the two would be (32 + 32) = 9 + 9 = 18 and of 
the one 62 = 36, making the two half as effective as the 
one. For wrought iron the correct equation for effective 
thickness can be simplified to T = (tj2 + t22 ... + tn2)1/2, 
where T is the effective thickness and t2 through tn are the 
actual thicknesses of the component plates. The ratio of 
the resistance of two three-inch plates to the six-inch 
plate would actually be 181/2 to 361/2, or 4.24 to 6.0, making 
the two plates 70% as effective as the one. Nathan Okun, 
"Armor and its Application to Warships," Warship Interna­
tional 15, no. 4 (1978): 284-85.
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In an 1862 discussion at the Institution, Sir John C.
Dalrymple Hay, Chairman of the Iron Plate Committee of
Parliament, stated,
The resisting power shewn by the iron will be very 
nearly measured by the square of the thickness in 
inches; that is to say, assuming a 2-inch plate has 
a resisting power of 4, a 4-inch plate is equal to
16. . . .27
Later, in an 1863 discussion at the Royal United Service
Institution, it was noted that,
When a mass of iron is produced by overlaying plates 
one upon the other, you lose in the mass the cohe­
sive strength which iron has when it is in one 
thickness.28
While the question of hammered or rolled plates was 
still open, Hay said the Iron Plate Committee found almost 
no difference between them, and rolled plates "if equally 
well done" were equal to hammered plates.29
As might be expected with so novel a ship, New Iron­
sides ' design continued to change during her construction. 
The rigging was at issue in December 1861, but a three
27John C. Dalrymple Hay, March 27, 1862, discussing 
John Ford's paper, "On the Manufacture of Armour Plates," 
March 27, 1862, Transactions INA 3 (1862): 153. (The paper 
was reprinted in the Mechanics' Magazine in April 1862 and 
again in the Journal of the Franklin Institute 3d. ser. 44 
(July-December 1862): 39.)
28A Mr. Clarke, discussing Jasper H. Selwyn's "On the 
Future of Naval Attack and Defence," February 16, 1863, 
Journal of the Royal United Service Institute (hereafter 
Journal RUSH 7, no. 26 (1863): 49.
29John C. D. Hay, March 27, 1862, discussing Ford's 
"Armour Plates," Transactions INA 3 (1862): 153.
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masted bark rig was chosen.30 The battery was in flux as 
late as April 15, 1862, when Smith wrote to Commander John 
A. Dahlgren, then Commandant of the Washington Navy Yard, "I 
have deck plans of 'Ironsides,' also plans of shutting 
ports. Come up & see them & see how many XI inch guns she 
can fight."31 As a result, fourteen Xl-inch Dahlgren 
smoothbores and two 150-pounder Parrot rifles replaced the 
sixteen IX-inch Dahlgrens then planned for the ship.32
The battery was again changed in July 1862, when the 
two 150-pounder Parrott rifles were moved from the spar deck 
to the gun deck.33 In addition to the guns, the ship's 
weapons included an iron ram on the prow.
The increased battery caused a large increase in the 
size of the crew, which grew to almost 400. Cramp's concep­
tual design for the ship included a battery of VUI-inch
30Smith to B. H. Bartol, December 3, 1861, NARG 45, 
Entry 464, Subject File, AD— Ironclads, typescript, NWR, 
2634: 114. For rigging plan, NARG 19, Plan 107-9-12L (Fig­
ure 1).
31Smith to Dahlgren, April 15, 1862, NARG 45, Entry 
464, Subject File, AD — Design, Box 48. Dahlgren became 
Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance on July 18, 1862, and was 
promoted Captain on August 5, 1862. David K. Allison, "John 
A. Dahlgren: Innovator in Uniform," in Captains of the Old 
Steam Naw: Makers of the American Naval Tradition 1840- 
1880. ed. James C. Bradford (Annapolis: United States Naval 
Institute Press, 1986), 36-37.
32For armament listing, National Archives, National 
Archives, Record Group 74, Records of the Bureau of Ord­
nance, Entry 121, Reports of Armaments on Vessels, 1: 80.
33Dahlgren to Turner, July 24, 1862. National Ar­
chives, Record Group 74, Entry 2, Letters and Telegrams Sent 
to Naval Officers, Box 2, 3: 116.
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shell guns. The VUI-inch was allowed 1\ men per gun, re­
sulting in a total crew of 120 for the guns and 41 more for 
the powder division (to carry powder and shell and help the 
surgeon by carrying wounded), for a total crew of 161 exclu­
sive of engineers. The revised design, carrying IX-inch 
Dahlgrens, required gun crews totaling 136 men and 46 men 
for the powder division, for a crew of 182 not counting 
engineers. The Xl-inch battery required 200 men for gun 
crews, plus 22 to handle the fifty-pounder Dahlgren rifles 
added on the spar deck and 75 more in the powder division, 
totalling 297 exclusive of engineers.34
Other major additions to the original design included 
armored shutters to cover the gun ports, armored bulkheads 
to protect the ends of the battery, and an armored pilot 
house.35 The port shutters, four inches thick, pivoted at 
their tops on axles penetrating the ship's sides. Ten men 
worked each shutter, but since the shutters were operated 
from within the battery the crews were well-protected.36
34The allowance for the Xl-inch Dahlgren and 150- 
pounder Parrott used on the broadside was 12.5 men per gun. 
The IX-inch was allowed 8.5 men per gun. Ordnance Instruc­
tions . Appendix A, iii, vi.
35Merrick & Sons to Smith, August 7, 1862: "The fol­
lowing work additional to contract is now progressing 
rapidly, viz., Gun carriages, Port shutters, Iron bulk­
heads. ..." NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 448: 105. Edward Ship- 
pen, "Fort Fisher - December, 1864, and January, 1865," 
United Service Magazine, n.s., 2 (July 1889): 11; also Bel­
knap, "Reminiscent of the 'New Ironsides'," 63-64.
36Captain Thomas Turner to Smith, April 2, 1863, NARG 
71, Entry 5, Box 449, 2: 7.
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The original design provided no defense against shot 
that might enter the unarmored wooden bow or stern and pass 
lengthwise through the ship, an effect known as "raking."
To prevent it, Merrick & Sons designed armored bulkheads to 
protect the battery, which Bartol proposed to Smith on 
January 9, 1862. The bulkheads would run across each end of 
the battery, on the gun deck and the berth deck below. Each 
was of twelve inch oak covered with 2h inches of iron.37
On January 16, Smith wrote back that he had considered 
the proposal, but expressed concern about the effect of the 
bulkhead on the working of the anchor cables and a bow 
gun.38 His letter crossed one from Bartol that gave an es­
timate of the added weight and enclosed a drawing. This 
letter was sent to the Bureau of Construction, Equipment and 
Repair for comment and was returned with the note, "The dis­
advantages viz. weight above water and obstruction on deck 
are greater than any advantage we can perceive." On the 
strength of this, Smith noted on January 18, "Concluded not 
to put in the bulkhead."39
Fortunately for the Navy, Merrick & Sons did not drop
37Merrick & Sons to Smith, January 8, 1862, ibid., Box 
447, 3: 17.
38Smith to Merrick & Sons, January 16, 1862, NARG 45, 
Entry 464, Subject File, AD— Ironclads, Box 51, typescript, 
NWR, 2634: 157. No bow gun was ever installed.
39Bartol to Smith, January 16, 1862, with annotations, 
NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 447, 3: 32. Smith notified Merrick & 
Sons on January 18, 1862.
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the matter. On February 13, 1862, Smith wrote to Merrick
and Sons that he would accept the bulkheads as long as they
did not affect the other characteristics of the ship. He
was especially worried about her speed, saying, "I do not
mean to let up a hair on the speed of the vessel. . . . "40
Bartol replied on February 14 that
we think the bulkheads absolutely essential between 
the spar and gun deck because a raking shot might 
disable several guns . . .  an ironclad steamer is 
expected to be proof against an accident of this 
kind.41
Smith, still concerned about increased weight and draft, 
approved bulkheads between the spar and gun decks only.42
The armored pilot house was added late in the 
construction period. The small circular structure extended 
through the spar deck and was entered from the gun deck 
level by a spiral staircase.43 It was placed on the cen­
terline of the spar deck directly aft of the smokestack and 
mainmast, probably because unarmored ships were normally
40Smith to Bartol, February 13, 1862, NARG 45, Entry 
464, Subject File, AD— Design, typescript, NWR, 2634: 184.
41Bartol to Smith, February 14, 1862, NARG 71, Entry 
5, Box 447, 3: 81.
42Smith to Merrick & Sons, February 15, 1862, NARG 45, 
Entry 464, Subject File, AD— Ironclads, Box 51, typescript, 
NWR, 2634: 185.
43The placement was not determined as late as April.
On April 4, 1862, Smith telegraphed Merrick & Sons, request 
ing their proposal. Ibid., 2634: 257. For placement, NARG 
19, Plan 107-9-12A. The "Look Out" had an inside diameter 
of four feet and an outside diameter of five feet. Merrick 
& Son to Lenthall, NARG 19, Entry 71, 4: 198.
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directed from that area. In this decision the lack of 
either precedent or sound ideas to guide the designer led to 
a serious operational problem, since the smokestack drasti­
cally reduced the conning officer's forward vision.
New Ironsides was usually steered from a wheel on the 
spar deck but in action was steered from a wheel behind 
armor on the berth deck. A speaking tube apparently con­
nected the conning officer in the pilot house with the 
helmsman below. Engine orders were passed by voice until 
late August 1863 when the engine room bell pull was extended 
to the spar deck level.
While design details were being resolved, construction 
continued at Cramps' shipyard. There was little security 
during the early stages. Charles Cramp wrote, "The war on 
land . . . occupied the entire attention of the people, so 
that the yard was left open; no fence around it and no visi­
tors.” After the battle between Monitor and Virginia, 
interest in ironclads rose and the number of visitors 
soared. "We had to build a high fence around the yard and 
only admitted those who secured tickets issued by us."44
Under pressure of war New Ironsides' construction was 
remarkably rapid for such a novel design, although she, like 
Monitor, took longer to build than the contracted time. New
44Cramp, [Contemporary Club], 7.
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Ironsides was launched on May 10, 1862.45 By June the 
engines were on board and the armor was being installed.
The ship was drydocked on June 6 at the Philadelphia Navy 
Yard to install her copper and propeller, and the urgency of 
completing her was so great that the coppering was worked 
day and night.46 By June 14, the propeller shafting was 
installed, and Wood was optimistic enough of prompt comple­
tion to request permission to enlist firemen for the ship. 
The boilers and engines were tested under steam in July.47
By this time, New Ironsides' prospective Commanding 
Officer had reported to the Navy Yard. He was Captain 
Thomas Turner, a naval officer of 37 years experience. Born 
December 23, 1808, in Washington, D.C., he entered the Navy 
in 1825. A veteran of combat against Malay pirates, he had 
commanded several other ships, both sailing vessels and
45U.S. Navy Department, Naval History Division, Civil 
War Naval Chronology (Washington: GPO, 1971), 11-62. Smith 
was unable to attend. NARG 45, Entry 464, Subject File,
AD— Ironclads, Box 51, typescript, NWR, 2634: 282. The 
ship's sponsor, Commodore Charles Stewart, launched her at 
10:27 A.M. "Launch of the 'New Ironsides.'" Philadelphia 
Daily Evening Bulletin. May 10, 1862: 1; Edith Wallace Ben- 
ham and Anne Martin Hall, Ships of the United States Navy 
and their Sponsors (Norwood, MA: Privately printed [Plimpton 
Press], 1913), 121.
46Wood to Smith, June 7, 1862, NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 
448, 1: 15. For coppering, Turner to Smith, April 2, 1863, 
ibid., Box 449, 2: 7.
47For firemen, Wood to Smith, June 14, 1862, ibid.,
Box 448, 1: 25. Permission was granted. For testing, Wood 
to Smith, July 12, 1862, ibid., 1: 68.
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steamers, before assuming command of Mew Ironsides.48
On August 2, 1862, Welles directed Dahlgren, by this 
time Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, to rush production of 
the ordnance equipment.49 In reply, Dahlgren told Welles 
that the ship's iron gun carriages would be done by August 
11. Of the sixteen carriages, eight were made by Merrick & 
Sons and eight by Cooper & Company of Trenton, New Jer­
sey.50 Dahlgren visited New Ironsides in Philadelphia on 
July 29, and on July 31 visited Cooper in Trenton.51
The ship's guns were probably received on board in 
early August. Most were prewar pieces; eight of the four­
teen Xl-inch Dahlgrens were cast in 1856, two in 1860, and 
four in 1862. All except one were made at West Point Found­
ry. The two 150-pounder Parrotts were cast in 1862 by the 
Parrott firm.52
48Turner commanded the South Pacific squadron from 
1868 to 1870. He died on March 24, 1883. Appleton's Cyclo­
paedia . s.v. "Turner, Thomas.”
49Welles to Dahlgren, August 2, 1862, National Ar­
chives, Record Group 74, Entry 16, Letters Received from the 
Secretary of the Navy and Navy Department Bureaus, Box 4,
62.
50To meet the delivery date, Dahlgren had to send men 
from the Washington Navy Yard to help Cooper. Dahlgren to 
Welles, August 4, 1862. National Archives, Record Group 74, 
Entry 1, Letters Sent to the Secretary of the Navy and Navy 
Department Bureaus, Box 1, Book 3: 9.
“Madeleine Vinton Dahlgren, Memoir of John A. Dahl- 
qren Rear Admiral United States Naw (Boston: James R. Os­
good and Company, 1882), 377.
“NARG 74, Entry 121, 1: 80. May 4, 1863, U.S.S. New 
Ironsides.
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During the ship's construction, the Philadelphia Navy 
Yard supplied some skilled labor to the contractors.53 The 
Yard also furnished hemp and manila line and various iron 
parts. This labor and material, and the cost of drydocking 
the ship in June, were deducted from the contract price.
Despite the urgency accompanying her construction, the 
nine months specified in the contract stretched to ten by 
the time New Ironsides was completed. On August 7, 1862, 
Merrick & Sons notified the Navy Department that construc­
tion was complete. There was still work to do on gun car­
riages, port shutters and iron bulkheads, but these items, 
Merrick & Sons' averred, were additional to the contract. 
Smith disagreed: "The contract is not complete til the Bulk­
heads are in. . . . "54
The originally calculated weights had by this time 
increased considerably. The heavier battery added 301 tons, 
the armored bulkheads 110 tons, and the pilot house 16.5 
tons. Additional men and their "appendages" added 29 tons, 
and increased fresh water storage another 51 tons. Against 
this there was a deduction of 40 tons for masts and rigging, 
as the full sail rigging was discarded for pole masts. The
53Among other tasks, Navy Yard carpenters installed 
the ship's capstan. Merrick & Sons to Smith, January 
13[14?], 1863, NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 449, 1: 36. It in­
cludes a letter from Hoover to Merrick dated January 14.
54Merrick & Sons to Smith, August 7, 1862, with pencil 
note in Smith's hand, ibid., Box 448, 1: 105.
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total was 495 tons beyond that initially estimated.55
Even with the additional weight, the ship drew between 
fourteen and fifteen feet. Bartol wrote Smith on August 14, 
"To day she draws 14 ft.9 aft & 14 ft forward & as she has 
immense capacity and they will not stop until she is full 
they will get her to the 15 feet [emphasis added]."56 The 
shallower draft was a mixed blessing, despite the original 
Navy advertisement that called for the least possible draft.
In an unarmored seagoing ship, draft mattered for two 
reasons. First, shallower draft permitted the ship to navi­
gate in shallower water. Second, given a specific ship's 
design, draft determined the height of the gun ports above 
the water. A ship with higher ports, all else being equal, 
could work her guns better in rough weather. For an iron­
clad, draft was more significant, since the armor had to be 
laid out around a nominal design draft.
The armor of the New Ironsides provided protection 
below as well as above the design waterline. This was 
because the actual position of the water relative to the 
armor was variable. It depended not only upon the ship's 
draft, but upon her heel, roll and pitch, and upon the ac­
tion of the seas. Given the established dimensions of the
55The full rigging was returned after the initial tri­
als. Turner to Merrick & Sons, September 22, 1862, ibid.,
2: 79.
56Bartol to Smith, August 14, 1862, marked "Private." 
Ibid., 2: 118.
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protection, too shallow a draft could have exposed the unar­
mored hull below the armor to enemy fire when the ship 
heeled before a wind or rolled in the seas.
The contract required New Ironsides' gun port sills to
be at least seven feet above water when the ship was ready
for sea. This was within reason for a seagoing ship; the
port sills of the French Gloire were six feet six inches,
although those of the much larger British Warrior were nine
feet.57 Cramp designed the ship such that the port sills
were eight rather than seven feet above his nominal fourteen
foot waterline. He later said,
Having in view the fact that all war-ships hereto­
fore built— particularly steamships— exceeded their 
calculated draught, I determined to avoid a similar 
error . . .  by allowing a foot for a margin.58
Yet he oriented the armor around the fourteen foot water
line.
When New Ironsides floated at her designed fourteen 
foot draft, she exposed her rudder head to shot.59 This 
shows that Cramp's original protective scheme, oriented 
around the fourteen foot water line, was defective. To
57Russell, "Iron-Cased Vessels," 24.
58NARG 71, Entry 42, 269; Cramp, [Contemporary Club],
6. Increasing the height of the gun ports by a foot in­
creased the range of the guns by no more than 20 yards.
59When coal was removed to compensate for the weight 
added during construction, the rudder head was out of the 
water. See below, 71-72. C.S.S. Virginia also suffered 
from inadequate immersion, the edges of her armor being only 
six inches below the waterline when she fought the Monitor. 
Still, Iron Afloat. 23.
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protect the rudder, the ship had to sit deeper in the water 
than fourteen feet. It made no difference whether the 
weight added to achieve this was guns, men, armor, coal or 
ballast; weight, not its composition, was the key. The 
increased weight of battery, bulkheads, and pilot house 
saved Cramp the embarrassment of having to ballast the ship 
to protect the rudder.
Cramp's margin did maintain the seven-foot height of 
the port sills above the waterline after the "normal" load 
draft was increased to fifteen feet to protect the rudder. 
Fortunately, the ship still met the requirement for a fif­
teen foot maximum draft after the rudder protection was 
resolved.
Merricks officially delivered the ship to the Navy on 
August 10, 1862, though shipyard work continued.60 The 
pressure for departure was great and the situation confused, 
and 53 crewmen deserted during the next week due to poor 
living conditions on board. Turner told Commodore Garrett 
J. Pendergrast, Commandant of the Philadelphia Navy Yard, 
that the crew should have remained in the receiving ship, 
since they had no cooking facilities— the men had been put 
on board "without the ordinary conveniences." In a lament 
familiar to naval officers, he complained, "I do not command 
and cannot control the mechanics." Although "the Gov't is
6QMerrick & Sons to Welles, November 13, 1862, en­
dorsed by Smith and Welles, NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 448, 2: 
159.
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exceedingly anxious to despatch this ship," he observed, "so
far from the departure of the ship being accelerated, it has
been retarded by the crew being on board."61
Turner wrote to Assistant Secretary Fox on August 16,
1862, saying,
I beg you to be assured that every effort is being 
made in every Dept, to get the 'New Ironsides' off 
as soon as possible. The utmost energy & activity 
is employed by the Contractors— and every one 
concerned to despatch her— as many men are employed 
as can be worked to advantage.62
Turner expressed misgivings in the same letter, writing,
My only fear is that the extraordinary haste, may 
cause things to be not so complete as I could wish.
The Commodore [Pendergrast] acting under the spur of 
telegraphs & letters from the Dept is disposed to 
push us off— before the finishing stroke can be 
given to make her a complete success.63
The main armament was completed August 15, and New Ironsides 
was commissioned on August 21, 1862.64 The seagoing iron­
clad U.S. Navy had become a reality.
61New York Public Library, Captain Thomas Turner Let­
ter Book (hereafter "NYPL, Turner Letter Book"), August 19, 
1862.
“August 16, 1862, Thompson, Correspondence of Fox. 1: 
356-57.
“Ibid., 1: 356-57.
“For armament, Dahlgren to Welles, August 18, 1862, 
NARG 74, Entry 1, Box 1: 9; Turner to Fox, August 16, 1862, 
Thompson, Correspondence of Fox. 1: 356-57. For commission­
ing, National Archives, Record Group 24, Records of the 
Bureau of Personnel, Log of the U.S.S. New Ironsides. August 
21, 1862.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
TEETHING TROUBLES: A "HOT-HOUSE" SHIP
Every new ship displays her share of defects when she 
leaves her builders' hands, and New Ironsides was no excep­
tion. In normal times, she would have a trial period for 
her crew to become familiar with their ship and their du­
ties. Following this "shakedown" period, the ship would 
return to the shipyard to correct the flaws the crew identi­
fied. A workup and trial period would be especially impor­
tant to an ironclad ship, unorthodox and unfamiliar to her 
officers and crew.
The summer of 1862 was not a normal time. The New 
Ironsides. like the Monitor, had no formal trial period or 
shakedown cruise. Unlike the Monitor, which had at least 
been tested in New York Harbor, New Ironsides' very first 
trip underway took her down the Delaware River enroute to 
possible action.
New Ironsides was urgently wanted at Hampton Roads, 
where Rear Admiral Louis M. Goldsborough began asking for 
her in July 1862. Her duty there was to counter the threat
58
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posed by Confederate ironclads up the James River.1 After 
her commissioning on August 21, she started down the Dela­
ware River to Hampton Roads on August 22, 1862, in what her 
Commanding Officer called "unprecedented haste."2 On Au­
gust 26 she anchored off Newport News. On August 31, 1862, 
after the flurry caused by the Richmond-based Confederate 
ironclads had subsided, New Ironsides steamed back to Phila­
delphia for post-trial repairs. Although Goldsborough want­
ed to keep the ship, Welles decided that the needed work 
could better be done at Philadelphia than at Hampton Roads 
and directed the ship's return there on August 29, 1862.3
During this first active service, New Ironsides dis­
played several failings, some best described as the "teeth­
ing troubles" expected in any new ship, and some less easily 
corrected. Most of the "teething troubles" were corrected 
during her refit. They included enlarging the galley and 
hammock nettings, both too small for the enlarged crew, and 
replacing the catheads, too drooping and not long enough to
lnI would urgently suggest that the Ironsides be sent 
here as early as practicable. I have but little faith in 
the Galena, and regard the Monitor as exceedingly overrat­
ed. ..." Goldsborough to Welles, July 8, 1862, ORN 7:
549; Goldsborough to Welles, July 13, 1862, ibid., 7: 569.
2Turner to Welles, August 27, 1862, in Report . . . 
Armored Vessels. 30.
3NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. August 22-31, 1862.
ORN 7: 688-89. Goldsborough continued to request New Iron­
sides . Goldsborough to Welles, September 12, 1862, ibid.,
8: 14. Welles wrote, "two or three times a week we are as­
sured they are in sight. ..." Welles, Diary, entry for 
August 10, 1862, 1: 72.
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handle the anchors properly.4 The galley was the most sig­
nificant of these difficulties. As Turner wrote,
The galley was made for 160 men, the complement of 
the ship originally intended. There are now four 
hundred on board— none too many; consequently, my 
crew are suffering in their meals, and are abso­
lutely living on raw beef and pork. . . .5
The surgeon blamed the galley for sickness in the crew.6
The major deficiencies revealed were in her speed, 
steering and gun carriages. In speed, the ship failed by a 
considerable margin to make her contract speed of 9% knots. 
During the open ocean passage from Cape Henlopen, Delaware, 
to Hampton Roads, she steamed an average of 5.7 knots for 
ten hours. The engines were not tested at maximum power 
because of steering problems, which became worse at speeds 
above 5.7 knots.7
4Turner to Welles, August 30 and October 5, 1862,
NYPL, Turner Letter Book. The full list is in Lenthall to 
Pendergrast, September 4, 1862, National Archives, Record 
Group 19, Entry 54, Letters Sent by the Bureau of Construc­
tion and Repair to the Commandant of the Philadelphia Navy 
Yard, 2: 196. Catheads were used to stow an old-fashioned 
stocked anchor.
sTurner to Welles, August 27, 1862, quoted in 
Report . . . Armored Vessels. 30.
6He also wrote, "Eating too much with abundant drink­
ing of wine and ice water may account for the officers being 
affected." National Archives, Record Group 52, Bureau of 
Medicine and Surgery, Entry 22, Medical Records of Ships, 
Medical Journal of the U.S.S. New Ironsides. August 26,
1862.
7Wood to Welles, August 27, 1862, published in 
Report . . . Armored Vessels. 31. The steering is mentioned 
in the report of trial made by Turner to Welles, August 27, 
1862, ibid., 30, and in Wood's report, ibid., 31.
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On her return up the Delaware River, Turner claimed a 
speed of ten knots for her. He based this upon the ship 
having covered an adjusted distance (allowing for the cur­
rent) in an adjusted time (allowing for maneuvering).8 As 
will be discussed later, his adjustments were incorrect; her 
speed was much lower than ten knots.
The steering problem was that the ship could not be 
controlled at high speed. She required constant attention 
and would veer off unexpectedly to starboard, at times so 
badly that she had to slow or stop to regain her course.9 
This was probably due to poor hydrodynamic design of the 
hull, but at the time it was supposed to be the fault of the 
rudder.10 The ship had a novel articulated rudder, consist­
ing of a rudder hung with pintles and gudgeons to the stern 
post with another rudder attached to the aft end of the 
first and fitted with gearing to connect the two (Figure
8Turner to Merrick & Sons, September 22, 1862, NARG 
71, Entry 5, Box 448, 2: 79. The highly complimentary let­
ter was apparently forwarded to the Bureau by the firm.
9Turner to Smith, October 20, 1862, ibid., 2: 110.
10The hull was very blunt aft, giving a poor flow of 
water into the screw and rudder. NARG 19, Plan 107-9-12M. 
The rudder was directly aft of the centerline of the screw. 
In modern practice, single screw ships of comparable dis­
placement have finer lines, their screws and rudders are 
below the plane of the ship's bottom rather than above it 
and their rudders are offset for improved steering. R. S. 
Crenshaw, Jr., Naval Shiphandlina. 4th ed. (Annapolis: Uni­
ted States Naval Institute Press, 1975), 20-25.
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9).11 The outer rudder was moved by pendants.12
Smith and Turner initially thought the problem was due 
to insufficient force on the tiller. During the post-trial 
repair period in Philadelphia, from September 3 to September 
26, 1862, blocks were rigged to give a three to one mechani­
cal advantage to the tiller ropes. This did not correct the 
problem. Turner wrote,
The trouble is not that it [the tiller] is moved 
with difficulty, but when moved under certain cir­
cumstances . she will not answer it, but on the con­
trary persists in going her own way.13
Smith proposed an "equipoised," or balanced, rudder to 
correct the problem. Figure 8 shows the articulated rudder 
with a one-piece balanced rudder overlayed, but no change 
was made to the ship during her commissioned service.14
There was a lesser steering problem with the lower 
(secondary) wheel. This wheel was placed on the berth deck
“Turner to Rear Admiral Samuel F. DuPont, February 6, 
1863, ORN 13: 646-47. The rudder was a proprietary design, 
sold by S. & G. Yerkes. NARG 19, Entry 71, Box 3, 1: 18.
“Based on Figure 9 and a letter, the inner rudder was 
actuated by the tiller and the outer by pendants. Commodore 
William Radford to Porter, January 1, 1865, National Ar­
chives, Record Group 45, Entry 395, Subentry 87, Correspon­
dence of Commodore William Radford. A description of a 
similar "fish rudder" is in Henry Lumley, "On the Steering 
of Ships," Transactions INA 5 (1864): 128-34 and plate.
“Turner to Smith, October 20, 1862, NARG 71, Entry 5, 
Box 448, 2: 130.
“NARG 19, Plan 107-9-12F. On March 31, 1865, Len­
thall told Commodore Isaac B. Hull, Commandant of the Phila­
delphia Navy Yard that the rudder would be replaced with a 
"balanced rudder of metal." NARG 19, Entry 54, 2: 302.
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Figure 9. U.S.S. New Ironsides Screw and Rudder Plan (BuShips Plan 107-9-12F.)
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so the ship could be steered from a protected place in ac­
tion. Turner called it "radically defective," but rerigging 
the tiller ropes improved it.15
The gun carriage problem, potentially the most serious 
of the three, was that the guns showed excessive recoil when 
fired. This risked injuring personnel and putting the bat­
tery out of action by breaking the carriages or dismounting 
the guns. The carriages for New Ironsides7 guns were of a 
new design (Figure 10), made of iron instead of wood.16 
The gun itself rode in an upper cradle which slid on iron 
rails. The upper cradle had eccentric axles with small 
wheels that lifted the cradle clear of the rails when en­
gaged. They were engaged to run out the gun easily and 
released for firing, to increase the friction working 
against the recoil. The carriage, attached to a pintle in 
the ship's side, pivoted at the outboard end.
Recognizing that the recoil of the Xl-inch gun would 
be greater than the friction of the cradle on the slide 
could dissipate, the designers included a compressor, or 
friction clamp, on each side of the sliding cradle. When 
tightened, the compressors squeezed the iron rails of the
“Turner to Smith, October 20, 1862, NARG 71, Entry 5, 
Box 448, 2: 110.
16A plan (Figure 10) shows detail and dimensions.
NARG 19, Plan 10-3-19. Monitor's Xl-inch Dahlgrens, also on 
iron rails, had different mountings with more elaborate 
compressors. Ernest W. Peterkin, Drawings of the U.S.S. 
Monitor (Raleigh: North Carolina Department of Cultural 
Resources, 1985), 525-27, 532-39, 543-53.
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Figure 10. Iron Carriage and Slide for New Ironsides7 Xl-inch Dahlgren guns. This 
drawing, with two compressors on each side, shows the carriage as modified in 
September 1862. (BuShips Plan 10-3-19, redrawn by William J. Jurens.)
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carriage to increase friction and dissipate recoil energy. 
The compressors were the only means provided to control the 
recoil.
Dahlgren advised Turner on August 19, 1862, that it 
was "desirable to be assured of the proper working of the 
armament of the 'Ironsides,' particularly because the guns 
are mounted on Iron Carriages."17 Turner tested the guns 
during the ship's first trip and observed excessive recoil. 
In a telegram he called the results "quite unfavorable."18
Turner was extremely concerned about the gun car­
riages. He wrote Dahlgren that he hoped the Bureau would 
correct the recoil but, "my only anxiety now is my battery." 
He believed he had "escaped by the skin of my teeth— Had I 
gone into action . . .  I would have disgraced myself and the 
noblest specimen of Naval Architecture— This Ship. ..."
Turner blamed the "hot house system— forcing things 
into existence before they could mature" and complained, 
"Those iron clad steamers Warrior-Couronne &. had 18 months 
to try and test things— two weeks is begrudged me . . .  We 
are again hurrying the ship off from here."19
17August 19, 1862, NARG 74, Entry 2, Box 1, 4: 26.
“Turner to Fox, telegram, August 23, 1862, NYPL, 
Turner Letter Book.
19"It ought not to be tested here at this wharf— I 
should know as the Captain of this ship before then that my 
guns will stand the charges intended for them— and then I 
should be held responsible for my management of them." In 
this letter, he addressed Dahlgren as "my dear friend." 
Turner to Dahlgren, September 10 [1862], Library of
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After the excessive recoil was observed on the trial 
trip, the Bureau of Ordnance sought a remedy. The first 
proposal was to increase the friction of the compressors. 
Tubes, three feet long, were provided to increase the lever­
age and permit the gun crews to tighten the compressors more 
than they could by hand. This was unsatisfactory because it 
slowed the rate of fire without sufficiently restraining the 
recoil.20 Another solution, implemented simultaneously, 
was to add a second compressor to each side of the carriage.
Along with the extra compressors, installed in Phila­
delphia during the September 1862 refit, breechings were 
specified. New Ironsides left for Hampton Roads on Septem­
ber 23, 1862, with the installation of breechings just be­
ginning.21 Dahlgren, still concerned, directed Turner to 
retest the guns with four compressors each.22 The recoil 
was still not subdued, even with the extra force provided by 
the extension tubes, and the compressors themselves could
Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of John A. B. Dahlgren 
[hereafter "Dahlgren papers”], General Correspondence Sep­
tember 1861-July 1863.
20Lieutenant Henry B. Robeson, Ordnance Officer, to 
Turner, November 13, 1862. National Archives, Record Group 
74, Entry 21, Letters Received from Inspectors of Ordnance, 
Ironclads, Box 1, 1: 34. Turner to Dahlgren, November 14, 
1862, ibid.
21Dahlgren to Welles, November 11, 1862, NARG 74, En­
try 1, Box 1, 41.
22Dahlgren to Turner, October 10, 1862, calling a test 
"of the utmost importance." NARG 74, Entry 2, Box 1, 4: 63.
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not stand the stresses imposed by increased leverage.23
These trials in early October resulted in two com­
plaints from Captain Turner. On October 17, Turner wrote 
from Hampton Roads to the Bureau of Ordnance that the appa­
ratus for controlling recoil was "utterly worthless" and the 
ship could not go into action without a remedy.24
Turner also wrote to Rear Admiral Samuel P. Lee, Com­
mander of the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, requesting 
that Lee appoint a board of officers to examine the guns. 
Turner claimed, "It would be impossible to carry this ship 
through an action of more than three or four rounds without 
tearing everything to pieces and disabling the guns." He 
blamed the Bureau: "My apprehensions as to the means adopted 
by the Bureau to correct the excessive recoil of the gun, 
that they would prove insufficient, are realized."25
Lee appointed the board of examination that Turner 
requested, and it convened on October seventeenth. The next 
day, Turner wrote again to the Bureau, qualifying his re­
marks to say the carriages, though not as bad as he asserted 
the day before, were "sufficiently unsatisfactory as to
23Dahlgren to Fox, October 19, 1862, reported that the 
recoil was still not sufficiently controlled. NARG 74,
Entry 1, Box 1, 3: 30; Turner to Dahlgren, November 14,
1862, NARG 74, Entry 21, Box 1, 1: 34.
24Turner to Dahlgren, October 17, 1862, NYPL, Turner 
Letter Book.
“Turner to Lee, October 17, 1862, ORN 8: 136.
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raise grave doubts" about protracted action.26
Commenting on the board's report, Dahlgren noted that 
after firing seven rounds from two guns, the board found the 
recoil "only inconvenient, not dangerous." He opined that 
the breechings the board had suggested would fix the problem 
and took exception to Turner's letter to Lee, noting that it 
might "impose upon me a responsibility that is not due— I 
allude to that where you express your 'apprehension as to 
the means adopted by the Bureau. . . ,'"27
Dahlgren reminded Turner that he (Dahlgren) had en­
tered the Bureau of Ordnance when the iron carriages were 
nearly completed and had authorized the ordnance officer in 
Philadelphia to do anything that Turner desired to correct 
the problem. Furthermore, the board appointed by Lee had 
come to the same conclusions as the Bureau. Dahlgren felt 
the trouble began when iron carriages were adopted "without 
that full experimental knowledge of their operation which 
should have been required."28
In addition to the installation of breechings Dahlgren 
recommended a change in the Xl-inch guns, from the "tulip"
26Turner to Dahlgren, October 18, 1862, NYPL, Turner 
Letter Book.
27Dahlgren to Turner, October 21, 1862, NARG 74, Entry 
2, Box 1, 4: 86.
28Ibid. Dahlgren to Welles, November 11, 1862: The 
difficulty "has arisen from the use of Iron carriages before 
it was fully known what the effect might be." NARG 74,
Entry 1, Box 1, 41.
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(flared) muzzle variant to the straight muzzle variety. He 
arranged for New Ironsides to come to the Washington Navy 
Yard for the exchange, but when circumstances changed to 
prevent this, he visited the ship on October 28, 1862.29 
After watching the guns fire ten rounds, he concluded that 
the guns should be exchanged even if New Ironsides could not 
come to Washington. He sent the guns downriver by ship, and 
the first vessel with replacement guns arrived in Hampton 
Roads on November 5, 1862.30
In a telegram on November 6, Dahlgren left the deci­
sion to Turner. Because of the threat of Confederate iron­
clads, Turner decided not to replace the guns, saying, "The 
Galena I think is not enough to help me if I am in any way 
hampered . . .  I don't wish to be caught napping."31
In the meantime, another carriage problem arose. On 
October 31, Turner wrote to Dahlgren that one gun had been 
disabled because the rollers on the forward eccentrics
29Dahlgren recalled visiting on October 26 but the 
ship's log shows the twenty-eighth. NARG 24, Log of New 
Ironsides; Dahlgren, Memoir, 381; Telegram, Dahlgren to 
Turner, October 26, 1862, NARG 74, Entry 2, Box 1, 4; 96.
30Dahlgren to Turner, October 30, 1862, ibid., 4; 97; 
NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. November 5, 1862. Turner es­
timated the exchange would take two or three weeks. Turner 
to Dahlgren, November 6, 1862, NYPL, Turner Letter Book.
31Telegram, Dahlgren to Turner, November 6, 1862, NARG 
74, Entry 2, Box 1, 4: 112; Dahlgren to Welles, November 11, 
1862, NARG 74, Entry 1, Box 1, 41. NARG 24, Log of New 
Ironsides. November 8, 1862. For his reasoning, Turner to 
Fox, November 6, 1862, in Thompson, Correspondence of Fox.
2: 427-28. The guns were never changed.
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broke. Dahlgren attributed the casualty to bad material in 
the rollers and told Turner he would send new parts. Turner 
blamed recoil stress, but Dahlgren appears to have been 
correct since the problem did not recur.32
New breeching bolts and stouter breechings were 
installed in November 1862 as New Ironsides lay in Hampton 
Roads. Mechanics from the Washington Navy Yard worked seven 
days a week to complete the job, and the guns were again 
test fired on November 14 and 18. On November 18, 1862, 
Turner wrote to Dahlgren from Hampton Roads that a Mr. Wil­
son, the ordnance supervisor from the Washington Navy Yard, 
had developed a solution. Wilson installed strips of ash 
wood so the compressors bore upon the wood rather than upon 
the iron carriage directly. The effect was to increase the 
friction markedly.33 On December 8 and 12, 1862, the bat­
tery was fired successfully.34
32Robeson to Turner, October 31, 1862, as enclosure to
Turner to Dahlgren, October 31, 1862, NARG 74, Entry 21, Box
1, 1: 10, 11. Telegram, Dahlgren to Turner, November 2, 
1862, NARG 74, Entry 2, Box 1, 4: 103. Turner to Dahlgren, 
November 5, 1862, NYPL, Turner Letter Book.
33Turner to Dahlgren, November 18, 1862, NARG 74, En­
try 21, Box 1, 1: 35. Coefficients of friction for cast 
iron on cast iron vary from 0.11 (lubricated) to 0.4 (chemi­
cally clean): for wood on iron from 0.2 to 0.6. Larger num­
bers mean more friction. Robert C. Weast, ed., CRC Handbook 
of Chemistry and Physics. 51st ed. (Cleveland, Ohio: Chemi­
cal Rubber Company, 1970), F15-F16. The carriages must have 
had some grease on them, so friction was at least doubled by 
the wooden strips.
34Telegram, Turner to Dahlgren, November 20, 1862,
NARG 74, Entry 21, Box 1, 1: 36; NARG 24, Log of New Iron­
sides. December 8 and 12, 1862.
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While the ship was correcting her problems and train­
ing in Hampton Roads, the Navy Department and Merrick & Sons 
were clearing up contractual loose ends. The government 
made the last progress payment on August 13, 1862, but 
$195,000, or 25 percent of the contract price, was reserved 
as surety for the ship's performance.35
The Government had ninety days from the date of deliv­
ery to test the ship's ability to meet the contract require­
ments. If she did not meet the specifications, the Govern­
ment could recover the money advanced to the contractor, 
holding the ship as collateral until it was repaid. The 
government would then return the ship to the contractor.36
On September 27, 1862, the Government paid Merrick & 
Sons $34,322.06 "by bill of extras allowed by agreement."
This apparently covered the addition of the armored bulk­
heads but probably not the port shutters and pilot house.
On October 4, though the ninety-day period had not expired, 
the Government paid Merrick & Sons $100,000 of the reserva­
tion.37 There were, however, disagreements to resolve.
Chief among them were the "extras." Smith wrote, 
since "omissions in regard to fitments" were to be supplied 
at the demand of the Navy Department, "the pilot house was 
one omission, and the port shutters another, which should
3SNARG 71, Entry 48, 1: 11-12.
36NARG 71, Entry 42, 270.
37NARG 71, Entry 48, 1: 11-12.
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not be charged as extras." It was, he said, "doing you a 
favor to pay the $100,000 before the expiration of the time 
specified." Merrick & Sons replied that they were awaiting 
the results of "further experiments with the vessel."38
On October 1, 1862, Smith directed Turner to report on 
the ship's performance. Smith reiterated his direction on 
October 16.39 Turner replied that he would conduct a trial 
if possible, but Lee was apprehensive of New Ironsides leav­
ing her Newport News station.40
In the event, the speed trial could not be run as 
Smith desired. Since her builders blamed the ship's failure 
to meet the contract speed requirement (9h knots) on the 
weight added during construction, he had directed that the 
coal on board New Ironsides, normally about 400 tons, be 
reduced to under 100 tons to compensate for the added 
weight. Lightening the ship so much exposed the rudder to 
shot.41 Combat readiness demanded that Turner keep enough 
coal on board to maintain fighting draft, and this require­
ment combined with Lee's prohibition on leaving station to
38Smith to Merrick & Sons, October 4, 1862, NARG 45, 
NARG 45, Entry 464, Subject File, AD— Ironclads, Box 51, 
typescript, NWR, 2634: 443. Merrick & Sons to Smith, Octo­
ber 7, 1862, NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 448, 2: 110.
39Smith to Turner, October 1, 1862, NARG 45, Entry 
464, Subject File, AD— Ironclads, Box 51, typescript, NWR, 
2634: 431; Smith to Turner, October 16, 1862, ibid., 458.
40Turner to Smith, October 20, 1862, enclosing Lee to 
Turner, October 18, 1862, NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 448, 2: 130.
41Turner to Smith, November 11, 1862, ibid., 2: 157.
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keep Turner from running the trial.42
The results of lightening the ship confirm that 
Cramp's original protective scheme was defective. Had the 
original IX-inch battery not been increased to Xl-inch, some 
300 tons of non-productive ballast would have been needed to 
submerge the rudder head.
On November 13, Merrick & Sons wrote to Welles, re­
questing the remaining reservation of $95,000. In his en­
dorsement, Smith noted that the ship was "highly spoken of 
except in speed in which she has failed to comply."43
Merrick & Sons had received $585,000 in progress pay­
ments, $34,322.06 on September 27, 1862, for agreed upon 
extras, and $100,000 on October 1, 1862, as an advance on 
the reservation. Without deducting the contractual penalty 
of $500 per day for delayed delivery, the Navy thus owed 
Merrick & Sons $95,000, the reservation remaining, minus 
$1,280.73 to cover the work done for them by the
42The results of a light-ship trial would probably not 
have differed much from the full-load trial enroute to Hamp­
ton Roads in August. A ship's top speed is achieved when 
resistance equals propulsive power. A major factor is wave- 
making resistance, which varies with hull form, and a minor 
one is frictional resistance, which varies with area of 
wetted curface. Removing weight would change the effective 
hull form and decrease the wetted surface slightly, but with 
her bluff lines it would certainly not have given the addi­
tional three knots to fulfill the contract. Thomas C. Gill- 
mer, Modern Ship Design. 2d ed. (Annapolis: United States 
Naval Institute Press, 1975), 97-98, 100-110. Also Smith to 
Merrick & Sons, October 4, 1862, NARG 45, Subject File, AD—  
Ironclads, Box 51, typescript, NWR, 2634: 443.
43Merrick & Sons to Welles, November 13, 1862, with 
endorsements, NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 448, 2: 159.
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Philadelphia Navy Yard, making the total due $93,719.27.44
The Government could hardly give up a powerful and 
perfectly serviceable ironclad just because she was three 
knots too slow. Welles implicitly acknowledged this when, 
on November 24, he favorably endorsed Merrick & Sons' 
request: "Admiral Smith will make a requisition on the De­
partment to pay the balance [on] the 'Ironsides.'"45
44Merrick & Sons claimed the Navy Yard had double­
billed them and asked for $544.77 more. Smith declined, 
noting that Merricks' still owed the Yard for drydocking. 
"The Secv was very liberal to the Contractors with settle­
ment." Endorsement on Merrick & Sons' letter of January 
13[14], 1863, ibid., Box 449, 1: 36. The ledger shows only 
the one correct charge from the yard, for $1280.73 on Octo­
ber 21, 1862. NARG 71, Entry 48, 1: 11-12. Given that the 
$500 per day penalty was not enforced and the ship did not 
make her contract speed, settlement was very liberal indeed.
45Merrick & Sons to Welles, November 13, 1862, with 
endorsements by Smith and Welles, NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 448, 
2: 159. From the Contract Ledger, the price was $813,041.33 
(exclusive of armament). ORN gives a total of $865,514.66, 
which probably includes work done on the Bureau of Ordnance 
account. ORN. ser. 2, 1: 159.
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Figure 11. New Ironsides with her masts and rigging.
(Carte de Visite photograph by B. F. Cooper, Philadelphia. 
Courtesy of the U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center, Person­
al Papers Section, Collection of Henry Clay Cochrane. U.S. 
Naval Historical Center Photograph.)
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CHAPTER FIVE 
EARLY EXPERIENCE: CLEARING FOR ACTION
Her initial refit period behind her, New Ironsides 
joined the fleet in Hampton Roads in September 1862. From 
then until she left for Port Royal, South Carolina, in Janu­
ary 1863, her crew of 461 officers and men gained experience 
while they guarded Hampton Roads.1
Her arrival in Hampton Roads was not unremarked by 
naval officers. Captain John Rodgers, a respected officer 
then commanding the ironclad Galena, wrote that New Iron­
sides was a "magnificent vessel— with the appearance of 
great strength— indeed of invulnerability to any ordinary 
artillery while her battery is most formidable— I know of no 
vessel which can pretend to cope with her."2 About Turner
:The first available muster roll for New Ironsides is 
dated September 23, 1862. The crew included 50 petty offi­
cers, 51 seamen, 43 ordinary seamen, 187 landsmen and boys, 
25 firemen, 24 coal heavers and 49 Marines, for a total of 
429. There were 32 officers. National Archives, Record 
Group 24, Entry 138, Civil War Muster Rolls of USS New Iron­
sides.
2John Rodgers to his wife Ann, September 28, 1862, 
quoted in Robert Erwin Johnson, Rear Admiral John Rodgers 
1812-1882 (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute Press, 
1967), 220. Rodgers left Galena in November 1862 for the 
monitor Weehawken, then under construction.
77
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he was less complimentary: "Turner will fight his vessel 
gallantly. I do not think he has thought much about fight­
ing her at all. . . ."3
While in Hampton Roads, New Ironsides lay at anchor 
with steam up and fires banked. At first the engineers 
maintained steam in all four boilers for maximum readiness, 
but in mid-November 1862 they were permitted to secure one 
boiler at a time for maintenance. The ship remained on 
three boilers until January 11, 1863, when she departed for 
Port Royal, the U.S. Navy's base near Hilton Head, about 
sixty miles south of Charleston.4 Arriving there on Janu­
ary 18, she prepared to join the ironclad fleet in an attack 
on Charleston under the commander of the South Atlantic 
Blockading Squadron, Rear Admiral Samuel F. DuPont.
Samuel Francis DuPont was born at Bergen Point, New 
Jersey, on September 27, 1803. He was appointed a midship­
man in the Navy in 1815 and his service included combat in 
the Mexican War. Appointed Flag Officer in September 1861, 
in his first Civil War service he seized Port Royal from the 
Confederates. He was promoted to Rear Admiral in July 
1862.5 From a patrician family, DuPont thought much of his
3John Rodgers to Ann, September 29, 1862, quoted in 
ibid., 220.
4NARG 19, Entry 1072, Steam Log of New Ironsides, 
various dates.
5DuPont died in retirement on June 23, 1865. DAB, 
s.v. "DuPont, Samuel Francis."
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reputation. At first he looked at the attack on Charleston 
as a chance to gain more laurels, but he gradually concluded 
that the risks of failure outweighed the possible gains.
New Ironsides had two major jobs to do at Port Royal. 
The first was to remove her masts and replace them with thin 
poles suitable for signalling but not for carrying sail 
(Figure 12). This was done between January 29 and 31,
1863.® The second was to cut down the stack so it did not 
block the view from the pilot house.
The pilot house was located directly abaft the stack. 
Since the stack was eight feet in diameter and the pilot 
house only four, it was impossible to see straight ahead 
from the pilot house.7 DuPont called attention to the lack 
of "sufficient scope of vision to steer the ship in a devi­
ous channel" when he inspected the ship in October 1862.8 
He wanted the pilot house moved forward, but instead the 
stack was cut down. On November 7, Fox informed DuPont,
The smoke pipe is fitted to take entirely off even 
with the rail, and the eyelet holes of the pilot 
house are enlarged, which will give more sweep
SNARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. 29-31 January, 1863.
7NARG 19, Plan 107-9-12A, 107-9-12E; Figure 3.
8DuPont to Mrs. Sophie M. DuPont, October 20, 1862, 
John D. Hayes, ed., Samuel Francis DuPont: A Selection from 
his Civil War Letters (Ithaca, NY: Columbia University Press 
for The Eleutherian Mills Historical Library, 1969), vol. 2, 
The Blockade; 1861-1862. 250. He wrote that Turner told 
Bartol about the problem but nothing was done. DuPont to 
Benjamin Gerhard, January 30, 1863, ibid., 2: 395.


















Figure 12. U.S.S. New Ironsides under bare poles. (From the collection of Dr. Charles Peery, used by permission.)
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especially with everything off even with the deck.9
The job was to be done in Hampton Roads, but under the cir­
cumstances there the ship could not shut down her boilers to 
permit it.10 It was deferred until she reached Port Royal.
On January 26, 1863, the stack was cut down to four 
feet, and New Ironsides took a trial trip around the harbor 
the next day.11 The experiment was unsuccessful. Stack 
gas nearly suffocated men in the pilot house and on the gun 
deck, and the lack of draft to carry away smoke and hot 
gases made it almost impossible to open the furnace doors to 
feed the boiler fires.12 The stack was reinstalled and 
moving the pilot house (called the "turret," though it did 
not revolve) was investigated. Since it weighed eighteen 
tons, it could not be moved with the means available.13 
DuPont wrote,
One would suppose that where you could not feel your 
way, by using a lead and line to ascertain the 
soundings, that at least an opportunity to see to
9F o x  to DuPont, November 7, 1862, ibid., 2: 279.
10Turner to Welles, November 30, 1862, NYPL, Turner 
Letter Book.
“For trial, NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. January 
26-27, 1863.
“Turner to Dupont, January 29, 1863, ORN 13: 550-51.
“DuPont to Welles, January 28(?], 1863, ibid., 13: 
543-44.
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advantage would have been provided.14 
He said, "We will have to 'go it blind.'. . . If we don't 
run ashore going in, it will be because God is with us."15
While New Ironsides was at Port Royal, the Confederate 
ironclads Chicora and Palmetto State attacked the Federal 
blockading ships off Charleston. The two Confederate ves­
sels were very similar, each being about 150 feet long, 
thirty-five feet in beam and twelve feet in draft. Palmetto 
State carried two seven-inch rifles and two IX-inch smooth­
bores while Chicora carried four 32-pounder rifles and two 
IX-inch smoothbores. Each carried two two-inch layers of 
iron plate on her casemate sides, with a single layer of 
two-inch iron at bow and stern.16 The Confederates knew 
that New Ironsides was in Port Royal, so the timing of their 
raid may have been connected with her imminent arrival at 
Charleston. William H. Parker, Executive Officer of the 
Palmetto State, mentioned only that plans were afoot 
throughout January to attack the blockaders.17
14DuPont to Mrs. DuPont, January 28, 1863, Hayes, Du­
Pont Letters 2: 389. The ram and the extreme tumble-home 
precluded the use of a lead from the eyes of the ship; it 
had to be heaved from a gun port farther aft. Turner to Du­
Pont, April 10, 1863, ORN 14: 25.
“DuPont to Gerhard, January 30, 1863, Hayes, DuPont 
Letters 2: 395.
16Still, Iron Afloat. 81-82, 97; Civil War Naval Chro­
nology. VI-211-12, VI-279.
17William Harwar Parker, Recollections of a Naval Of­
ficer 1841-1865 (New York: Scribner, 1883; reprinted Anna­
polis: United States Naval Institute Press, 1985), 314; J.
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The Confederate ships got underway the night of Jan­
uary 30, 1863, and crossed Charleston Bar soon after 4:00 
A.M. on January 31. In the ensuing action, Palmetto State 
rammed the Federal steamer Mercedita, which surrendered, and 
Chicora engaged Keystone State, which also yielded. The 
other Federal ships withdrew but both Mercedita and Keystone 
State escaped from the Confederates.18 General Pierre G.
T. Beauregard, in charge of the defenses of Charleston, im­
mediately proclaimed that the blockade had been broken.19
Beauregard was trying to use the law of blockade to 
the Confederacy's advantage. Specifically,
To make a blockade legal, the primary require­
ment is that it be effective. . . . ships had to 
hover close enough to the blockaded port or coast to 
be able to sight and capture blockade-runners day or 
night— the traditional 'close-in' blockade.20
If the blockade were broken by being made ineffective, the
Union would have to issue new notices of blockade to
Thomas Scharf, History of the Confederate States Navv from 
Its Organization to the Surrender of Its Last Vessel (New 
York: Fairfax Press, 1977; reprint of 1887 edition), 674-75.
18There was some dispute over the incident, which the 
Confederates considered a "faithless act." Commander J. R. 
Tucker, commanding C.S.S. Chicora. to Flag Officer Duncan L. 
Ingraham, January 31, 1863, ORN 13: 619-20.
19Letters from Beauregard and from the Confederate 
Secretary of State to foreign consuls are in ibid., 620-21. 
Parker considered the proclamation ill-advised: "I looked 
upon it as all bosh." Parker, Recollections. 320, 323.
Also Scharf, Confederate States N a w . 683-85.
20Burdick H. Brittin, International Law for Seagoing 
Officers. 5th ed. (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute 
Press, 1986), 272.
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reimpose it. The waiting period of legal ineffectiveness 
would be a godsend to blockade runners.
Beauregard had foreign consuls taken on a tour of the 
lower harbor to show them that the blockading forces were 
nowhere to be seen. The British consul and others stated 
the next day that they saw none of the blockading fleet; the 
Federals denied their claim. Beauregard's efforts were 
unavailing; the Federals resumed their stations the after­
noon of the raid and the blockade continued as before.21
New Ironsides hastily departed Port Royal on February 
1, 1863, as a result of the Confederate raid.22 DuPont or­
dered Turner to "prevent the rebel ironclads from again 
attacking the blockading fleet."23 In a conference on 
January 31, Turner objected strenuously to lying outside the 
Charleston bar. He claimed New Ironsides was unwieldy and 
would be blown ashore in a gale, that she needed her masts
“Certificate of commanding officers of United States 
vessels regarding the condition of the blockade, January 31, 
ORN 13: 605-607; Anderson, By Sea and By River. 160-61. 
Welles said the reports were "made up for the European mar­
ket by the foreign consuls who are Rebel agents." Welles, 
Diary, entry for February 4, 1863, 1: 232-33.
“George E. Belknap recalled New Ironsides arrived at 
Port Royal after the raid. His recollection was incorrect. 
George E. Belknap, "Address Before the Contemporary Club of 
Philadelphia, Dec. 14, 1897," Papers of Rear Admiral George 
E. Belknap, Box 2, 9 (hereafter "Belknap, [Contemporary 
Club]").
“DuPont to Turner, January 31, 1863, Hayes, DuPont 
Letters 2: 399.
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and sails, and that her anchor chains were untrustworthy.24 
DuPont told him to go anyway, saying he understood the great 
distinction between New Ironsides and the monitors lay in 
New Ironsides "being able to keep the sea."25
The next morning, February 1, DuPont received a letter 
from Turner officially stating his objections to outside 
blockade service. When DuPont said he could defer going, 
thereby implying Turner was unequal to the task, Turner 
reconsidered, withdrew his letter and departed.26
The Charlestonians quickly noted New Ironsides' pres­
ence. They reported first "a very large, formidable looking 
propeller, without masts," and then correctly identified the 
ship as New Ironsides. The Daily Courier reported,
She is not at all so formidable as described by the 
Yankee Abolition newspapers. . . . Those who ought 
to know say she is no match for our impenetrable 
little iron-clads, excepting perhaps in speed and 
sailing qualities.27.
24Turner wrote to Andrew H. Foote, Chief of the Bureau 
of Equipment and Recruiting, that New Ironsides' anchor 
chains were unsatisfactory. Government chain had a swivel 
every thirty fathoms, the contractor's only one in its whole 
length. This made for kinks, risk of breakage and difficul­
ty getting in the anchor. Turner to Foote, December 24, 
1862, NYPL, Turner Letter Book. New Ironsides broke a chain 
and lost an anchor while preparing to enter Port Royal.
NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. January 18, 1863.
25DuPont to Mrs. DuPont, February 1, 1863, Hayes,
DuPont Letters 2: 405.
26DuPont to Mrs. DuPont, February 1, 1863, ibid., 2: 
405-406; Turner to DuPont, January 31, 1863, ORN 13: 623-24.
27"From the Bar," Charleston Daily Courier. February 
3, 1863, 2. See also "Situation of Affairs Off the Bar," 
Charleston Mercury. February 3, 1863, 2.
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Turner was not so sure about her sailing qualities, or 
at least her seaworthiness at anchor. He soon wrote from 
Charleston, again expressing his anxieties. Rough weather 
had caused problems with the rudder and anchor chains. The 
rudder broke loose and had to be secured by men let down 
over the side. The anchor chains became fouled and because 
of the bow design they were difficult to unsnarl. The ram 
interfered with the ship's motion by catching the chains on 
its surface.28 The "fearful" yawing and sheering caused 
such problems that Turner left Charleston on February 6 and 
returned to Port Royal on February 7, 1863.29
Showing the importance he attached to New Ironsides' 
presence off Charleston, DuPont noted his astonishment and 
wrote, "He should never have come back. . . .  If those rams 
come out tonight he may be broke."30 A survey directed by 
DuPont reported that New Ironsides was uninjured but recom­
mended strengthening the rudder, soon accomplished by dint 
of the machine shop working all night.31 Leaving Port
28Turner to DuPont, February 6, 1863, ORN 13: 646-47. 
Turner to Smith, February 16, 1863, NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 
449, 1: 79.
29NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. February 5-7, 1863.
30DuPont to Mrs. DuPont, February 7, 1863, Hayes, Du­
Pont Letters 2: 416. DuPont could not know that the Con­
federate rams did not even dare to anchor outside the bar 
overnight, since "in case of a blow the vessels would have 
foundered." Parker, Recollections. 323.
31DuPont to Mrs. DuPont, February 7, 1863, Hayes, Du­
Pont Letters 2: 416-17. Turner had earlier written in 
"flattering terms” about the rudder. Silas Yerkes, Jr., to
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Royal on February 9, New Ironsides was back on station at 
Charleston on February 10, 1863.32
Although some of her early deficiencies were correct­
ed, New Ironsides' slow speed was a long term handicap. As 
experience mounted, it became clear that the ten knot figure 
Turner obtained during the return from her maiden voyage was 
wrong. The ship made a full power trial on February 11, 
1863, under favorable wind and sea conditions. Harman New­
ell, New Ironsides/ chief engineer, reported her best speed 
ever under steam was 6^ knots, but the best shown during 
this trial was six knots. Turner wrote,
Six (6) knots is her maximum speed per hour. When 
passing up the Delaware the last time . . .  I gave 
her a higher rate of speed, but there was evidently 
a mistake . . . she can never have exceeded the rate 
I have given her here.33
In May 1863, Turner reported to DuPont, "This ship is 
so unwieldy and moves so slowly . . .  if they only knew that 
on shore they would not give themselves much trouble about
Lenthall, January 8, 1863. NARG 19, Entry 71, Box 3, 1: 18.
32NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. February 9 and 10, 
1863. The Confederates did not miss her until February 9, 
thinking she laid off in the morning and returned after 
dark, "hoping to catch our ironclads should they make anoth­
er night attack on the Yankee fleet." "News from the Yankee 
Fleet," Charleston Daily Courier. February 9, 1863, 2; 
February 10, 1863, 2; for a similar opinion, "News From The 
Blockading Fleet," Charleston Mercury. February 9, 1863, 2.
33Turner to Smith, February 16, 1863, and Chief Engi­
neer Harman Newell to Turner, February 11, 1863, enclosure 
to Turner's letter to Smith of February 16, 1863, NARG 71, 
Entry 5, Box 449, 1: 79.
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her."34 George E. Belknap, Executive Officer of New Iron­
sides from the autumn of 1862 until her decommissioning in 
June 1864, wrote that pursuit of a swift blockade runner 
would have been "as absurd and useless as the efforts of an 
elephant in pursuit of a camelopard [giraffe]."35
In the Navy Department's technical bureaus, opinion of
her speed was similarly negative. John Lenthall, Chief of
the Bureau of Construction and Repair, and Benjamin Franklin
Isherwood, Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, told
Welles that New Ironsides had
just two-thirds of the speed guarantied [sic], and 
as the speed is in the ratio of the cube of the 
power, it follows that the contractor provided just 
one-third enough machinery, while the Government 
paid for the three-thirds, and, in addition, paid 
very large extra bills.36
The best speed the ship ever logged under both steam and
34Turner to DuPont, May 6, 1863, ORN 14: 178.
35Belknap, "Reminiscent of the 'New Ironsides'," 70. 
Belknap, born on January 22, 1832, in Newport, New Hamp­
shire, began his Navy career in 1847. After leaving New 
Ironsides for further wartime service as Commanding Officer 
of the monitor Canonicus, he rose to the rank of Rear Admi­
ral before retiring in 1894. He died at Key West, Florida, 
on April 7, 1903. DAB, s.v. "Belknap, George Eugene," NARG 
24, Records of Officers.
36C. H. Davis, Lenthall, Isherwood, Cullum[?] to 
Welles, August 15, 1863, NARG 45, Entry 464, Subject File, 
AD— Design, Box 48. Isherwood was right. Effective horse­
power = ([Total resistance coefficient x density x (veloci­
ty)3 x wetted surface]/2)/550. The ratio of power required 
for 9.5 knots to power required for 6.5 knots is thus 
(9.5)3/(6.5)3, or approximately 3.12. Gillmer, Modern Ship 
Design. 136.
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sail was seven knots.37
New Ironsides remained on guard at Charleston even as 
the monitors assembled for DuPont's assault. In March 1863 
DuPont had to discourage Turner's request to return to Port 
Royal. DuPont called New Ironsides "the only iron vessel 
which can lay outside" and noted that if a second Confeder­
ate raid were attempted in her absence, "the accountability 
would not be light."38 The Confederates were well aware of 
New Ironsides' presence, considering that she was, "perma­
nently stationed off the Bar, to protect the wooden sides of 
the Yankee gunboats from our 'iron clads.'"39
As one Confederate officer wrote, "It was not consid­
ered advisable to send our vessels [Chicora and Palmetto 
State! out to attack her."40 Unseaworthy, lightly armed 
and carrying only two two-inch layers of armor, neither 
would have stood a chance against New Ironsides. Instead, 
according to Belknap the time on board the frigate was spent 
"in perfecting the drills at the guns and in watching the
37NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. January 12, 1863.
There was a strong wind from dead astern.
38DuPont to Turner, March 3, 1863, ORN 13: 714-15.
39Charleston Daily Courier. February 14, 1863, 2; 
Charleston Mercury. February 14, 1863, 2.
40Parker, Recollections. 327. Richmond was full of 
rumors about an impending Union assault. For examples, John 
Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confeder­
ate States Capital 2 vols. (Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott, 
1866; reprinted Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1982), en­
tries for January 27 and 31, February 5, 6 and 10, 1863.
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enemy strengthening his defenses."41 During the first week 
in April 1863, the monitors arrived and the Federals made 
final preparations for their attack.
The most significant preparation aboard New Ironsides 
was strengthening the spar deck. Civil War-era sea battles 
were conducted at ranges less than 2,000 yards. Projectile 
trajectories were flat, and it was unusual to receive a hit 
on the deck in a ship-to-ship action. Since New Ironsides 
was designed to fight other ships, her deck protection was 
thin, and that made her vulnerable to plunging fire from 
shore guns and mortars.42 Plunging fire was considered 
very dangerous. Turner wrote, "One inch of iron and three 
of wood upon her spar deck form a very feeble barrier to 
resist plunging shot, and bombs."43
To increase resistance to plunging fire, Turner in­
creased the spar deck protection with sandbags over a layer 
of green (untanned) hides.44 A thick coating of grease on
41Belknap, [Contemporary Club], 11.
42In the low Charleston country "plunging" fire was 
misnamed. At 1000 yards, the angle of impact of an Xl-inch 
shell fired from sea level was 2.7 degrees; fired from an 
elevation of fifty feet, it would strike at 3.5 degrees. 
Trajectory extrapolation from BALLISTA, a program to calcu­
late exterior ballistics; the original version, by William 
J. Jurens, appeared as "Exterior Ballistics with Microcompu­
ters," Warship International 21, no. 1 (1984): 49-72.
43Turner to Smith, April 2, 1863, NARG 71, Entry 5,
Box 449, 2: 7. "Bombs" were mortar shells.
44This was the only engagement in which hides were 
used. Belknap wrote years later that the hides were placed 
on top of the sandbags, but Turner in his report and in
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her armored sides, to increase the tendency of shot and 
shell to glance off, completed New Ironsides' battle outfit.
sworn testimony in 1863 stated specifically that the hides 
were under the sandbags. Belknap, "Reminiscent of the 'New 
Ironsides'," 66, 70; ORN 14: 26; Turner's testimony at the 
Stimers Court of Inquiry, Report . . . Armored Vessels. 149.
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CHAPTER SIX 
BATTLE EXPERIENCE: "A CAPITAL SCARECROW"?
New Ironsides' first combat experience was the April 
7, 1863, assault on Charleston, in which her unique design 
affected the outcome of the battle. Serving Rear Admiral 
DuPont as fleet flagship, New Ironsides engaged the Charles­
ton fortifications at a range of more than 1,000 yards.
Charleston Harbor was well defended. The major works 
of the outer defenses were Fort Moultrie on Sullivan's Is­
land and Fort Sumter. They were supported by Batteries 
Wagner and Gregg on Morris Island and Batteries Bee and 
Beauregard on Sullivan's Island. All except Fort Sumter 
were earthworks. The inner layer included Fort Johnson and 
Battery Glover on James Island, Fort Ripley and Castle 
Pinckney in the harbor, and the White Point Battery on Bat­
tery Point in Charleston itself (Figure 13).
Charleston had little strategic importance, but it was 
the "original seat of the great wickedness that has befallen 
our country," and accordingly "there is not another place
93
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[our anxious countrymen] would so rejoice to see taken."1
As Welles wrote before he received news of the assault,
A desperate stand will be made at Charleston, and 
their defenses are formidable. Delay has given them 
time and warning, and they have improved them. They 
know also that there is no city so culpable, or 
against which there is such intense animosity.2
The Confederates knew a Federal assault was probable. Writ­
ing, "Charleston is bitterly hated. ..." the Charleston 
Mercury told Charlestonians in mid-February 1863 to expect 
"some eight or ten iron-clad gunboats to try the harbor" in 
the near future.3
DuPont had been planning his assault on Charleston for 
months, and as his planning continued his requirements grew. 
He insisted on more ships and wrote, "the limit of my wants 
in the way of ironclads is the capacity of the Department to 
supply them."4 Secretary Welles sent the ironclads, but as 
DuPont's delays mounted, Welles began to worry. When they 
met in October 1862, Welles called DuPont "skillful and
belles, Diary, entry for May 26, 1863, 1: 314. A 
Philadelphia paper called South Carolina "the insolent, con­
ceited, unreasonable and arbitrary author of all our 
national troubles. . .. " "Port Royal." Philadelphia Daily 
Evening Bulletin. November 15, 1861: 1.
2Welles, Diary, entry for April 9, 1863, 1: 264.
3"The Yankee Preparations," Charleston Mercury. Feb­
ruary 12, 1863: 1.
4DuPont to Fox, March 2, 1863, Hayes, DuPont Letters.
2: 463. Fox replied that Welles had sent DuPont "every ves­
sel except the Sangamon." guarding Hampton Roads. Other 
commanders had called for ironclads, "but we have not given 
them any." Fox to DuPont, March 11, 1863, ibid., 2: 487.
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sagacious," noting that although he was "given to the for­
mation of cliques," Welles would make no controversy "while 
he continues to do his duty so well."5
By February 1863, Welles was writing that
DuPont shrinks from responsibility, dreads, [sic] the 
conflict he has sought yet is unwilling that any other 
should undertake it, is afraid the reputation of DuPont 
will suffer. . . .  I deplore the signs of misgiving and 
doubt which have recently come over him . . .  It is not 
what we have talked of. . . .6
By March 1863, Welles was convinced, "DuPont is getting as
prudent as McClellan . . .  He has a reputation to preserve
instead of one to make."7
Welles' concept of the attack was that the Navy could
move independent of the Army, and pass Sumter, not 
stop to batter it. Once in the rear, and having the 
town under the guns of the ironclads, the military 
in the forts and on James Island would be compelled 
to leave.8
DuPont appears to have based his plan on the same idea of 
passing the outer defenses, Forts Moultrie and Sumter, but 
he intended then to destroy Sumter from behind. He planned 
to proceed up the channel between Sumter and Moultrie, pass 
into the harbor, and reduce Sumter from Rebellion Roads,
belles, Diary, entry for October 2, 1862, 1: 160. He 
later noted, "When here last fall, expressly to consult and 
concert measures for the capture of Charleston, he was as 
earnest and determined as any of us, did not waver a moment, 
and would not listen to a suggestion of Dahlgren as an 
assistant." Ibid., entry for April 15, 1863, 1: 273.
sIbid., entry for February 16, 1863, 1: 236.
7Ibid., entry for March 12, 1863, 1: 247.
8Ibid., entry for February 16, 1863, 1: 236.
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that is, from the north and northwest.
Fort Sumter, a pentagonal brick fort constructed 
between 1829 and 1860, was shaped as four sides of a regular 
hexagon with the gorge opening closed by a straight wall.
It joined Moultrie to cover the ship channel with a cross­
fire. Sumter was oriented so its lightly armed gorge faced 
southwest, protected by Morris Island, and the four heavily 
armed sides covered the channel.9
DuPont knew that attacking Sumter from inside the
harbor would have two serious disadvantages. First, his
ships would have to navigate a channel full of obstructions
including, he believed, torpedoes (Figure 14).10 These
would have "entangled the vessels and held them" under heavy
fire. Second was the risk to New Ironsides. Attacking from
the northwest,
We are further inside and if we meet disaster will 
lose this ship, which from her size and unwieldiness 
cannot be got out like the monitors. . . .  If I 
leave her out altogether, or down here, I divest 
myself of half my force. . . .“
Despite these disadvantages, DuPont chose to enter the
9Willard B. Robinson, American Forts; Architectural 
Form and Function (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press 
for the Amon Carter Museum of Western Art, Fort Worth,
1977), 107-109.
10DuPont to Welles, April 15, 1863, ORN 14: 7. The 
Civil War "torpedo" was what is now called a mine, a water­
tight container of explosive with a detonator. Various det­
onators, including contact and electrical fuzes, were used.
“DuPont to Mrs. DuPont, April 6, 1863, Hayes, DuPont 
Letters. 2: 552.
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harbor for two major reasons. First, it would remove his 
ships farther from Fort Moultrie and place them in a 
position where, he believed, some of the forts and batteries 
would be unable to fire upon them. Second, once inside, the 
ships would have deeper water and more maneuvering room.12
DuPont's plan appears to owe something to advice he 
received from Captain John Rodgers on attacking Charleston. 
Rodgers' plan, set forth in a letter to DuPont, called for 
taking a position close enough to Fort Sumter to breach its
Figure 14. Typical Confederate barrel torpedo. (From 
Scharf, Confederate Navy. 757.)
walls but far enough away to render its cannon ineffective 
against the ironclads. Rodgers estimated, based upon a 
"very incomplete" account of British experiments he had 
read, that the ironclads would be secure at ranges of 1200 
to 1300 yards. Since "Beauregard breached the walls of Fort
12DuPont to Mrs. DuPont, April 6, 1863, ibid., 2: 552.
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Sumter" at a distance greater than this, he recommended 
positioning the ironclads near the center of Charleston 
Harbor, along the arc of a circle of 1250 yards radius cen­
tered on Sumter. "I should be inclined to anchor," he 
wrote, for "better aim, [and] less danger from torpedoes." 
Rodgers' chosen position was over a mile from Forts Moultrie 
and Johnson, permitting the ironclads to "take the forts 
successively in quiet."13
Beauregard, on the contrary, expected the Federals to 
run past the forts. If they did not, he expected that they 
would silence Battery Wagner on Morris Island first and then 
attack Sumter "where it is weakest,— i.e., the gorge, south­
east angle, and east face." The Federals might also
send one or more monitors during the night to take 
position in the small channel north of Cummings 
Point, within close range. . . . That mode of at­
tack being the one most to be apprehended should be 
guarded against, as well as our limited means will 
permit. . . ,14
Beauregard underestimated the draft of the monitors and the 
difficulty they would have in coping with Charleston's 
tricky tidal currents, and overestimated DuPont's daring.
DuPont's tactics were straightforward. He planned to 
cross the bar with New Ironsides, seven monitors and the
13John Rodgers to DuPont, October 29, 1862, ORN 13: 
421-22. Johnson, John Rodgers. 239-40.
14Beauregard to Ripley, February 8, 1863, United 
States, War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compi­
lation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate 
Armies 128 vols. (Washington: GPO, 1880-1901), ser. 1, 14:
769. Hereafter OR.
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hybrid Keokuk.15 The ships would form in line astern at 
two hundred yards interval, with the monitor Weehawken lead­
ing, New Ironsides fifth in line, and Keokuk last. The 
ships would pass up the main ship channel without returning 
the fire of the Morris Island batteries and open fire on 
Sumter "when within easy range." DuPont planned to remain 
underway and his preferred firing position was 600 to 800 
yards from the northwest face of the fort.16 After re­
ducing Sumter, the ships would return outside to destroy the 
batteries on Morris Island.
DuPont's choice of close action rather than Rodgers' 
plan of prolonged distant firing may have been influenced by 
the reported short life and unreliability of the monitors'
XV inch guns.17 By moving closer, he gained greater effect 
for his ships' guns in exchange for increasing their vul­
nerability to Confederate projectiles. Because of the prim­
itive state of gun fire control technology and the monitors' 
slow speed, keeping the monitors moving reduced slightly 
both their chances of hitting vital portions of the forts 
and the Confederates' chances of hitting them.
In choosing New Ironsides as his flagship and placing 
her in the center of the line, DuPont had his ability to
“Keokuk had a monitor's low freeboard but her two 
stationary "turrets" did not revolve.
“DuPont's plan of attack, April 4, 1863, ORN 14: 8-9.
17Johnson, John Rodgers. 240.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
100
direct his fleet foremost in his mind. The only reliable 
means of signalling from ship to ship in daylight was by 
hoisting signal flags. The ability of subordinates to see 
their commander's flag hoists depended upon the prevailing 
visibility, their distance from the flagship and the posi­
tion of the flagship's halyards upon which the signals were 
hoisted. DuPont could not change the visibility nor prevent 
it from being reduced by powder smoke in battle. He could 
control the other two factors by judicious selection of the 
flagship and the formation.
To this end, he chose Hew Ironsides as his flagship.
In addition to better accommodations for an admiral and his 
staff, with her high freeboard and tall masts New Ironsides 
provided a better signalling platform than any monitor. To 
minimize the distance over which signals would have to be 
seen, he placed the flagship in the center of the line of 
ships.18 Another benefit of having a monitor lead the line 
was that the shallower-draft monitors could act as pathfind­
ers for New Ironsides among the harbor shoals.
The battle did not go as DuPont planned. As Welles 
foresaw, the defenses had been "strengthened much faster 
than the assailants.1,19 The ironclads were to cross 
Charleston Bar on April 5, but the crossing took longer than
18"The New Ironsides being in the center, from which 
signals could be better made to both ends of the line." 
DuPont to Welles, April 15, 1863, ORN 14: 5.
19Welles, Diary, entry for March 17, 1863, 1: 249.
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expected. DuPont and his staff boarded New Ironsides at 
7:30 A.M. on April 6 and she finally crossed the bar at 9:00 
A.M. That afternoon the ships anchored in the planned line 
of battle.20 Due to this delay and to bad visibility, the 
attack, originally planned for April 6, was delayed until 
April 7. The Confederates had noted the unusual activity 
and were ready for "important movements."21
At 12:10 P.M. on April 7, 1863, DuPont signalled his 
ships to get underway (see Figure 15). Further delay was 
caused when a special torpedo-clearing raft, equipped with 
grapnels for catching and removing torpedoes, fouled the 
anchor chain of the Weehawken. the monitor that was to push 
it ahead of the formation. The force finally started up the 
channel at 1:15 P.M., and at 2:10 P.M. Weehawken. the 
leading ship, met the first obstructions.22
Weehawken/s Commanding Officer, John Rodgers, believed 
he saw a torpedo explode near his ship. Upon reaching the 
rope obstruction the Confederates had placed across the 
channel, he turned aside to avoid it, writing, "upon 
deliberate judgment I thought it right not to entangle the
20NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. April 6, 1863.
21"From the Bar," Charleston Daily Courier. April 6 
and 7, 1863; also, "Highly Important From the Bar," Charle­
ston Mercury. April 6, 1863: 2 and "The Hour at Hand," 
ibid., April 7, 1863: 2.
22Times are from DuPont's report. The times recorded 
in New Ironsides' Log are consistently ten to fifteen min­
utes earlier. NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. April 7, 1863.
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vessel in obstructions which I did not think we could have 
passed through and in which we should have been caught."23 
Rodgers' action threw the formation of ships into confu­
sion.24 Although DuPont later reported Weehawken had 250 
feet of rope wrapped around her propeller shaft and inferred 
that it came from the obstructions, the Confederates said 
she had not come within 600 yards of them.25
The Confederate batteries commenced firing about 3:00 
P.M. and at 3:15 P.M. DuPont signalled to Weehawken to begin 
the action. The monitors and Keokuk engaged the east and 
northeast faces of Fort Sumter, but no further attempt was 
made to pass or clear the rope obstruction. Beauregard 
claimed the ships "were baffled and driven back before 
reaching our lines of torpedoes and obstructions. . . ."26
A strong flood tide was making, pushing the ships into 
the obstructions. By 3:25 P.M. New Ironsides became unman­
ageable and DuPont signalled to disregard the motions of the
23John Rodgers to DuPont, April 8, 1863, ORN 14: 12.
24DuPont to Welles, April 15, 1863, ibid., 14: 6.
25DuPont to Welles, April 22, 1863, ibid., 14: 54. 
DuPont wrote two weeks after the attack, and Weehawken prob­
ably fouled the rope after the assault. For Confederate 
views, General Ripley to General Thomas Jordan, October 12, 
1863, ibid., 14: 107-108; Colonel William Butler to W. F. 
Nance, October 9, 1863, with endorsement by General T. L. 
Clingman of October 10, ibid., 14: 108-109; Colonel Alfred 
Rhett to Jordan, October 12, 1863, ibid., 14: 109-110.
Jones, Rebel War Clerk's Diary, entry for April 25, 1863, 
provides more contemporary evidence of Confederate opinion.
26Beauregard to General S. Cooper, May 24, 1863, ORN 
14: 76.
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flagship. At 3:30 P.M. New Ironsides anchored to avoid 
going aground but almost immediately hove up her anchor.27 
At 4:05 P.M. she was once again in difficulty, as shown by 
DuPont's signal to give the flagship more room. The moni­
tors Catskill and Nantucket. next astern of her, struck her 
at about that time.28 Keokuk, originally last in line, ran 
past her to within 500 yards of the fort. Confederate guns 
penetrated Keokuk's armor ninety times in thirty minutes of 
close action and she withdrew mortally wounded.
New Ironsides' officers believed their ship came 
within 800 yards of Sumter, but Turner's report credited her 
with 10 0 0 . 29 The smoke was so thick that Sumter could not 
be seen, and at times Turner could not see fifty yards from 
the ship.30 At 4:15 P.M. New Ironsides fired her port 
broadside at Fort Moultrie, her only shots during the ac­
tion.
In the midst of this, at 4:30 P.M. DuPont signalled 
his force to withdraw.31 Soon after, New Ironsides again
27The incident of the "boiler torpedo" probably 
occurred at this time.
28New Ironsides' Log records a brief anchorage at 3:30 
P.M., the signal for more room at 3:40 P.M., and the col­
lision at 3:45 P.M.
29Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, Ohio, 
John M. Butler Diary, 1862-1864, MSS 3947 (microfilm) (here­
after Butler Diary), entry for April 7, 1863; ORN 14: 26. 
Butler was a volunteer officer in New Ironsides.
“Butler Diary, entry for April 7, 1863; ORN 14: 26.
“DuPont to Welles, April 15, 1863, ibid., 14: 5-6.
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sheered badly and anchored for the second time. She hove up 
again at 4:45 and steamed down the channel.32 After nine­
ty minutes of fighting and with evening approaching, the 
ironclads departed.33 The ships had fired 139 shot and 
shell; the fortifications fifteen times that number.34
The attack was no surprise to the Confederates, either 
tactically or strategically.35 The forts and batteries had 
been instructed in detail on how to attack ironclads. Dis­
tance buoys were installed to permit close estimates of 
range, and there were obstructions liberally scattered 
through the channel.36 Torpedoes were also installed to 
block the channel, although there may not have actually been 
any in place in the obstructions when DuPont attacked.37
For New Ironsides, this first combat action showed
32NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. April 7, 1863.
33Sunset in Charleston during the first week in April 
was between 6:20 and 6:30 P.M.
34Abstract of ammunition expenditure, dated April 14, 
1863, and signed by Lieutenant A. S. Mackenzie, ORN 14: 27.
35Jones, Rebel War Clerk's Diary, entries for February 
5, 6, and 21; March 23 and 28; April 4, 6 and 7, 1863.
36Circular of Instructions from the Commanding General 
at Charleston, S.C., dated December 26, 1862, and signed by 
Brigadier General Roswell S. Ripley, ORN 14: 102-103.
37Weehawken supposedly saw explosions, and Beauregard 
wrote that installation of torpedoes began soon after he 
took command in September 1862. Pierre G. T. Beauregard, 
"Torpedo Service in the Harbor and Water Defences of Char­
leston," Southern Historical Society Papers (hereafter SHS 
Papers) 5, no. 4 (April 1878): 147-48. Other Confederates 
stated the only torpedo in place at the time was the large 
one which failed. Hayes, DuPont Letters, 3: 13, note 1.
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more of her deficiencies than of her strengths, although the 
small amount of damage she suffered was encouraging. Her 
chief deficiency was her inability to support Admiral DuPont 
as his fleet flagship, caused by her unique pilot house and 
touchy maneuvering qualities. DuPont, writing two months 
after the failure of his assault, was caustic. Calling the 
ship's defects "glaring," he particularly disliked "the 
contracted size of her pilot house and its improper location 
behind the enormous smokestack," which shut out all view 
ahead and "most materially interfer[ed] with the management 
of the vessel in battle. . . ."38
Turner's report cited three major deficiencies, all of 
which adversely affected shiphandling. First, the ship was 
unmanageable in the current. Second, the pilot house was 
too small, holding only three people. Third, the ship's 
draft placed her within a foot of the bottom during the 
action.39 Turner implied New Ironsides could not be navi­
gated effectively in combat.
The design of the pilot house contributed to DuPont's 
problems both directly and indirectly. The design of its 
small viewing ports and its placement on deck abaft the
38DuPont to Welles, June 3, 1863, ORN 14: 69.
39Turner to DuPont, April 10, 1863, ibid., 14: 25. A 
contemporary Union chart shows the channel depths to be 
approximately three fathoms, or 18 feet. "Charleston Harbor 
and Its Approaches, 1863," National Archives, Record Group 
23, Records of the Coast and Geodetic Survey, Special Civil 
War Maps.
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smoke stack directly reduced the Admiral's ability to see 
the battle and control the ship. The indirect impact of its 
small size was more serious. Merely four feet in inside 
diameter, it had room only for DuPont, his pilot Acting 
Master John W. Godfrey, and his fleet captain, Commander C. 
Raymond P. Rodgers.40
DuPont had considered the problem before the attack, 
calling the pilot house "miserably small." He told Turner 
that if Rodgers could not be in the pilot house with him, he 
would have to shift his flag to a monitor.41 Since DuPont 
insisted on Rodgers' presence, lack of room in the pilot 
house forced Turner to station himself on the gun deck.42 
This meant that Turner, the senior officer most familiar 
with the ship and most knowledgeable of her characteristics, 
could not contribute to maneuvering her in action.
Ship control, difficult enough under fire, was made 
even more difficult by being within a foot of grounding.
The full lines of the ship (Figure 16) combined with the 
shallow water to make steering difficult, and the novel
40Belknap opined it had only room for two. Belknap, 
[Contemporary Club], 15.
41DuPont to Mrs. DuPont, April 5, 1863, Hayes, DuPont 
Letters, 2: 546. If nothing else, the monitor pilot houses, 
being atop the turrets, had excellent all-around vision.
42Turner to DuPont, April 10, 1863, ORN 14: 25.
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Figure 16. Body and Sheer Plan of U.S.S. New Ironsides. (BuShips Plan 107-9-12M, 
redrawn by William J. Jurens.) The lettered stations correspond to the similarly 
lettered stations in Figure 1.
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articulated rudder probably aggravated the situation.43 
The need for precise control, and the frustration of being 
unable to get it, must have been a factor in DuPont's man­
agement of the battle. DuPont undoubtedly found that maneu­
vering his flagship took much attention, which detracted 
from his ability to control the fleet.44 Turner's report 
to DuPont noted the skill with which Godfrey kept the ship 
clear of the bottom, but the pilot's performance was de­
cidedly mixed: he kept the ship off the ground but did not 
maneuver her to be effective in combat.45
Much of the difficulty with ship control came only 
because the Admiral and his pilot were unfamiliar with the 
ship and what her Executive Officer, George Belknap, called 
"wrinkles in the management of the helm." DuPont and God­
frey did not board the ship until April 6.46 As shown by
43NARG 19, Plan 107-9-12M. The lines did not permit 
smooth flow to the rudder. With the ship's hull only a foot 
from the bottom, rudder effectiveness would be reduced by 25 
percent. Crenshaw, Naval Shiphandlino, 20-25, for forces 
affecting a single-screw ship. Stephen B. Luce, Text-Book 
of Seamanship, rev. ed. (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1884), 
538-48, is understandably less sophisticated.
44Notes from Papers of Rear-Admiral DuPont, U.S. Navy, 
on the attack on Fort Sumter, April 6, 1863, ORN 14: 28.
The old saying about a collision at sea ruining your whole 
day is apropos. DuPont wrote, "This ship would not 
steer . . . and had to be anchored twice." DuPont to Mrs. 
DuPont, April 8, 1863, John D. Hayes, ed., DuPont Letters, 
vol. 3, The Repulse: 1863-1865. 3.
45ORN 14: 25.
46Belknap, "Reminiscent of the 'New Ironsides'," 68. 
Belknap later said Godfrey was "utterly ignorant" of the 
ship and handled her badly. Belknap, [Contemporary Club],
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her later movements in the same channel, at night and under 
fire, New Ironsides would have given a better account of 
herself had her own Commanding Officer and pilot been per­
mitted to maneuver her instead of DuPont and Godfrey.47
DuPont's tactical leadership is also open to critical 
discussion. Foremost is the question of whether DuPont 
should have led the formation as he did at Port Royal. The 
advantage of leading the line was that he could draw his 
ships on by example. A resolute commander could execute the 
simple and direct "follow the leader" by force of will, 
without relying on a subordinate, as when Admiral David G. 
Farragut took the lead at Mobile Bay and saved the day for 
the Union. Civil War gun fire control, even from shore 
batteries, was poor enough that the leading ship ran little 
increased risk of being hit by concentrated fire. Against 
this, "follow me" leadership put the leader in the most 
hazardous position because leading the line increased the 
commander's exposure to torpedoes.48 It also reduced his
16. Belknap incorrectly wrote the attack was the first time 
Godfrey handled the ship; she crossed the bar "in charge of 
Pilot (Mr. Godfrey)." George E. Belknap, "Reminiscent of the 
Siege of Charleston," in Naval Actions and History 1799-1898 
(Boston: Military Historical Society of Massachusetts,
1902), 170; NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. April 6, 1863.
47Pilot Benjamin Dorey worked New Ironsides up to 
Moultrie "in the night without lights, bearings or compass." 
Captain S. C. Rowan to Rear Admiral John A. Dahlgren, Sep­
tember 10, 1863, Report . . . Armored Vessels. 240.
48At New Orleans and Mobile, Farragut was dissuaded by 
his captains from leading the line due to the perceived 
torpedo risk. Clarence Edward Macartney, Mr. Lincoln's
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ability to control all of his ships at once.
DuPont knew New Ironsides could not operate outside 
the narrow channel. By choosing a position in the middle of 
the line to increase his ability to communicate, DuPont 
foreclosed his option to haul out of line and take the lead 
if necessary. At the decisive moment of his attack he had 
to rely completely upon John Rodgers's judgment that the 
obstructions could not be passed.
Although Rodgers had an excellent reputation, his 
conduct shows a keen appreciation of risk but not of possi­
ble gain.49 Without trying to pass the obstructions or use 
the grapnel-equipped torpedo clearing raft, he turned away 
from the obstructions and disrupted the formation.
From his position in the middle of the line, DuPont
could do little to rectify the situation. A British
critique opined that the Federals were repulsed
because their vessels were delayed under the enemy's 
guns. . . .  It will have been seen how little, 
after all, the Confederate obstructions were re­
quired to do. Only one vessel, the Weehawken, . . . 
was directly affected by them. The others . . . 
thus thrown into partial confusion . . . half an 
hour's firing then completed their discomfiture.50
DuPont's disposition of New Ironsides was, on balance, 
adequate. Disregarding her steering qualities, which could
Admirals (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1956), 43, 64-65.
49G. F. Eliot considered him to be "probably the best 
captain of the war." Ibid., viii.
S0H. W. Tyler, "Spithead and Harbour Defence," Journal 
RUSI 8, no. 31 (1864): 145.
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have been overcome by skilled handling, New Ironsides' sig­
nificant tactical characteristics were her relatively deep 
draft, soft ends, and great offensive power on the broad­
side. Her draft and her restricted forward visibility made 
it unwise to place her at the head of the line, especially 
since she could not cast the lead from the bows. Her soft 
ends could not be helped, but her powerful battery was best 
placed near the head of the line to aid in suppressing Con­
federate defensive fire. DuPont might have improved his 
formation by stationing New Ironsides second in line, to 
give "encouragement" to the leader, or by leaving New Iron­
sides in the middle of the line and transferring himself to 
the leading or the second monitor.
During her first trial by fire, New Ironsides was hit 
by more than fifty Confederate shot and shell.51 The dam­
age she received, which set the pattern for her later en­
gagements with the Charleston fortifications, was of four 
types: Projectiles which struck the side armor, the port 
shutters, the armored spar deck, and the unarmored areas.
Projectiles that struck the side armor were of little 
concern. Those that struck obliquely glanced off. Shot 
that struck squarely might indent the armor, perhaps 
cracking it or crushing the wood backing behind it, without
“Abstract log of the U.S.S. New Ironsides. April 7, 
1863, ORN 14: 26.
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doing significant damage (Figure 17).52
Projectiles that struck the port shutters frequently 
broke them; if they broke in two, the detached part fell 
overboard. Replacement port shutters were shipped from the 
North to be installed on station.53
Captain Turner had written to Admiral Smith a week
Figure 17. Damage to New Ironsides/ armor from Confederate 
fire at Charleston. (Official Records . ♦ . Navies. 15: 
555)
before the attack, discussing the port shutters at length. 
He worried, "should a shot strike the bolts upon which they 
pivot, and vibrate— doubtless they would be disabled and 
perhaps the free action of them obstructed." He wanted to
“Abstract Log of the U.S.S. New Ironsides. April 7, 
1863, ibid., 14: 26; Turner to Smith, April 25, 1863, NARG 
71, Entry 5, Box 449, 2: 33.
530n April 23, 1863, Lenthall directed Commodore 
Charles K. Stribling, Commandant of the Philadelphia Navy 
Yard, to send replacements. NARG 3.9,- Entry 54, 2: 223. 
Several orders were eventually made.
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reshape them to work "longitudinally on the ship's sides—  
instead of on the arc of a circle as now— moving in grooves 
fitted on the outside of the [armor] cladding." They were 
to be held to the ship's side with bolts "through the entire 
wood of the ship's side and the cladding" and operated by 
tackles attached to the inside of each shutter.54
During the battle on April 7, one shutter was carried 
away by a shot, but Turner did not mention it or press the 
case for his modification, when he wrote to Smith shortly 
after the battle. Despite the number of times shutters were 
damaged, they did not jam, and the proposed alteration, 
which would have been very expensive, was never made.55 
This was for the better as it would have weakened the armor 
and complicated the working of the guns.
Projectiles that struck the deck were a greater 
threat. In addition to penetration of the deck, Turner saw 
another problem "fraught with danger" to the gun crews. The 
spar deck planking was secured to the iron deck plating by 
screws, about three inches long, projecting up through the 
iron into the wood. These screws were knocked loose from 
the overhead in the battery when shot struck the spar deck.
54Turner to Smith, April 2, 1863, NARG 71, Entry 5,
Box 449, 2: 7.
“Turner to Smith, April 25, 1863, ibid., 2: 33. No 
report of damage mentions inability to serve a gun. ORN 14: 
26, 460, 534, 555. The change, clearly shipyard work, could 
have been made only in the 1864 refit, but Shippen describes 
the ship after that refit as having shutters "much indented 
by shot." Shippen, "Fort Fisher," 11.
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Turner wrote, "... a shot striking anywhere over 
them, drives them out— when corroded by the iron-rust— They 
fly out bodily— like bullets and would kill men standing 
underneath."56 His fears were groundless; although the 
deck was hit repeatedly in various engagements and received 
shots that completely broke the deck plating, no serious 
injuries from this cause were recorded.57
The fourth category, projectiles that struck the un­
armored areas of the ship, generally caused no significant 
damage.58 They were always a concern since the lack of 
protective bulkheads between the gun and berth decks, and 
the lack of a protective deck other than the spar deck, made 
the machinery and steering gear vulnerable.
The armored bulkheads between the spar deck and gun 
deck protected the battery itself, but a shot could pass 
through the spar deck and diagonally down through the wooden 
gun deck outside the battery to reach the engines or rudder. 
Similarly, a shot could pass through the stern above the 
armor and reach the rudder head and tiller. Turner was well 
aware of this. As he wrote before the April 7 attack,
56Turner to Smith, April 25, 1863, NARG 71, Entry 5,
Box 449, 2: 33.
57For instances of deck damage, July 24, 1863, ORN 14: 
392; August 17, 1863, Bishop to Rowan, August 16[17], 1863, 
ibid., 14: 460; Rowan to Dahlgren, November 29, 1863, ibid., 
15: 142.
580n various occasions, railings, boats and cabin fur­
nishings were damaged. Ibid., 14: 392, 408, 409, 460, 509.
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If her iron bulkheads had been dropped to the berth 
deck and she had been given twenty inches more 
vertically of iron-plating around her bows, and 
quarters— there would have been no necessity for 
these additional safe-guards of sand-bags.59
Without the armored bulkheads upon which Bartol had 
insisted, the ship would have been tactically useless 
against fortifications. As it was, the ship control prob­
lems noted above were aggravated by the need to minimize the 
unarmored areas presented to enemy fire. DuPont recognized 
this before the attack, stating, "she is not so strong as 
the monitors, or has many more vulnerable places."60 Con­
cern became acute after the Charleston attack. Turner 
deemed it "most important" to give the rudder "an iron-clad 
protection— in any way it can possibly done."61 No addi­
tions to the bow and stern protection were made, however, 
and she remained vulnerable there throughout her career.
Had the Confederates' defensive torpedo system worked 
as planned, improving the ship's protection would not have 
been an issue— New Ironsides would have been sunk in the 
April 7 attack. During that attack, New Ironsides spent 
about ten minutes anchored in the main ship channel directly
"Turner to Smith, April 2, 1863, NARG 71, Entry 5,
Box 449, 2: 7.
60DuPont to Mrs. DuPont, April 6, 1863, Hayes, DuPont 
Letters, 2: 552. C. Raymond P. Rodgers told New Ironsides' 
Executive Officer, "If the first fire of the enemy does not 
strip the armor off this vessel, I will be agreeably sur­
prised." Belknap, [Contemporary Club], 13.
“Turner to Smith, April 25, 1863, NARG 71, Entry 5,
Box 449, 2: 33.
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over a Confederate torpedo made from an old boiler filled 
with 3,000 pounds of powder.62 The torpedo had an electric 
detonator, and Captain Langdon Cheves, C.S.A., tried repeat­
edly to set it off.
Cheves' efforts failed and New Ironsides escaped. He
was reported to have said
that for ten minutes he could not have placed the 
Ironsides more directly over it if he had been al­
lowed to, but the confounded thing, as is usual, 
would not go off . . . The insulation of the wire, I 
suppose, defective.63
Scharf states one of the wires had been severed by a wagon 
passing over it, but the man who built the torpedo, Assis­
tant Engineer Ch. G. de Lisle, noted three possible causes 
for the failure: a leak in the boiler, a rupture of the 
cable, or a defect in the fuze. He reported that the cable 
to the torpedo was twice the intended one mile length, and 
surmised, "the distance of the poles in the fuse was too 
great for the length of the cable." De Lisle was probably
“From location and time, this was during her second 
anchorage. Map of Approaches to Charleston, S.C., ORN 14, 
facing page 1 (Figure 13 above). This chart includes the 
torpedo's position. A deserter claimed it contained 12,000 
pounds of powder, but its builders said 3,000. Statement of 
Seaman John B. Patrick, June 27, 1864, ORN 9: 770; report by 
Assistant Engineer Ch. G. de Lisle to Beauregard, May 25, 
1863, OR, ser. 1, 14: 949-50.
“Captain Francis H. Harleston, C.S.A., to Lieutenant 
James Thurston, C.S.M.C., April 26, 1863, ORN 14: 111. For 
a flowery narrative, A. W. Taft, "The Signal Service Corps.
A Tribute to Their Arduous and Invaluable Services During 
the War." SHS Papers 25 (1897): 132-3. Surveyors' transits 
were used to determine when the ship was over the torpedo.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
118
correct.64 Considering the damage later inflicted by a 
much smaller charge (Chapter 7 below), New Ironsides could 
not have survived the explosion of 3,000 pounds of gunpowder 
under her keel.
Although her protection proved sound, New Ironsides 
did not make the offensive contribution expected of her by 
both Federals and Confederates. Due to her maneuvering 
difficulties she fired only eight rounds, although the Con­
federates credited her with considerably more, believing she 
was to "perform the lion's share" of the reduction of the 
defenses.65 As a result of her disappointing performance, 
the opinions formed of her by her Commanding Officer and 
Admiral were unfavorable and she became an issue in the 
controversy surrounding DuPont's failure to resume the at­
tack after his first effort was repulsed.66
Convinced of the fleet's inability to take the city, 
DuPont asserted he could not renew the attack due to the
64Scharf, Confederate N a w . 750. Seaman Patrick 
averred that the wires had been "cut by the man who invented 
the torpedo. ..."  ORN 9: 770. For De Lisle's opinion, De 
Lisle to Beauregard, May 25, 1863, OR, ser. 1, 14: 951-52.
“Lieutenant A. S. Mackenzie, Ordnance Officer, to 
DuPont, April 14, 1863, ORN 14: 27. "The Attack on Charles­
ton," Charleston Daily Courier. April 8, 1863, 2? "The Siege 
of Charleston," ibid., April 11, 1863, 2; also "The Attack 
on Charleston Opens," Charleston Mercury. April 8, 1863, 1.
“DuPont originally contemplated a much longer action. 
He wrote that the monitors' XV-inch guns needed repairs 
after each day's fight, while "we may be a week before a 
result is gained at Charleston." DuPont to James Stokes 
Biddle, March 25, 1863, Hayes, DuPont Letters. 2: 509.
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heavy damage to the monitors.67 He claimed he had never
advised the attack on Charleston, but as Welles wrote,
He certainly never discouraged it . . . DuPont 
claimed the right to perform this great work . . .
His third dispatch since the battle, brings me the 
first intelligence he has thought proper to 
communicate of an adverse character.68
Others disagreed with DuPont's assessment, blaming him for
the failure and for exaggerating the monitors' injuries, and
he was roughly handled in the press.
The Baltimore American published the severest
criticism, written by Charles C. Fulton, a reporter whom
DuPont believed had the sanction of the Navy Department.69
Fulton wrote of the "dreadful fear that overshadowed the
fleet authorities" of torpedoes and stated his belief: "The
great work has been entrusted to incompetent hands."70
Aboard New Ironsides, initial acceptance of failure
turned to resentment of DuPont and of the ship's meager
participation. On April 8, Lieutenant John M. Butler wrote
67DuPont to Welles, April 8, 1863, ORN 14: 3, and 
April 15, 1863, ibid., 14: 6-7. DuPont feared Confederate 
salvage of a sunken monitor, writing, "What most oppresses 
me is the possible losing of the ironclads, more or less— in 
which case we lose the whole coast. ..." DuPont to Henry 
Winter Davis, April 1, 1863, Hayes, DuPont Letters. 2: 533.
68Welles, Diary, entry for April 21, 1863, 1: 277.
69DuPont to Welles, April 22, 1863, ORN 14: 51-56. 
DuPont wrote, "Fulton came especially down to represent the 
monitor interest in full sympathy with Fox." DuPont to H.
W. Davis, Hayes, DuPont Letters, 3: 78. Fox denied it. For 
political implications, Niven, Gideon Welles. 435.
70 "Newspaper clipping from the Baltimore American of 
April 15, 1863," signed C. C. F[ulton], in ORN 14: 57-59.
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the repulse was "not much after all— we may grow again," but
on April 9 he noted, "Sumter is still looking us in the
face . . .  we have been too slow." On April 13 he wrote,
"We feel more and more the effects of not fighting this
ship. All are blue."71 In his more restrained fashion,
Belknap said,
The officers and men had unbounded faith in the 
prowess of the ship, and sore was their disappoint­
ment at this day's failure. Sorer still was the 
feeling when it was given out on the next morning 
that the attack would not be renewed. . . .72
Belknap was not alone in his opinion, but others gave 
more vigorous vent to their feelings. Edward Kershner, Hew 
Ironsides' Assistant Surgeon, wrote a letter to the American 
attacking DuPont. He stated, "the strongest ships and 
heaviest battery that ever floated" would "wait until the 
Government sends— not more iron-clads— but a MAH to take 
Charleston."73 When DuPont departed Hew Ironsides after 
the Charleston attack, Turner ordered his crew to cheer the
71Butler Diary, entries for April 8, 9, 13, 1863.
72Belknap, "Siege of Charleston," 171. A Philadelphia 
newspaper stated, based on a letter from the ship, "All on 
board have great confidence in the ship and in Captain Turn­
er, and think that the Hew Ironsides can take Charleston 
alone." "Particulars of the Attack on Charleston," Phila­
delphia Daily Evening Bulletin. Monday, April 13, 1863, 1.
73DuPont preferred charges, Kershner admitted guilt, 
and a Court Martial sentenced him to dismissal, but Welles 
retained him in the Havy. General Court Martial of Edward 
Kershner, June 5, 1863, Case Ho. 3253, national Archives, 
Record Group 125, Records of the Judge Advocate General 
(Havy), Microfilm Entry M273, Records of General Courts- 
Martial and Courts of Inquiry of the Havy Department, 1799- 
1867, Roll 108.
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Admiral; they refused.74
Captain Turner's own statements show an ambivalence 
which appears to be the result of pride in his ship warring 
with his innate pessimism and his desire to support DuPont, 
his friend and superior. Turner's opinion of New Ironsides 
varied with time. In August 1862, he took command with con­
fidence, calling New Ironsides "the noblest specimen of 
naval architecture." He sent word to friends in Charleston 
that he hoped they had good wine since he expected to come 
to drink it, but there were still questions in some minds 
about his attitude. In October 1862 Rear Admiral Lee wrote 
to Assistant Secretary Fox, "As to Turner I knew nothing of 
his 'temper' in regard to the Government and the War. . . .
I shall now have an opportunity to sound him about the War 
as you seem to desire."75
Turner's initial report to Welles in 1862 was followed 
by a highly complimentary letter to Merrick & Sons, written 
soon after the trial trip to Newport News. After that,
74For the cheering incident, Journal of Surgeon Marius 
DuVall, quoted in Report . . . Armored Vessels. 276; DuPont 
to Turner, May 14, 1864, Hayes, DuPont Letters. 3: 342; Bel­
knap, "Siege of Charleston," 171. Butler wrote, "The 
Admiral leaves on the James A[dger] . . .  no one cheers the 
Admiral." Butler Diary, entry for April 12, 1863.
75"Noblest specimen" from Turner to Dahlgren, Septem­
ber 10 [1862], Dahlgren Papers. For Charleston friends,
Mrs. DuPont to DuPont, August 28, 1862, Hayes, DuPont Let­
ters. 2: 229n. For Lee's comment, Thompson, Correspondence 
of Fox. 2: 220. DuPont wrote, "He [Turner] has the same way 
of speaking discouragingly as formerly— trims his political 
views. Very sound, however, and very anti-South on the 
war." Hayes, DuPont Letters. 2: 372.
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Turner's letters became more pessimistic and critical.76 
His anxiety at being off a lee shore at Charleston increased 
until even DuPont became exasperated.77 After finding in 
Port Royal that he "never could get him along with his 
work," DuPont was surprised at Turner's return on February 
7, 1863, and wrote, "Turner came on board with a long report 
of complaints and dangers."78
Yet after the April 7, 1863, attack, Turner became 
less, or at least no more, pessimistic. He stated in his 
report that the ship's damage, except the loss of a port 
shutter, was not material, although he opined that had she 
been in closer action, "not one port shutter could have been 
left."79 In a letter to Smith, he complained, "In a sea
76Turner to Welles, August 27, 1862, in Report . . . 
Armored Vessels. 30. Turner to Merrick & Sons, September 
22, 1862, NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 448, 2: 79. Also Turner's 
report of the trip to Port Royal, stressing the risk of a 
lee shore to a ship with such low power: "Nothing could save 
her but her anchors." Turner to DuPont, January 19, 1863, 
ORN 13: 518-19.
77"I desire that the Navy Department may be undeceived 
if they supposed that this ship was equal to any such ser­
vice [at anchor off Charleston]. . . this vessel is not 
calculated for any outside work, and should avail herself of 
the most favorable opportunities to get from port to port as 
soon as she can." Turner to DuPont, February 6, 1863, 
ibid., 13: 646-48. Events proved her equal to the task.
78DuPont to Mrs. DuPont, February 1, 1863, Hayes, Du­
Pont Letters. 2: 405. DuPont to Mrs. DuPont, February 7, 
1863, ibid., 2: 416. DuPont later wrote, "He [Turner] is a 
queer man; I believe (indeed I know) he is a devoted friend 
of mine, but he has disturbed my equanimity more since he 
has joined my squadron than any other officer in it." Du­
Pont to Mrs. DuPont, March 18, 1863, ibid., 2: 494 and note.
79Turner to DuPont, April 10, 1863, ORN 14: 26.
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fight at close quarters— she would be terrible," but, "She 
is not adapted to this kind of [blockade] service— and is 
deteriorating every day under the wear and tear of it."80
At a later Court of Inquiry, Turner testified that New 
Ironsides had received damage in the April 7 attack, but 
there was nothing to impair her efficiency in the slightest 
degree. He stated, "She was as ready to go into the fight 
ten minutes afterwards as she ever was. . . .  No shot or 
shell entered the iron-clad part of the Ironsides."81
After the attack, DuPont quickly was convinced that 
the monitors were worthless. As early as April 8 he told 
Major General David Hunter, "These monitors are miserable 
failures where forts are concerned. . . ,"82 For the New 
Ironsides, however, he initially had kinder words. Far from 
worthless, on April 11 DuPont wrote Welles to say it was 
"absolutely necessary" that New Ironsides should remain at 
Charleston as "the great protective force of the blockading 
vessels" against Confederate raids.83 On April 16, DuPont 
wrote, "But for the Ironsides the raid of the 31st January
80Turner to Smith, April 25, 1863, NARG 71, Entry 5,
Box 449, 2: 33.
^Turner's testimony at the Stimers Court of Inquiry, 
Report . . . Armored Vessels. 148-49. The Charleston press 
claimed "the plating could be distinctly seen to peel off," 
but this was wishful thinking. "The Siege of Charleston," 
Charleston Daily Courier. April 11, 1863, 1.
82DuPont to Hunter, April 8, 1863, ORN 14: 30-31.
83DuPont to Welles, April 11, 1863, in Report . . . 
Armored Vessels. 85-86.
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would have been repeated with more serious effect."84
DuPont's attitude toward the ship became more critical 
as time passed and he received more press abuse about the 
attack. In May, a month after the battle, he told Congress­
man Henry Winter Davis that he was most attacked in the 
Philadelphia press "just in the proportion that the Iron­
sides is more worthless than the monitors . . . she is the 
greatest sham of all. . . ."85 He wrote another friend of
. . . the greater worthlessness of the Ironsides as 
compared with the monitors, for defective as the 
latter are they have some merits. The Ironsides has 
none except of accommodation for men and officers—  
and is a capital scarecrow, for the rebels have not 
found her out yet, and she keeps in the rams from 
pouncing again on the blockaders.86
DuPont's deteriorating opinion of New Ironsides was 
thus motivated by his desire to assign the blame for failure 
at Charleston to someone or something other than himself.
As the controversy grew more heated, his opinion of all 
ironclads become less favorable.
Eventually, to vindicate himself, DuPont requested a 
court martial for Chief Engineer Alban C. Stimers, the
84DuPont to Welles, ORN 14: 139.
85DuPont to Davis, May 3, 1863, Hayes, DuPont Letters. 
3: 78. The emphasis is DuPont's. The Philadelphia Evening 
Bulletin noted that Farragut took the forts below New Or­
leans with a wooden fleet. "It is absurd, then, to suppose 
that forts cannot be taken by iron-clad vessels whose im­
pregnability has been thoroughly proved." "The Iron-Clads," 
Philadelphia Daily Evening Bulletin. April 17, 1863, 4.
86DuPont to Biddle, May 4, 1863, Hayes, DuPont Let­
ters. 3: 86.
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General Inspector of Ironclads. DuPont believed that 
Stimers encouraged Fulton, the Baltimore American reporter, 
with false and unfounded statements. According to DuPont, 
Stimers said the monitors received less damage than DuPont 
claimed and DuPont was "too much prejudiced against the 
monitors to be willing to give them a fair trial."87
Stimers was competent but overly ambitious. He 
supervised construction of the original Monitor and was 
favorably mentioned in the accounts of her stormy passage to 
Hampton Roads and her battle with the Virginia. After that 
action, he returned to New York as General Inspector of 
Ironclads, the principal assistant to Rear Admiral Francis 
Gregory, the General Superintendent of Ironclads. As such, 
he directly supervised the construction of the many monitors 
being built along the eastern seaboard.
Self-centered and overconfident, Stimers was no friend 
of Engineer-in-Chief Isherwood because he wanted that post 
for himself.88 His report of the battle of Charleston, 
which defended the monitors (and denigrated New Ironsides),
87DuPont to Welles, May 12, 1863, ORN 14: 59-60.
88Edward William Sloan, III, Beniamin Franklin Isher- 
wood Naval Engineer: The Years as Engineer in Chief. 1861- 
1869 (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute Press, 1965), 
71, 74-76. Stimers later designed the notoriously defective 
"light-draft monitors." Sloan recounts that Stimers was or­
dered to the light-draft Tunxis in 1864. "He discovered a 
plaque . . . [stating the vessel was built] 'from designs 
prepared by Alban C. Stimers . . .' Reflecting on the repu­
tation of this class of vessel, Stimers for once became 
modest of publicity and proceeded to cut his name out of the 
plate with a cold chisel." Ibid., 77.
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was a masterpiece of "political" engineering in support of 
the Department's monitor construction program.
Secretary Welles confided that DuPont wanted "to lay 
his failure [at Charleston] on the ironclads, and with such 
a court as he would organize, and such witnesses as he has 
already trained, he would procure Stimers and vessels to be 
condemned." Saying he would not put anyone whom DuPont 
"wished to make a victim, in his power," Welles appointed a 
court of inquiry (vice a court martial) to investigate. 
"Nothing less will satisfy DuPont, who wants a victim."89
DuPont's failure first to press home and then to renew
his attack on Charleston was due to his own mental state.
Belknap reported,
John Irwin, then executive officer of the Wabash 
[DuPont's flagship] reportedly said: 'DuPont was 
beaten before we left Hilton Head. The reason was 
that he had contemplated defeat with more earnest­
ness down there than he had counted upon 
success. /9°
His attitude, which Welles assessed as "imparting his doubts 
to his subordinates, until all are impressed with his 
apprehensions," made it impossible for him to succeed. Yet 
his pride, and perhaps fear of being relieved, kept him from
89Welles, Diary, entry for May 20, 1863, 1: 307. Af­
ter testimony from most of the officers commanding ironclads 
in the attack, the court, under Rear Admiral Gregory (Sti­
mers' immediate superior), recommended no further action on 
the charges. Report . . . Armored Vessels. 114-69.
90Belknap, "Siege of Charleston," 166.
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resigning or making clear his objection to the attack.91
DuPont, for his part, believed most of the attacks 
upon him in the press came "from the mechanics in the squad­
ron and the representatives in the machine shop," and wrote 
that Harman Newell, Chief Engineer of New Ironsides, was 
"Mr. Merrick's agent, as Stimers was for Ericsson. ..."
He stated the idea of the "clever men": "Charleston could 
have been readily taken if naval officers had believed in 
the irresistible machines in their hands."92
Whatever the beliefs of the "clever men," DuPont 
clearly had no faith in the ironclads. New Ironsides en­
gaged in no more combat operations while DuPont commanded 
the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron.93
91K. Jack Bauer, "Samuel Francis DuPont: Aristocratic 
Professional," in Captains of the Old Steam Navv: Makers of 
the American Naval Tradition 1840-1880. ed. James C. Brad­
ford (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute Press, 1986), 
154, 158-59. In October 1862 DuPont refused Dahlgren as his 
second-in-command, and Welles did not force the issue. Du­
Pont knew Dahlgren earnestly desired the command and stood 
high in President Lincoln's favor. For Dahlgren's attitude, 
Dahlgren to Welles, October 11, 1862, ORN 13: 377-78.
92DuPont to Mrs. DuPont, May 2, 1863, Hayes, DuPont 
Letters, 3: 74. DuPont to H.W. Davis, May 3, 1863, ibid.,
3: 78-79.
93After the April 7 attack, New Ironsides settled into 
a "blockade service" routine. Prior to the attack, she 
turned her engines (for testing) once or twice a week only. 
Commencing April 19, 1863, she steamed to her anchor from 
about 8:00 P.M. until dawn each day, maintaining propeller 
revolutions for about one knot. This increased readiness 
but consumed more coal and increased wear on the machinery. 
NARG 19, Entry 1072, Steam Log of New Ironsides. April 19- 
July 8, 1863.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
COMBAT VETERAN: MATURE REFLECTION
On July 6, 1863, Rear Admiral John A. B. Dahlgren 
relieved Rear Admiral DuPont as Commander of the South At­
lantic Blockading Squadron.1 Dahlgren's plans for the 
Squadron took full advantage of New Ironsides' unique capa­
bilities, and under his command she made a contribution to 
the Siege of Charleston unmatched by any other ship.
Dahlgren's arrival had an immediate if inadvertent 
effect on New Ironsides. As a result of DuPont's departure, 
the ship lost her first Commanding Officer, Commodore Thomas 
Turner, who was relieved at his own request.
There were several reasons for Turner's departure. 
First, before Dahlgren was promoted to rear admiral, Turner 
was considerably senior to him, in a service where seniority 
was jealously guarded.2 Second, Dahlgren had not commanded 
at sea as a commander or captain, and had not seen action in
^ivil War Naval Chronology. III-110.
2"Relative rank defined one's shipboard quarters, 
one's seat at the mess table, one's duties, one's social 
habits, indeed, often one's very friends." Peter Karsten, 
The Naval Aristocracy (New York: The Free Press, 1972), 63. 
Dahlgren was promoted Captain on August 5, 1862, and Rear 
Admiral on February 27, 1863. Allison, "Dahlgren," 26.
128
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the Civil War. Third, Turner had earlier been at odds with 
Dahlgren over the gun carriage problem.
As Welles confided to his diary, there was discontent 
because of Dahlgren's promotion. DuPont spoke for many when 
he wrote about Dahlgren: "He chose one line in the walks of 
his profession while [Rear Admiral Andrew H.] Foote and I 
chose another; he was licking cream while we were eating 
dirt. .. . "  Welles told Dahlgren that if officers who had 
been senior to him wanted to be transferred, the Department 
would permit it.3
Turner was one such officer. Anticipating that DuPont 
would be relieved, Turner wrote to Foote, expressing his 
willingness to serve under Foote but not under Dahlgren. 
Although he understood Turner's "natural and proper" views 
on Dahlgren, Welles was on the whole displeased with this 
letter, in which Turner wrote of the "miserable monitors," 
built to fill the pockets of speculators.4 When Foote died 
enroute to the command and Dahlgren replaced him, Turner 
chose not to remain. His departure probably distressed 
neither Welles nor Dahlgren. On July 6, 1863, Captain
3Welles, Diary, entry for June 21, 1863, 1: 337. Du­
Pont to Fox, October 8, 1862, Hayes, DuPont Letters. 2: 243.
4In Welles' words, "Tom Turner is a simple dupe, and 
merely echoes the insinuations of another [DuPont], who 
moulds him at pleasure and is demoralizing that entire com­
mand." Ibid., entry for May 27, 1863, 1: 314. Turner's 
change in feeling from the "my dear friend" of his letter of 
September 10, 1862, probably came more from Dahlgren's rapid 
promotion than from the carriage problem.
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Stephen C. Rowan relieved Turner as Commanding Officer of 
New Ironsides.5
Stephen Clegg Rowan was born in Ireland on Christmas 
Day, 1808, emigrating at the age of ten to join his parents 
in Pigua, Ohio. He entered the Navy in 1826, served in the 
Seminole and Mexican Wars, and distinguished himself in the 
North Carolina sounds early in the Civil War. Fox proposed 
him as Commanding Officer of New Ironsides as early as Sep­
tember 1862: "If he [Turner] wishes to give up the command, 
S. C. Rowan would be an admirable man. . . ."6
Although not as cautious as Turner, Rowan still laid 
stress on the navigational dangers besetting his ship. In 
July 1863 he wrote to Dahlgren that his position inside the 
bar was unsafe; Dahlgren's comment was, "Curious 1 The 'Iron­
sides' has been at her anchor in all weather outside in the 
open sea for a year, and yet here within the bar she is 
unsafe. ..." In August, Dahlgren wrote, "Rowan is 
terribly careful about that vessel."7 In battle, however,
belles wrote in May, "There would be bitter opposi­
tion to Dahlgren from some good officers as well as Tom 
Turner [emphasis added], were he given the squadron."
Ibid., entry for May 27, 1863, 1: 315. Turner was relieved 
July 6 and left the ship July 7, 1863.
®For Fox's proposal, Fox to S. P. Lee, September 11, 
1862, Thompson, Correspondence of Fox. 2: 212. After 
leaving New Ironsides in 1864, Rowan commanded in the North 
Carolina sounds. He was promoted to Rear Admiral in 1866 
and retired as a Vice Admiral in 1889. He died March 31, 
1890. Appleton's Cyclopaedia, s.v. "Rowan, Stephen C."
DAB, s.v. "Rowan, Stephen C." NARG 24, Records of Officers.
7Dahlgren, Memoir, 404, 410.
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Rowan handled his ship boldly and resolutely.
Upon taking command of the South Atlantic Blockading 
Squadron, Dahlgren lost no time in resuming active opera­
tions against Charleston. On July 10, 1863, Brigadier Gen­
eral Quincy A. Gillmore attacked Fort Wagner on Morris Is­
land. The Confederates repulsed the Army's coup de main and 
Gillmore began a siege, with Dahlgren's ships providing 
heavy naval gunfire support for the Army troops.
Between February and July, New Ironsides' mission had 
changed. She was designed and built to fight other ships, 
specifically ironclad ships, and her first employment was to 
counter a Confederate ironclad threat to Hampton Roads.
When she first went to Charleston it was to protect the 
blockading fleet from the Confederate ironclads Chicora and 
Palmetto State. As the number of Union ironclads available 
increased and more than one could be kept on station at 
Charleston, the threat from Confederate ironclads became 
proportionately less severe. DuPont's April 7, 1863, as­
sault marked the change in the ship's primary mission, from 
ship-versus-ship action to shore bombardment.8
The April 7 attack was the first time New Ironsides 
was used for shore bombardment. Although she made a poor 
showing then, her large battery made her a unique asset to
8New Ironsides' secondary mission remained the protec­
tion of the blockading fleet for one overriding reason: she 
was the only Union ironclad which could remain on station 
and fight her guns in any weather.
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any attack on fortifications. As a result, once Dahlgren 
arrived New Ironsides was soon back in action. On July 18, 
1863, she attacked Fort Wagner, an action which set the 
pattern for her participation in the "Siege of Charleston."
This attack, coordinated with the Army, was Dahlgren's 
first opportunity to engage the enemy. His correspondence 
with General Gillmore shows his high estimate of New Iron­
sides. The ship was scheduled to cross Charleston Bar on 
July 14, but due to low tides and heavy seas she was de­
layed. Dahlgren so informed Gillmore and suggested post­
poning the attack to wait for New Ironsides, which "will 
double the number of guns in action from Ironclads."9
At 12:15 P.M. on July 18 the ship got underway and 
stood up the channel, second in line behind the monitor 
Montauk. At 12:57 she opened fire on Fort Wagner with a 
150-pounder Parrott rifle and at 1:12 commenced fire with 
the port broadside. She anchored 1400 yards from Fort Wag­
ner at 1:20 P.M. She stayed there, firing broadsides and 
working the engines and rudder to keep the guns bearing, 
until she swung to the flood tide at 4:37 P.M.
After a pause to let the ship complete her swing, at 
4:55 P.M. she commenced firing the starboard broadside. The 
fleet's fire was effective, as New Ironsides' Log records, 
"Fort Wagner silenced about 4.45, the enemy driven into
9Dahlgren to Gillmore, July 14, 1863, Dahlgren Papers, 
Letterbook June-July 1863, 49.
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their bomb proofs." The action continued until 7:49 P.M., 
when she ceased firing and soon withdrew out of range.
During the action she fired 665 Xl-inch shell, 15 Xl-inch 
shrapnel and 125 150-pounder rifle shell.10 Federal sailors 
were impressed; a seaman aboard the Powhatan wrote,
". . . 'Ironsides' comes nobly up . . . taking a commdg 
position . . . and opened upon [Fort Wagner] with shell and 
judging from appearances she did terrible execution."11
New Ironsides engaged Fort Wagner again on July 20, 
firing 147 Xl-inch and 21 150-pounder shell and receiving 
thirteen hits.12 In this and later actions, the guns were 
normally fired in rotation, one at a time, instead of rapid­
ly and continuously. Firing in rotation, an option not 
available to the monitors, reduced ammunition consumption 
and kept the garrison in their bombproofs. New Ironsides 
again employed the tactic when she attacked Fort Wagner 
early on July 24. During this action, the ship fired 464 
rounds and took only five hits. One of these, a X-inch 
solid shot, passed through the spar deck armor.13 The Con­
federates had already established New Ironsides as their
10NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. July 18, 1863.
“Charles K. Mervine, "Jottings By the Way: A Sailor's 
Log 1862 to 1864," Kent Packard, ed. Pennsylvania Magazine 
of History and Biography 71, no. 2 (April 1947): 134.
“Rowan to Dahlgren, May 13, 1864, ORN 14: 605; NARG 
24, Log of New Ironsides, July 20, 1863.
“Rowan to Dahlgren, May 13, 1864, ORN 14: 605; Rowan 
to Dahlgren, July 25, 1863, ibid., 14: 391-92.
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most serious threat; in late July, Beauregard's Chief of 
Staff wrote, "Our great enemy now is the Ironsides."14
On July 29, New Ironsides stood up the channel to an­
chor some 1400 yards away from Fort Wagner. At first her 
battery would not bear because a southerly breeze kept her 
from swinging to the ebb tide. At 12:20 P.M. she commenced 
firing at Wagner and at Battery Gregg, on the north end of 
Morris Island, receiving two hits in return. She also sent 
twenty-five rounds from the spar deck fifty-pounder rifles 
at Fort Sumter, some 2500 yards distant.15 Having learned 
that his ship was hard to maneuver but also hard for the 
Confederates to hurt, Rowan fought her from anchor in these 
engagements.
On July 30, New Ironsides anchored to shell Battery 
Gregg, receiving two hits. Before retiring she threw one 
fifty-pounder at Sumter.16 The Confederates, recognizing 
New Ironsides as the most effective of the attackers,
14Brigadier General Roswell Ripley's endorsement on 
Brigadier General Johnson Hagood's report of July 25, 1863, 
OR ser. 1, 28, part 1: 433.
lsRowan to Dahlgren, May 13, 1864, ORN. 14: 605; Rowan 
to Dahlgren, July 29, 1863, ibid., 14: 408; Abstract Log of 
New Ironsides, ibid., 14: 405.
“Rowan to Dahlgren, May 13, 1864, ibid., 14: 605;
Rowan to Dahlgren, July 30, 1863, ibid., 14: 408-409; ii)- 
stract Log of New Ironsides, ibid., 14: 405. One hit 
cracked the armor but did not penetrate. Rowan's May letter 
gives a total of 329 main battery shell vice 329 Xl-inch and 
37 150-pounders; the Log agrees with the higher figures.
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concentrated their fire on her.17
On August 17, the ship again anchored to bombard Wag­
ner and Gregg and again fired at Sumter, this time at a 
range of 2700 yards. In return, she received thirty-one 
hits, mostly from X-inch guns in Wagner and Gregg. Four of 
the nineteen hits on the armor caused cracking but little 
other damage; a port shutter was shot away and the spar deck 
armor was partially broken in one place. Other projectiles 
hit woodwork or the smokestack, which was holed eight 
times.18 In this action, characterized by a Federal sailor 
as "truly terrific, on both sides," Fleet Captain Commander 
George W. Rodgers was killed.19
On August 18, 1863, New Ironsides remained underway to 
bombard Fort Wagner, but on August 19 she again anchored to 
attack the same target, when the "very fresh" wind "kept the 
rest of the fleet quiet."20 On August 20 she fired at 
Wagner from anchorage and tried two fifty-pounders at a
17"Fort Sumter and Battery Gregg replied deliberately, 
their shots being made with great accuracy; nearly every one 
striking and taking effect on the Ironsides." "News from 
the Islands," Charleston Daily Courier. July 31, 1863, 1.
18Rowan to Dahlgren, May 13, 1864, ORN 14: 605; Rowan 
to Dahlgren, August 21, 1863, ibid., 14: 459-60.
19Mervine, "Jottings By the Way," 140.
20"News from the Islands." Charleston Daily Courier. 
August 20, 1863, 1.
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"Rebel steamer" at the extreme range of 3,400 yards.21 The 
ship also anchored for an August 21 bombardment of Wagner, 
during which she received one Xl-inch hit from Sumter.22
On August 22 and 23, New Ironsides stayed underway for 
her attacks on Fort Wagner. The ship received no injuries 
on August 22, but on August 23 she was hit four times.23 
After twelve engagements in five weeks, her primary mission 
was clearly shore bombardment in support of the Army; her 
prowess against other ironclads remained untested. Her 
battery did considerable damage.24
During this period, changes were made to improve the 
ship's handling characteristics. The earlier difficulties 
in ship control were partially remedied by moving the
21Rowan to Dahlgren, May 13, 1864, ORN 14: 605. Fort 
Wagner's Chief of Artillery wrote, "In less than thirty 
minutes after I opened fire, the Ironsides came into posi­
tion, and opened an enfilade fire upon the guns engaged. My 
guns being now subjected to a very severe fire and in great 
danger of being dismounted, I deemed it prudent to cease 
firing and to close my embrasures. ..." Captain Robert 
Pringle to Assistant Adjutant General Major Henry Bryan, Au­
gust 20, 1863, OR ser. 1, 28, part 1: 547.
22The summary states she anchored, but Rowan's initial 
report said she was underway. Rowan to Dahlgren, May 13, 
1864, ORN. 14: 605; Rowan to Dahlgren, September 3, 1863, 
ibid., 14: 533.
23Rowan to Dahlgren, May 13, 1864, ibid., 14: 605;
Rowan to Dahlgren, September 3, 1863, ibid., 14: 533; Ab­
stract Log of New Ironsides, ibid., 14: 509.
24Report of Captain of Engineers J. W. Gregorie to 
Capt. Molony, Assistant Adjutant General, August 22, 1863:
"I repaired sea face [of Wagner], which was sadly torn up by 
the Ironsides, also traverse over southeast magazine, which 
was nearly cut through . . ." OR ser. 1, 28, part 1: 503.
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secondary steering wheel, or "fighting wheel," from the 
berth deck to the gun deck under the pilot house.25 By 
shortening the reaction time between the conning officer's 
order and the helmsman's response, the Captain's ability to 
direct the ship in action was greatly improved.
Although her handling difficulties were ameliorated, 
the ship still suffered from the tactical handicap of soft 
ends. Dahlgren wrote, "Then her ends are not armored, and 
between Wagner, Sumter and Moultrie she is always enfiladed 
by one or more of them."2S The armored bulkheads provided 
enough protection to enable her to make her approach, after 
which she fought the enemy on her broadside.
As New Ironsides gained battle experience, her battery 
came to be considered the most effective in the ironclad 
fleet, especially by the Confederates.27 Beauregard 
opined, "she was the most effective vessel employed in the 
reduction of Battery Wagner," and Confederate historian J. 
Thomas Scharf called New Ironsides "more troublesome to Fort 
Wagner than all the monitors combined." The Confederates
“Belknap, "Reminiscent of the 'New Ironsides'," 68. 
Similarly, it was not until August 31, 1863, that the engine 
room bell pull, used to give orders to the engines, was 
extended to the spar deck level. NARG 19, Entry 1072, Steam 
Log of New Ironsides. August 31, 1863.
“Dahlgren to Gillmore, August 22, 1863, ORN 14: 466.
27A Union view: "The Ironsides is capable of a more 
rapid and concentrated fire, which, under the circumstances, 
made her guns more effective than the XV-inch of the moni­
tors." Dahlgren to Welles, January 28, 1864, ibid., 14: 
598-600.
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publicly affirmed this opinion when they offered a reward 
for destroying a Union ironclad— they set the amount at 
$50,000 for a monitor and twice that for New Ironsides.28
One Confederate officer, a veteran of the fighting on 
James Island, thought her "one of the most powerful vessels 
ever built."29 Another Confederate officer in Charleston 
called her
the most formidable ship of the fleet . . . Her 
broadsides were not fired in volley, but gun after 
gun, in rapid succession, the effect upon those who 
were at the wrong end of the guns being exceedingly 
demoralizing. Whenever she commenced there was a 
painful uncertainty as to what might happen before 
she got through.30
An English officer serving with the Confederates at Fort
Wagner observed, "As for the Ironsides, she gives three
rounds for every single shot any of our batteries think
proper to send her."31 The Charleston press also
28Beauregard, "Water Defences," 151. Scharf, Confed­
erate N a w . 695. For reward, Theodore D. Wagner to Beaure­
gard, August 13, 1863, OR ser. 1, 28, Part 2, 280; E. Milby 
Burton, The Siege of Charleston 1861-1865 (Columbia: Uni­
versity of South Carolina Press, 1970), 216. The offer in­
cluded $100,000 for sinking the flagship, U.S.S. Wabash. 
Thomas Jordan, Beauregard's Chief of Staff, informed B. A. 
Whitney, "in charge of Submarine Torpedo-Boat," on August 
15, 1863. OR ser. 1, 28, Part 2, 285.
29Major John G. Pressley, C.S.A., "The Wee Nee Volun­
teers of Williamsburg District, South Carolina, in the First 
(Hagood's) Regiment," SHS Papers 26 (1888): 153.
30Charles H. Olmstead, "Reminiscences of Services in 
Charleston Harbor in 1863," SHS Papers 11 (1883): 159. Olm­
stead was Colonel of the First Georgia Volunteers.
31S. A. Ashe, "After the Evacuation of Battery Wag­
ner," Confederate Veteran 35, no. 12 (December 1927): 451.
In this article he quotes a letter from a Captain DuHaume
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considered her the most dangerous of the Federal fleet.32
Her offensive prowess was due to her large battery and 
to the ease of working the guns provided by her broadside 
mountings, compared with the turret mountings of the moni­
tors.33 In discussing an earlier action between three mon­
itors and an earthwork fortification in which Passaic fired 
only 100 shots in eight hours, DuPont noted the monitors' 
ineffectiveness. He wrote, "Continuity of fire is the 
thing; twenty-five minutes of the Wabash. broadside, would 
take that fort about three times a day. . . . "34 New Iron­
sides. with her iron protection, brought "continuity of 
fire" to areas where a wooden ship like Wabash could not 
possibly survive.
After the initial troubles with her gun carriages were 
solved, the sole defect noted in New Ironsides' battery was 
that the maximum gun elevation was only 4^ degrees.35 This
dated September 10, 1863.
32"The formidable vessel in whose capacity for injur­
ing us the invaders of our harbor place their chief reli­
ance." Charleston Daily Courier. October 10, 1863, 1.
33The monitor Montauk's rate of fire was one round per 
gun in 2.40 minutes and New Ironsides' one in 1.33 minutes. 
With her larger battery, in an hour New Ironsides could fire 
360 rounds; Montauk only 25. Dahlgren to Welles, January 
28, 1864, ORN 14: 598.
34DuPont to Mrs. DuPont, March 4, 1863, Hayes, DuPont 
Letters, 2: 467.
35Rowan answered an inquiry about the battery, saying 
the guns had been fired 334 times before he took command and 
4439 times since. "The recoil is easily controlled-The car­
riages show no signs of weakness." Rowan to Commander
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constraint, imposed by the size of the gun ports, limited 
the maximum range to under 2,000 yards.36
Short range was a handicap at Charleston, where shal­
low water kept the ship at a distance from the Confederate 
forts. In one action Rowan used the ship's roll to increase 
the effective elevation of the guns, but New Ironsides did 
most of her work at ranges of 1200 to 1300 yards.37 On Au­
gust 17, 1863, she was able to close to within 900 yards of 
Fort Wagner and on September 2, to 1000 yards. She engaged 
Battery Gregg at about 1800 yards and, after the fall of 
Morris Island, engaged Moultrie at 1200 yards.38 Recalling 
DuPont's intent to engage Fort Sumter at 600 to 800 yards, 
these ranges were greater than optimum.
The size of the gun ports was restricted to reduce the 
chance of projectiles entering them, but this meant the
H[enry] A. Wise, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, October 2, 
1863, Rowan Letter Book, 151.
36In a letter of August 22, 1863 to Gillmore, Dahlgren 
wrote, "her ports only allow of elevations of 4 to 4^ de­
grees." ORN 14: 466. Turner said under 4°; Turner to 
Smith, April 25, 1863, NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 449, 2: 33. 
Tabulated ranges for the Xl-inch were:
Elevation Range (15# charge) Range (20# charge)
4° 1,524 yards 1,660 yards
5° 1,757 yards 1,975 yards
Ordnance Instructions. Appendix B, No. V, xv.
37"Firing at Battery Gregg at extreme elevation on 
weather roll. ..." NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. July 
30, 1863.
38Dahlgren to Welles, ORN 14: 590, 602; Rowan to Dahl­
gren, ibid., 14: 605. The ranges depended upon the tides—  
with a higher tide, the ship could approach more closely.
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range of the guns was limited by the angle to which they 
could elevate without striking the top of the port. Since 
New Ironsides was designed to fight other ships and such 
battles rarely took place at long range, reducing the range 
of the guns in exchange for reducing their vulnerability 
must have appeared to the designers as a good trade.
New Ironsides' great combat effectiveness made her a 
prime target for the Confederates, and Beauregard promoted a 
torpedo expedition against her as early as April 1863. He 
told Captain John R. Tucker, the naval officer in charge at 
Charleston, it was of the utmost importance that "some ef­
fort should be made to sink either the Ironsides or one of 
the monitors," emphasizing the "great moral effect" of such 
an act.39 The first torpedo attack on New Ironsides fol­
lowed on the night of August 20, 1863.
This attack was made by a torpedo craft built from a 
gunboat hull left on the stocks at Charleston.40 Captain 
James Carlin, commanding the blockade runner Ella and Annie, 
took charge of the vessel, equipped with a spar carrying
39Beauregard to Tucker, July 18, 1863, ibid., 14: 728. 
Scharf describes Confederate boat expeditions in Charleston 
harbor, saying most had been sent out "with a view to dis­
covering the possibilities of a torpedo attack upon the New 
Ironsides. . . . "  Scharf, Confederate Navy. 690-91, 695.
40Captain Francis D. Lee, C.S.A., was in charge of 
this effort. Lee to Beauregard, July 25, 1863, OR ser. 1, 
28, part 1: 229-30. A discussion is in Milton F. Perry, 
Infernal Machines (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1965), 77-78.
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three torpedoes each with 100 pounds of powder.41 The 
night chosen for the attack was very dark and Carlin could 
not see the New Ironsides until he was nearby. Upon sight­
ing her, he lowered the spar and turned to the attack.
Either Carlin misjudged the torpedo boat's motion or
New Ironsides swung to her anchor at precisely the correct
moment, because the boat passed up the starboard side of the 
ironclad rather than striking her. Carlin's misjudgment, at 
night and under stress, is most likely. Carlin's attention 
was also distracted by the boat's engine, which stopped and
would not restart. As the boat passed, about 1:00 A.M., New
Ironsides' Officer of the Deck hailed her. Carlin, whose 
crew was working frantically on the engine, identified his 
vessel as the U.S. steamer Live Yankee from Port Royal.
As New Ironsides beat to quarters and fired a rocket 
to alert the fleet, the torpedo boat grazed the ironclad's 
bow, and Beauregard's account stated the torpedo spar became 
entangled in New Ironsides' anchor chain.42 Carlin's engi­
neers restarted the engine and the torpedo boat escaped into
41Burton, Siege of Charleston. 217; Lee to Beauregard, 
July 25, 1863, OR ser. 1, 28, part 1: 229-30. Beauregard, 
"Water Defences," 150. The spar is shown in Lee to Jordan, 
August 2, 1863, OR ser. 1, 28, part 2: 251-52. Carlin was 
well-regarded by the Charleston press: "Captain Carlin cer­
tainly understands how to run the blockade." Charleston 
Daily Courier. April 29, 1863, 2.
42Beauregard, "Water Defences," 150. A more detailed 
account is in Perry, Infernal Machines. 78-80.
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the night, under Xl-inch fire from New Ironsides.43 Carlin 
"most unhesitatingly" condemned the torpedo vessel and her 
engine.44 No further torpedo attack was made on New Iron­
sides until October 1863.45
Meanwhile, the ship continued her support of the Army. 
On September 2, the ship stood in and dropped anchor at 1:40 
A.M. to shell Gregg and Sumter. She demolished "nearly the 
whole of the eastern scarp" of Sumter, in return receiving 
seven hits from Gregg and Moultrie which broke the port 
sheet anchor hawse pipe and cracked the floor plate of the 
pilot house and a port shutter.46
She engaged Wagner and Gregg on September 5. The 
Commanding Officer of Fort Wagner noted her fire "proved
43"At 1. Saw a strange looking vessel coming up astern 
very fast, and upon being hailed she answered 'Live Yankee' 
from Port Royal. Beat to quarters fired a Rocket, slipped 
the chain and fired several Guns at stranger but as he 
passed he grazed our bows and then kept directly ahead so 
that we could not get our battery to bear on him. At 1.20 
he disappeared under the land." NARG 24, Log of New Iron­
sides . August 21, 1863.
44Beauregard, "Water Defences," 150; Captain J. Carlin 
to Beauregard, ORN 14: 498-99; Rowan to Dahlgren and Ensign 
Benjamin H. Porter to Rowan, ibid., 14: 497-98.
4SRowan did not resume Turner's over-anxious practice 
of steaming to anchor. The ship had by then been out of 
port for seven months and repairs were already frequent; 
extra wear was not desirable. NARG 19, Entry 1072, Steam 
Log of New Ironsides, August 20-December 31, 1863.
46Rowan to Dahlgren, May 13, 1864, ORN 14: 605; Rowan 
to Dahlgren, September 3, 1863, ibid., 14: 533-34; Abstract 
Log of New Ironsides, ibid., 14: 558. For damage, Brigadier 
General Ripley's report of September 22, 1863, OR ser. 1,
28, part 1: 87.
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very destructive and had a rather depressing effect on many 
of the garrison, to whom it was a novelty."47 After firing 
all day in exchange for one hit from Gregg, she remained 
anchored off Wagner overnight, and on September 6 fought 
another all-day action with the same fortifications.48
The Confederates evacuated Fort Wagner that night.
The next day, September 7, New Ironsides anchored to engage 
Fort Moultrie from 5:45 P.M. to 7:15 P.M. During this bom­
bardment she received 24 hits that did little damage.49
On September 8, New Ironsides was loading shell from 
the store ship Memphis when she was called up to cover the 
monitor Weehawken, aground off the pass between Sumter and 
Cummings Point. Anchoring some 1,200 yards from Moultrie, 
New Ironsides engaged the fort and soon drove the Confeder­
ate gunners to cover. She eventually withdrew due to lack 
of ammunition, having expended every Xl-inch shell she had.
During the successful action, which involved five 
monitors besides the grounded and refloated Weehawken, New 
Ironsides fired 483 shell and was struck at least seventy
47Colonel Lawrence M. Keitt, Commanding Battery Wag­
ner, to Captain W. F. Nance, Assistant Adjutant General, 
September 18, 1863, describing the action of September 5.
OR ser. 1, 28, part 1: 489.
48Rowan to Dahlgren, May 13, 1864, ORN. 14: 605; Ab­
stract Log of New Ironsides, ibid., 558-59.
49At least on this occasion, anchor chains were placed 
under the sandbags to give more protection to the engine 
room. Rowan to Dahlgren, May 13, 1864, ibid., 14: 605; 
Rowan to Dahlgren, September 10, 1863, ibid., 14: 553-56.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
145
times.50 The Confederates concentrated on her, one 
Charleston newspaper noting, "our guns were served with 
admirable precision— six out of every seven shots on an 
average, striking the Ironsides."51 Even in so heavy an 
engagement, she proved her powers of resistance, emerging 
with minor damage.52 The Confederates again recorded their 
high opinion of New Ironsides when Beauregard's Chief of 
Staff directed the shore batteries to concentrate their fire 
on the nearest ironclad but specified, "Should the Ironsides 
at any time come within effective range, it will be well to 
concentrate fire on her."53
During the night of September 8, officers and men from 
New Ironsides participated in Dahlgren's attempt to capture 
Fort Sumter by assault.54 Commander Thomas H. Stevens of
50Rowan to Dahlgren, May 13, 1864, ibid., 14: 605;
Rowan to Dahlgren, September 10, 1863, ibid., 14: 553-56; 
Dahlgren to Welles, January 28, 1864, ibid., 14: 594-95; Ab­
stract Log of New Ironsides, ibid., 14: 559-60. The latter 
says 488 shell.
51"The Siege of Charleston," Charleston Daily Courier. 
September 9, 1863, 1.
52Bishop to Rowan, September 9, 1863, ORN 14: 555-56. 
Rowan requisitioned six more pairs of shutters, writing in a 
cover letter, "These are not times for red tape." Rowan to 
Merrick & Sons, September 9, 1863, Rowan Letter Book, 146; 
Rowan to Stribling, September 9, 1863, ibid., 146.
53Jordan to Ripley, September 9, 1863, OR ser. 1, 28, 
part 2: 351.
54Thomas H. Stevens, "The Boat Attack on Sumter," in 
The Wav to Appomattox, vol. 4 of Battles and Leaders of the 
Civil War. Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence C. Buel, 
eds. (New York: Castle Books, 1956; reprint), 49-50.
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the monitor Patapsco led the force of 400 sailors and 
Marines in which Ensign Benjamin H. Porter commanded New 
Ironsides' gig* Without being aware of Dahlgren's plan, 
General Gillmore planned a similar attack for the same 
night. Neither would yield leadership of a joint expedition 
to the other and their telegrams betray a total lack of 
cooperation.55 Stevens, who learned he was to lead the 
attack just before it occurred, tried to decline the command 
but in the end proceeded as Dahlgren ordered.56
The hastily-prepared attack was poorly planned and 
executed. The boats started up the channel towed by the tug 
U.S.S. Daffodil about 10:00 P.M. on September 8, 1863. They 
were to attack in two groups, with a diversionary group 
assaulting the northwest face before the main force stormed 
the southeast. The main force became confused and rushed 
the fort at the same time as the diversionary group.57
The lack of a diversion made little difference, be­
cause the Confederates were awaiting an attack. They had 
seen the Union boats assembling and knew of Dahlgren's plans 
from intercepted messages.58 Beauregard alerted the
55The correspondence is in ORN 14: 606-610.
56Stevens to Welles, September 28, 1865, ibid., 14:
633.
57Union reports of the action are in ibid., 14: 610-
36.
58Alfred Roman, The Military Operations of General 
Beauregard in the War Between the States 1861 to 1865 (New 
York: Harper & Brothers, 1884), 2: 153-54.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
147
garrison and the surrounding batteries and moved the iron­
clad Chicora so she could cover the outside of the fort with 
gunfire. When the Union boats were sighted, at about 1:00 
A.M. on September 9, the Confederates held their fire until 
the boats were within a few yards. They then opened fire 
with small arms and hand grenades and made the pre-arranged 
signal to the batteries and the Chicora to commence firing.
The few Federals who got ashore were pinned down and 
captured or killed. The total Union loss was four killed, 
nineteen wounded and 102 more captured, the latter including 
Ensign Porter; the Confederates suffered no casualties.59 
The Army detachment, seeing the lack of surprise and the 
Navy's failure, withdrew without attacking.60 Belknap, who 
admired Dahlgren for his physical bravery and scientific 
accomplishments, wrote that this failure "seemed to paralyze 
the Admiral" and prevented further offensive action.61
During the "siege of Charleston," New Ironsides suf­
fered many minor injuries, but her solid armor proved its 
worth as she had no serious damage or battle casualties.
One novel feature of her design showed its value when a shot 
from Moultrie passed through the foundation of the smoke­
stack. The grating that protected the boiler uptakes was
“Confederate accounts are in ORN 14: 636-40; OR ser.
1, 28, part 1: 125-26, 403, 724-28.
“Stevens to Welles, September 28, 1865, ORN 14: 633.
“Belknap, "Siege of Charleston," 190.
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bent, but it kept the shot from injuring the machinery.
Despite being punished by over 150 heavy projectiles, 
her fighting efficiency was never impaired. This was in 
contrast to the monitors, which frequently suffered jammed 
turrets from Confederate shot.62
When Fort Wagner was abandoned by the Confederates on 
September 7, 1863, with it fell Battery Gregg.63 After the 
fall of Wagner and the boat assault on Sumter, New Ironsides 
returned to her blockade routine. She remained at anchor 
off Charleston with fires banked and steam up in all 
boilers. The crew stood alternating watches during the 
night, with half awake at their stations and half sleeping 
near their guns. Sentinels and lookouts were posted around 
the ship and, after evening quarters, the officers would 
gather informally on deck aft for amusement. Alarms during 
the night were frequent, as ships tried to run the blockade 
and blockaders saw nonexistent torpedo boats.64
“Dahlgren to Welles, September 8, 1863, Letterbook 
July-August 1863, 182.
“Quincy A. Gillmore, "The Army Before Charleston in 
1863," in The Wav to Appomattox, vol. 4 of Battles and Lead­
ers of the Civil War. Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence 
C. Buel, eds. (New York: Castle Books, 1956; reprint), 64.
“Belknap, "Reminiscent of the 'New Ironsides'," 70,
80. One officer wrote that before the October attack, "I do 
not recall having heard there was such a thing as a torpedo 
boat and the attack upon us was a complete surprise." Wil­
liam S. Wells to James H. Tomb, January 19, 1915, from the 
Tomb Papers #723, Southern Historical Collection, University 
of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. Wells must 
have confused this with the earlier incident, since he him­
self was the engineer on watch during the August attack.
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The Confederates had not given up the idea of sinking 
New Ironsides with a torpedo, and their second try nearly 
succeeded. Unlike Carlin's converted boat, the Confederates 
built the "torpedo steamer" David expressly for torpedo 
attack (Figure 18). Low in the water, she presented a small 
target. Her steam engine drove her at six knots and she was 
armed with a single spar torpedo mounted on the bow. This 
torpedo, attached to a fourteen foot tube of iron, contained
Figure 18. Confederate spar torpedo boat C.S.S. David. 
(Official Records . . . Navies 15: 15)
about 100 pounds of gunpowder with four percussion detona­
tors. Her Commanding Officer, Lieutenant William T. Glas- 
sel, C.S.N., had been Executive Officer of the C.S.S. North 
Carolina and had already made one unsuccessful attempt at 
torpedo warfare in the waters around Charleston.65
There was some debate among the Confederates on the 
propriety of attacking New Ironsides with a torpedo. One
65William T. Glassel, "Reminiscences of Torpedo Ser­
vice in Charleston Harbor by W. T. Glassell [sic], Commander 
Confederate States Navy," SHS Papers 4, no. 5 (November 
1877): 227-30.
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school feared that destroying the ship would work against 
the Confederacy by causing public revulsion at this method 
of warfare. Another held that the torpedo was "correct 
warfare," and the latter prevailed.66
On the evening of October 5, 1863, New Ironsides lay 
at anchor off Morris Island. The Captain and Executive 
Officer had gone below shortly after 9:00 P.M. About 9:15 
P.M., the Officer of the Deck, Acting Ensign Charles W. 
Howard, saw an object 300 yards away. He hailed it, re­
ceived no answer, and hailed again. Again receiving no 
answer, he hailed a third time, saying, "Keep off or I will 
fire into you." The reply was a shotgun blast which wounded 
him mortally. A minute after the first hail, the torpedo 
exploded on the starboard side, under number six starboard 
gun and even with the after end of the engine room.67
The shock was considerable. On board New Ironsides. 
General Quarters was sounded. The Marines and lookouts took 
the torpedo boat under small arms fire and two main battery 
rounds were fired, but as the David drifted away she van­
ished in the darkness and no hits were made. The engineers
66Wells to Tomb, September 28, 1914, and December 18, 
1914, Tomb Papers. Tomb told Wells years later that Glassel 
had "an excess of wine" at supper before the attack. Wells 
to Tomb, March 12, 1915, ibid.
67Belknap, "Reminiscent of the 'New Ironsides'," 80- 
81? Glassel, "Torpedo Service," 231-32; Rowan to Dahlgren, 
October 6, 1863, ORN 15: 12-13; NARG 24, Log of New Iron­
sides , October 5, 1863? Confederate reports in OR ser. 1,
28, part 1: 731-35.
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spread fires under the boilers and started the engine, and a 
boat was launched to pursue the David.68 William S. Wells, 
then an Assistant Engineer aboard New Ironsides, was playing 
chess with another officer when the torpedo exploded. He 
remembered a "tremendous concussion," with water coming 
through the hatches and the smoke pipe. Some joints in the 
steam piping were dislocated, and, he wrote, "I can assure 
you that there was considerable excitement on board to as­
certain whether the ship was sinking."69
There was excitement aboard the David as well, and for 
the same reason. The plume of water raised by the explosion 
went down her stack and put out her fires, and the shock 
threw some of her iron ballast into the engine and jammed 
it. Glassel then ordered abandon ship. The crew went over­
board, but the pilot, Walker Cannon, could not swim and held 
on to the boat. After drifting away from New Ironsides. 
Cannon got back aboard and rescued Acting First Assistant 
Engineer James H. Tomb. They rebuilt the boiler fires, 
restarted the engine and proceeded back to Charleston.
68Belknap, "Reminiscent of the 'New Ironsides'," 80; 
NARG 19, Entry 1072, Steam Log of New Ironsides. October 5,
1863. Fires were banked, showing the alarm was over, at 
9:30 P.M.
69Wells to Tomb, December 1, 1913, Tomb Papers.
Wells, who joined the ship in December 1862, was the only 
officer who served in her throughout her fighting career, 
from 1863 to 1865. He struck up a correspondence with Tomb 
long after the War and the two became friends. By 1913 they 
were the only surviving officers of their ships.
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Glassel and Fireman James Sullivan were captured.70
The New Ironsides was inspected the next day, both by 
her crew and by Dahlgren, but little damage was found. The 
engineers suffered broken floor plates and displaced bulk­
heads in the engine room and "store rooms and stores thrown 
into confusion." Divers inspected the hull and told Dahl­
gren, "no impression of any consequence is to be seen, ex­
cept, perhaps, the removal of some copper. . . ,"71 Ensign 
Howard, who was meritoriously promoted to Acting Master 
before he died October 10, was the only serious casualty New 
Ironsides sustained in the action.72
In recounting the action, Beauregard stated that New 
Ironsides "never fired another shot after this attack," and 
remained off Morris Island "undergoing repairs" until she 
was "towed" to Port Royal.73 He was totally incorrect.
70Glassel, "Torpedo Service," 232-33; Tomb to Flag Of­
ficer J. R. Tucker, October 6, 1863, ORN 15: 20-21. A re­
port said, "[Glassel and Sullivan] state that the people of 
Charleston have very little faith in the capacity of [moni­
tors] to reduce the fortifications leading to the harbor, 
but hold in great fear the terrible batteries of the New 
Ironsides." "Yankee History of the Attempt to Blow up the 
Ironsides." Charleston Daily Courier. October 13, 1863, 2.
71NARG 19, Entry 1072, Steam Log of New Ironsides. Oc­
tober 5, 1863; Dahlgren to Welles, October 7, 1863, ORN 15: 
11; NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. October 6, 1863.
720rdinary Seaman W. L. Knox had his left leg broken 
and Master at Arms Thomas Little was bruised all over. How­
ard died of the shotgun wound to his abdomen. NARG 52,
Entry 22, Medical Journal of New Ironsides. October 5, 1863.
73Beauregard, "Water Defences," 152. Beauregard also 
said the ship then went to Philadelphia, "where she remained 
until destroyed by fire after the war." Roman repeats
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The damage was not significant, and on November 16, 1863, 
the ship got underway to aid the U.S.S. Lehigh. Although 
the grounded monitor floated free before New Ironsides could 
assist, it is clear that the Federals did not consider New 
Ironsides to be out of action. The fact that she remained 
on station instead of retiring to Port Royal for repairs 
should have told Beauregard she was not badly damaged.74
Assistant Engineer Wells wrote after the War,
Our ship was not hurt very much, for fortunately the 
torpedo struck on the starboard side amidships, and 
just where we had a coal bunker, and the ship did 
not make any water; and after the coal was taken 
out, (which was not until the following March) we 
found she was crushed in a little, but nothing very 
serious.75
He opined, however,
If the torpedo had struck the ship on the port side 
we would certainly have gone down, for the outboard 
delivery [the sea water discharge pipe from the main 
condenser] was just on a line with the point where 
the torpedo struck on the starboard side.76
More damage was discovered when the coal bunkers near 
the explosion were emptied. As Dahlgren told Welles, "upon
Beauregard's error. Roman, Beauregard, 2: 181-82.
74The non-nautical Beauregard also believed New Iron­
sides' hull was five feet thick and did not correct Lee's 
estimate that it was twenty feet thick. F. D. Lee to Beau­
regard, October 7, 1863, OR ser. 1, 28, part 1: 733. Per­
ry's partisan account credits New Ironsides with an iron 
hull and also magnifies the damage. Perry, Infernal Ma­
chines . 82-85.
75Wells to Tomb, December 1, 1913, Tomb Papers. Writ­
ing fifty years after the incident, Wells overlooked an in­
spection made in November 1863 (see below).
76Ibid.
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removing coal in the bunkers of the Ironsides. it is dis­
covered that the damage done by the torpedo was much more 
serious than first appeared."77 Even so, the damage was 
minor: some of the beams and knees of the framing were 
broken, the wooden side of the ship was sprung in, some 
copper was missing and the planking abreast the engine room 
was "shattered" 1H inches deep over an area six feet high 
and ten to twelve feet long.78 Despite the damage, the 
ship could still steam and fight without impairment.
Although damaged, since New Ironsides did not leak 
"excessively" there was no compelling reason to send her 
North for repairs. Welles offered to send her to Philadel­
phia for repairs and for installation of a new pilot house 
and steam steering gear, but Dahlgren, rightly distrusting 
the Secretary's estimate of twenty days absence from station 
to perform the repairs, preferred to keep her: "After the 
work has been accomplished, which will not be long after the 
new monitors arrive, the Ironsides can probably be spared
77Dahlgren to Welles, November 19, 1863, ORN 15: 16-
17.
78Carpenter T. H. Bishop to Rowan, November 24, 1863, 
ibid., 15: 17-18. Underwater damage depends in part on bri- 
sance, the ability to shatter hard structures. The torpedo 
contained black powder, a low explosive with brisance only 
1.5 percent of that of TNT. Melvin A. Cook, The Science of 
High Explosives (New York: Reinhold Publishing, 1958), 8,
17, 308; Arthur Marshall, A Short Account of Explosives 
(Philadelphia: P. Blakiston's Son, 1917), 69, 71. With the 
warhead so close to the surface, much of its energy was 
vented to atmosphere instead of transferred to the target.
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without disadvantage."79 Since the ship could not be sent 
back to Philadelphia, plates made for the new pilot house 
were sent to the ship to improve the protection (but 
unfortunately not the size or location) of the old one.80
After the attack, Dahlgren directed additional protec­
tive measures, active and passive, for the entire squadron. 
Among the active measures were heavily-armed ships' boats 
and tugboats patrolling the anchorage, extra guards and 
loaded boat howitzers topside, and, on New Ironsides' pilot 
house, a "calcium light" to illuminate the water around the 
ship.81 The primary passive measures were barriers of logs 
or rope netting placed around the ships to impede the ap­
proach of torpedo boats.82
New Ironsides settled again into a blockade routine,
79For leakage, Dahlgren to Welles, November 30, 1863, 
ORN 15: 17. For repairs, Welles to Dahlgren, November 24, 
1863, ibid., 15: 135. Dahlgren remarked that the ship would 
probably consume ten days each way to and from Philadelphia. 
Dahlgren to Welles, December 6, 1863, ibid., 15: 170-71.
80Merrick & Sons built a new pilot house, to be in­
stalled forward of the stack. It was five feet inside diam­
eter and eight inches thick. Merrick & Sons to Lenthall, 
April 17, 1863, NARG 19, Entry 71, Vol 4: 198; Merrick &
Sons to Lenthall, ibid., 4: 203. Dahlgren to Welles, Decem­
ber 6, 1863, notes receipt of plates. ORN 15: 135, 170-71.
81For Dahlgren's measures, ibid., 15: 148, 15: 226.
The "calcium light," probably an acetylene lamp fueled by 
calcium carbide, was provided by the Army. Gillmore to 
Dahlgren, October 17, 1863, ibid., 15: 50.
82The barriers also impeded the protected ships; New 
Ironsides once took five hours to remove the netting and get 
underway. NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. November 16, 1863. 
See also Belknap, "Siege of Charleston," 194; NARG 52, Entry 
22, Medical Journal of New Ironsides. November 16, 1863.
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but Rowan's unease was evident. He wrote, "Since the night 
we were struck by the torpedo, we have found it necessary, 
for the safety of the ship, to go to general quarters at 8 
o'clock at night and permit the men to sleep on the deck at 
their guns." The gun deck was too low and too cluttered by 
the gun slides to permit the ship to be ready for action 
quickly if the hammocks were slung.83
New Ironsides saw no further combat at Charleston. To 
Dahlgren, as to DuPont, the consequences of failure loomed 
larger than the rewards of success. It did not help that 
the Confederates had ceaselessly improved their defenses.
In a letter to Welles on October 18, 1863, Dahlgren stated 
that his preference was to "enter the harbor with adequate 
force [emphasis added] and make my way to Charleston." Yet
a defeat might involve "our forces on the islands, the
blockade, and other material advantages," he wrote, and "I 
confess I am not prepared to risk these unless relieved of 
the responsibility of such a result. . . ."04
On October 22, 1863, Dahlgren held a council of war to 
discuss the options available. The assembled captains 
agreed there would be "extreme risk incurred without ade­
quate results" by entering the harbor. It would be unjus­
tified to enter the harbor with the force they had, so the 
preferable course of action was cooperation with the Amy to
83Rowan to Dahlgren, November 22, 1863, ORN 15: 134.
84Dahlgren to Welles, October 18, 1863, ibid., 15: 53.
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reduce Sullivan's Island and Fort Moultrie.85
Another conference, with similar results, was convened 
on May 10 and 12, 1864. Rowan's caution showed again when 
he at first endorsed an attack on Sumter "with much qualifi­
cation." When the question was discussed the next day, 
however, he was strongly against an attack.86 Dahlgren, 
ever sensitive about his reputation, later came to believe 
that Rowan was part of "that 'Ironsides' and Gillmore co­
alition . . . Gillmore, undermining [me] in the papers, and 
then preparing his book; while Rowan was ready to take the 
vacancy!"87 In the event, the Army could not spare the men 
to continue joint operations. No further offensive moves 
were made at Charleston until the end of the War.
Thus the blockade routine continued uninterrupted for 
New Ironsides. There were few things to occupy the crew's 
attention, but a favorite was smuggling liquor aboard. On 
one occasion, a batch of hams, "neatly covered with cotton
85Ibid., 15: 67-68. Dahlgren's need to diffuse re­
sponsibility reflects Welles' opinion: "As a bureau officer 
he is capable and intelligent, but he shuns and evades re­
sponsibility. This may be his infirmity in his new posi­
tion." Welles, Diary, entry for May 27, 1863, 1: 341.
86Dahlgren, Memoir, 453-4; ORN. 15: 430-33.
87Recorded as March 31, 1865, in conversation with 
Fox. Dahlgren, Memoir. 507. There is no sign of intrigue, 
but the "general sentiment" in the squadron was that if 
Dahlgren left, Rowan should succeed him. J. A. DeCamp, com­
manding U.S.S. Wabash, to Admiral David D. Porter, January 
1, 1864, National Archives, Record Group 45, Microfilm Entry 
M625, Squadron Letters: South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, 
Roll 208: 74.
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cloth, painted yellow and branded true grocer fashion," came 
aboard from the supply steamer that regularly visited the 
ship. Upon noticing liquid oozing from one of the "hams," 
the Executive Officer had the Master-at-Arms attack it with 
a battle axe, whereupon a spurt of liquid "showed that the 
tinsmith and the rumseller had put their heads together."
On another occasion, when half of the crew became more or 
less drunk, a search turned up a five gallon keg of whiskey 
packed in a barrel of potatoes. Fishing over the side was 
popular as well, and once provided a sea turtle which fur­
nished sixteen gallons of soup for the crew.88
Dahlgren's increasingly obvious anxiety about torpedo 
boats enlivened the blockade. The information he received 
from deserters and prisoners certainly showed a growing 
threat. By January 1864, the Federals had accurate informa­
tion about the existence and unsuccessful trials of the 
"American Diver" (the submersible torpedo boat Hunley), and 
an informant had seen eight more torpedo boats like the 
David under construction.89
88For liquor, George E. Belknap, "The Old Navy, His­
torical and Reminiscent, With Side Glances at the British 
Navy," typescript annotated in pencil, "Read January 5th, 
1897." George E. Belknap papers, Box 2. The surgeon pro­
vided whiskey to flavor the soup. NARG 52, Entry 22, Medi­
cal Journal of New Ironsides. April 17 and June 16, 1863.
89"Information obtained from the examination of de­
serters from the enemy," January 7, 1864, ORN 15: 227-31; 
also Dahlgren to Welles, January 13, 1864, Dahlgren Papers, 
Letterbook January-February 1864, 166. It is corroborated 
in Beauregard, "Water Defences," 152-54, although in March 
1864, Beauregard wrote that there were but three torpedo
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Commenting on the precautions he had earlier directed, 
Dahlgren required that ships be anchored out of each other's 
lines of fire and not in the deepest part of the channel, 
since with minimum clearance between the ship and the 
bottom, the "diving torpedo" (Hunlev) could not operate 
effectively.50 He emphasized, "The blockade is important, 
but the safety of the ironclads much more so."51
The next successful torpedo attack was made not by a 
David but by the Hunley. On February 17, 1864, Hunlev 
passed the ironclads inside the bar, apparently deterred 
from attacking them by their vigilance, to reach the wooden 
steam sloop U.S.S. Housatonic. At about 8:45 P.M. Housa- 
tonic saw the submersible at a range of 100 yards. She 
slipped her anchor chain and backed engines to get clear, 
but three minutes later a torpedo exploded on her starboard 
side. She sank immediately, though her rigging remained 
above water and all but five of her crew were saved. Hunlev 
also sank, but Dahlgren could not know of this lessening of 
the threat; his concern was again increased.
In a letter to Welles, Dahlgren noted, "the whole line 
of blockade will be infested with these cheap, convenient,
boats ready. Beauregard to Major General W. H. C. Whiting, 
March 31, 1864, OR ser. 1, 35, part 2: 396.
50A 1 s o ,  he noted, raising a sunken ship would be eas­
ier in shallow water. Dahlgren to the South Atlantic Block­
ading Squadron, January 7, 1864, ORN 15: 226-27.
5dahlgren to Rowan, February 5, 1864, ibid., 15: 273.
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and formidable devices, and we must guard every point."92 
Torpedo warfare was certainly in his mind when in May 1864 
he wrote Welles that, with the forces at his disposal,
"there will be no opportunity for active operations against 
the enemy at this place for some time." New Ironsides would 
probably have to be withdrawn for repairs, no more monitors 
were coming to him, and most of the Army troops had depart­
ed. He asked to be relieved, "having effected all that I 
believed to be in my power to punish the atrocious rebels 
who harbor here. . . ."93 Welles did not agree to the re­
lief, and Dahlgren remained in command of the South Atlantic 
Blockading Squadron until June 1865.94
The damage from the October 1863 David torpedo attack
eventually caused New Ironsides to go North for repairs,
though she did not travel under tow as Beauregard asserted.
Dahlgren would not send the ship back to Philadelphia in
1863, but by the spring of 1864 she clearly needed a refit.
On May 5 and 6, 1864, divers again examined New Ironsides'
hull. Their report to Rowan stated,
In our opinion from the appearance of the ships bot­
tom, so much copper being off and loose, we consider
92F. J. Higginson, Executive Officer of U.S.S. Housa- 
tonic, to Dahlgren, February 18, 1864; Dahlgren to Welles, 
February 19, 1864; ibid., 15: 329.
93Dahlgren to Welles, May 14, 1864, ORN 15: 430-33, 
including the report of the council of war mentioned above.
94Dahlgren, Memoir, 612. Dahlgren, unrelieved, did go 
North in the spring of 1864 and Rowan was "Commanding S.A.B. 
Squadron Pro Tem" from March through May of that year.
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it an imperative necessity that the ship be sent 
North and docked at once, for in the next two months 
the worms will pierce in so many places as to seri­
ously injure the planking and keels.95
By that spring of 1864, New Ironsides had been on her 
blockade station for fifteen straight months and the strain 
was beginning to tell on the crew as well as the ship. Upon 
Dahlgren's return to Charleston in May, he received a letter 
from Marius DuVall, surgeon of the New Ironsides, who al­
leged that Rowan, Belknap, and other officers had made dis­
paraging remarks about Dahlgren which had demoralized the 
entire fleet. Rowan endorsed that the allegations concer­
ning him were false and pressed charges against DuVall.
Since Rowan neglected to mention the other officers in 
his endorsement, on May 9 Dahlgren "decided to begin with 
[Belknap] as the senior officer."96 A Court of Inquiry 
cleared Belknap; Duvall was found guilty by a General Court 
Martial but was saved from dismissal "by the extreme favor 
of Secretary Welles and Assistant Secretary Fox."97
"Messrs Smith and Phelps to Rowan, May 6, 1864, Rowan 
Letter Book, 193. NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. May 5-6,
1864. The shipworm or teredo, an elongated clam, feeds on 
wood particles.
"Dahlgren expressed astonishment to Rowan at this al­
leged state of things. "He said he was astonished too, and 
that Belknap was as clear of it as he was. . . . " Dahlgren, 
Memoir, 453.
"Belknap, "Siege of Charleston," 196-97. For Bel­
knap's Court of Inquiry, NARG 125, Entry M273, Courts-Mar­
tial, Roll 167, Case 4305. For DuVall's preliminary Court 
of Inquiry, ibid., Roll 167, Case 4306; for his General 
Court-Martial, ibid., Roll 128, Case 3606. Dahlgren wrote, 
"It seems that nobody ever spoke disrespectfully of me in
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On May 3, 1864, Rowan wrote to Dahlgren asking to be 
relieved, stating that his health was "breaking down from a 
long confinement of ten months to this ship."98 Many of 
his crew had been confined much longer. Because of her 
superior seakeeping and coppered bottom, New Ironsides 
stayed at Charleston while the monitors were rotated to Port 
Royal for repairs and cleaning. Belknap wrote that New 
Ironsides "was the only vessel never permitted the recre­
ation and refreshment of leaving behind for a few days the 
wearing and unceasing strain of the blockade."99
The divers' report and the growing backlog of repairs 
finally impelled the ship's return North in June 1864. On 
June 6, New Ironsides left Charleston for Port Royal. On 
June 7, Rowan wrote to Dahlgren, protesting an order to 
transfer all of New Ironsides' crew with over six months of 
service remaining to the receiving ship U.S.S. Vermont.
This would take over forty petty officers and disorganize 
the ship, Rowan said. Also, his men had been twenty-three 
months onboard ship without liberty.100
Dahlgren's answer showed the Union manpower shortage: 
the squadron was 1300 men short, the shortage was getting
the 'Ironsides.' Fortunate man!" Dahlgren, Memoir, 454.
"Rowan to Dahlgren, May 3, 1864, ORN 15: 418.
"Belknap, "Reminiscent of the 'New Ironsides'," 70.
100Rowan to Dahlgren, June 7, 1864, Rowan Letter Book,
216.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
163
worse and he was already keeping every man the allowed thir­
ty days over the term of his enlistment. It would be un­
fair, he wrote, to send back men who had months left to 
serve. "Would not this disorganize the whole sguadron 
instead of one ship. . . .?"101 Despite two more protests 
from Rowan, on June 12 and 14 New Ironsides transferred 135 
crewmen and 33 Marines to the Vermont. In return, she re­
ceived 121 men for passage north.102
On June 8, 1864, New Ironsides received her masts and 
full sail rigging. On June 16, 1864, she offloaded much of 
her ammunition and set off for Philadelphia. After dis­
charging her remaining ammunition at Fort Mifflin, she ar­
rived at the Philadelphia Navy Yard on June 24, where she 
was decommissioned on June 30, 1864.103
New Ironsides made two vital contributions to Federal 
efforts in the South Atlantic Squadron area. First, her 
ability to keep the sea saved the blockade of Charleston 
during the early months of 1863. No low-freeboard monitor
101Dahlgren to Rowan, June 9, 1864, Rowan Letter Book, 
229-31 and Dahlgren Papers, Letterbook May-June 1864, 435.
On February 15, Dahlgren had offered a month's furlough to 
any man who would reenlist for one year. ORN 15: 324.
102NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. June 12-15, 1864. 
Dahlgren to Rowan, June 10, 1864, Dahlgren Papers, Letter- 
book May-June 1864, 474, restated Dahlgren's position and 
assured Rowan that the Petty Officers who left New Ironsides 
would not be disrated because of their transfer.
103NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. June 30, 1864. Bel­
knap noted that after nearly 18 months without seeing any, 
"there were more pretty girls in Philadelphia than any other 
city could boast of." Belknap, "Siege of Charleston," 199.
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could have remained on station in all weathers as she did; 
had it not been for New Ironsides, the Confederates could 
have repeated their ironclad raid on the blockaders. Se­
cond, without her great offensive capability the Navy's part 
in the "Siege of Charleston" would have been minimal. The 
monitors could not have supported the Army as New Ironsides 
did. While their slow firing helped eventually to batter 
down Fort Sumter's walls (without, however, driving the 
Confederates from the fort), they could not provide the vol­
ume of fire needed to silence defending artillery, drive 
troops into their bombproofs or disrupt earthworks.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
FINAL CAMPAIGNS: FORT FISHER AND JAMES RIVER
Only sketchy information is available about New Iron­
sides7 refit at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. Much of the 
work was undoubtedly the result of the ship's strenuous ex­
tended operations. Drydocking would have been required, and 
the work must have included hull and machinery repairs as 
well as recoppering.1 Some work involved alterations based 
on experience; for example, a second auxiliary pump was 
installed, relieving the ship's engineers of the anxiety of 
depending so heavily on only one. Although both the steam 
steering gear and the new pilot house were ready, neither 
was installed, probably due to time constraints.2 Some of
1Several letters from Lenthall to Stribling are ger­
mane, including one of August 3, 1864 (NARG 19, Entry 54, 2: 
280) which directs a survey of the "metal sheathing on the 
bottom of the 'New Ironsides'" and one of August 11 which 
directs "no delay" in repairing it (ibid., 2: 281).
2For pump, NARG 19, Entry 1072, Steam Log of New Iron­
sides, September 2, 1864. For pilot house and steering gear 
completion, Merrick & Sons to Lenthall, October 3, 1863,
NARG 19, Entry 71, 5: 184; for installation, Lenthall to 
Stribling, September 7, 1864, and Lenthall to Isaac B. Hull, 
April 21, 1865, NARG 19, Entry 54. In April 1865 both were 
still on hand; Merrick & Sons wanted either to install them 
or be paid for them. Merrick & Sons to Lenthall, National 
Archives, Record Group 19, Entry 70, Letters Received from 
Contractors, 1: 107.
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the work was apparently done by Merrick & Sons; in June the 
Bureau of Steam Engineering disapproved Merrick & Sons' 
proposal to remove the forced draft blowers.3
Upon completion of her refit, New Ironsides was recom­
missioned at 6:00 P.M. on August 22, 1864, under the command 
of Commodore William Radford. Radford, born in Fincastle, 
Virginia, on September 9, 1809, had joined the Navy in 1825. 
His career included extensive West Coast operations during 
the Mexican War. He was introduced to ironclad warfare in 
Hampton Roads: his first Civil War service was as Commanding 
Officer of the frigate U.S.S. Cumberland, although he was 
absent on court-martial duty when his ship was sunk by the 
Virginia. Between 1862 and 1864 he served as Executive 
Officer of the New York Navy Yard.4
After her re-commissioning, New Ironsides remained at 
the Navy Yard until August 29. She then moved out to anchor 
off Fort Mifflin, where she loaded powder and shell. The 
straining urgency which marked her previous departure from 
Philadelphia was missing. During the next month the ship 
remained at Fort Mifflin while her crew exercised at General
3Isherwood stressed that no means of increasing New 
Ironsides' speed should be omitted. Isherwood to Merrick & 
Sons, June 25, 1864, National Archives, Record Group 19, 
Entry 968, Letters Sent to Contractors, 413.
4After promotion to Rear Admiral in 1866, Radford com­
manded the European Squadron from 1869 to 1870, when he 
retired. He died January 8, 1890. DAB, s.v. "Radford, Wil­
liam;" Appleton's Cyclopaedia, s.v. "Radford, William;" NARG 
24, Records of Officers.
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Quarters and gunnery and sail drills.
Most of the men were kept aboard, although officers 
had shore leave and some men went ashore on liberty. As at 
Charleston, the men did their best to sneak alcohol on 
board.5 Visits from dignitaries and petty infractions of 
the ship's regulations broke the monotony.6 There were 
more serious incidents, too. Marine private Terrence Devlin 
died of illness on September 14; seaman Hugh Looney drowned 
on October 2 when he tried to desert and swim ashore.7
On October 6, 1864, New Ironsides stood down river to 
join the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron at Fortress 
Monroe, Virginia, where she arrived October 8. Target prac­
tice was held October 10, "to get the men accustomed to the 
smell of powder and working in the smoke."8 On October 12, 
the ship moored at the Norfolk Navy Yard, where her rigging 
and upper masts were removed.9 After coaling and taking in
5James Rowbottom, a second class fireman, was confined 
for "endeavouring to smuggle liquor." NARG 24, Log of New 
Ironsides. September 26, 1864.
6Commodore John L. Worden of Monitor fame visited the 
ship (ibid., September 15, 1864) and Edward Bennett received 
five hours extra watch for "committing a nuisance" out a gun 
port (ibid., September 20, 1864).
7Ibid., September 14 and October 2, 1864.
8Surgeon Edward Shippen to "My dear Wife" Kate, Octo­
ber 10, 1864. Edward Shippen Collection, Historical Society 
of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
9The original intent was to replace her masts with 
signalling masts, as had been done at Port Royal, but during 
the job she was ordered to keep the lower masts. NARG 24, 
Log of New Ironsides. October 12 and 13, 1864.
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shell, men went ashore to fill sandbags to protect the deck. 
New Ironsides moved back across Hampton Roads to Fortress 
Monroe on October 19, 1864.10
New Ironsides spent the next seven weeks near Fortress 
Monroe. It must have been evident something big was in the 
wind. The crew conducted gunnery exercises and sent men 
ashore to exercise as landing parties. Boat drills were 
frequent.11 Rear Admiral David D. Porter visited the ship 
on November 25, and on December 1 the crew practiced shift­
ing steering from the open spar deck wheel to the fighting 
wheel, "to see that everything was in order." On December 
6, 1864, three of the ship's boats were painted black, indi­
cating the possibility of night action.12
The objective was officially secret. Although Porter 
wrote, "We don't often surprise the rebels; there are too 
many leaky people who participate in our secret movements," 
there was only one remaining Confederate objective important 
enough to merit a full-scale joint expedition.13 It was 
Fort Fisher, which guarded the mouth of the Cape Fear River
10Ibid., October 14-19, 1864.
11For example, armed boat drills are logged on October 
21, 22, 26, 31, November 2 and 8. Ibid., dates indicated.
“Ibid., November 25-December 8, 1864.
“Porter to Welles, January 11, 1865, ORN 11: 228.
Major General William H. C. Whiting, Commander of the Third 
Military District, Department of North Carolina, referred to 
"my spy from Norfolk." Whiting to Major General J. F. Gil­
mer, December 23, 1864, OR ser. 1, 42, part 3: 1297.
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and the city of Wilmington, North Carolina (Figure 19).
By the autumn of 1864, the Confederacy was visibly 
failing, but Wilmington was its busiest remaining seaport. 
Most of the blockade-runners came to Wilmington, and most of 
the imports which kept the Confederate Army in the field 
moved through there. Closing the port had been a Federal 
objective since 1862, when Rear Admiral Lee proposed a joint 
expedition to capture it, but troops could not then be 
spared.14 In late 1864, Secretary Welles argued that the 
loss of Wilmington would be a serious blow to the Confeder­
ate Army's supplies, and this argument persuaded General 
Ulysses S. Grant to provide the needed troops.15
General Robert E. Lee apparently agreed with Welles.
He wrote to Colonel William Lamb, commander of Fort Fisher, 
that Fort Fisher must be held or he could not subsist his 
army.16 Lamb used his two years tenure as commander to 
make Fort Fisher as secure as possible.
14Anderson, By Sea and By River. 277.
15Grant considered the port of "immense importance" to 
the Confederacy. Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U.S. 
Grant (New York: Charles L. Webster & Co., 1885), 2: 385. 
Welles wrote, "I have been urging a conjoint attack on Wil­
mington for months." Welles, Diary, entry for August 30, 
1864, 2: 127.
16William Lamb, "The Defense of Fort Fisher," in The 
Wav to Appomattox, vol. 4 of Battles and Leaders of the 
Civil War, eds. Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence C.
Buel (New York: Castle Books, 1956; reprint), 642. For a 
book-length treatment of the Fort Fisher campaign, Rod 
Gragg, Confederate Goliath: The Battle of Fort Fisher (New 
York: HarperCollins, 1991).










Figure 19. Fort Fisher and vicinity. (From An Atlas to 
Accompany the Official Records of the Union and Confederate 
Armies 1861-1865: Plate 132 Section 1.)
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There were two entrances to the Cape Fear River. Old 
Inlet was just west of Cape Fear itself, between Smith's 
Island and the mainland. It was only some six miles south 
and west of New Inlet, but because deep draft vessels had to 
skirt Frying Pan Shoals, which extended east from Cape Fear, 
they faced a voyage of thirty or forty miles between the two 
entrances. Fort Fisher occupied the tip of the peninsula 
which formed the eastern bank of the Cape Fear River and the 
northern side of New Inlet.
Fisher was an earthwork, its "sea face" stretching 
three quarters of a mile from the semi-detached Mound Bat­
tery in the south to the northeast bastion, whence the works 
turned west (the "land face") to cross the spit. Battery 
Buchanan, a detached battery, covered the fort's rear and 
the Cape Fear River, and other detached batteries and torpe­
does protected the landward side.17
The Fort Fisher expedition was subject to many delays, 
among them those caused by lack of coordination between the 
Army and the Navy. Porter commanded the warships, and Grant 
chose Major General Godfrey Weitzel to command the Army 
troops. Fort Fisher, however, lay within the military de­
partment commanded by Major General Benjamin F. Butler, who
17Lamb, "Defense of Fort Fisher," 642-43; Gragg, Con­
federate Goliath. 20. In December 1864, the fort mounted 
twenty-four guns on the sea face and twenty on the land 
face. Ibid., 19.
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insisted upon taking charge of the expedition himself.18
Butler conceived the idea that the fort could be de­
molished by exploding a ship filled with powder near it, and 
preparing this ship further delayed the expedition. But­
ler's force, with its transports and supply ships, was 
finally ready to sail on December 9 but storms delayed it 
until December 14.19 Meanwhile, the Navy portion of the 
expedition rendezvoused off Beaufort, North Carolina.
New Ironsides left Hampton Roads on December 13, 1864, 
and anchored off Beaufort December 15.20 The fleet left 
Beaufort on December 18, arriving at their rendezvous (twen­
ty miles off New Inlet) on December 20. Meanwhile, Butler's 
troops were again delayed, this time by running out of food, 
water and coal. After weathering a gale which began Decem­
ber 20, the fleet awaited the transports.21 Not until 
December 24 did the entire expedition join off New Inlet.
By this time, the defending Confederates were
18Anderson, By Sea and By River. 278; Grant, Personal 
Memoirs, 2: 388-90; Thomas 0. Selfridge, "The Navy at Fort 
Fisher," in The Wav to Appomattox, vol. 4 of Battles and 
Leaders of the Civil War, eds. Robert Underwood Johnson and 
Clarence C. Buel (New York: Castle Books, 1956; reprint), 
655.
19Shippen, "Fort Fisher," 13; Grant, Personal Memoirs. 
388-90. Shippen, writing after a lapse of years, is some­
times careless of chronological detail.
20NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. December 13-17, 1864.
21Grant, Personal Memoirs. 2: 390-91; NARG 24, Log of 
New Ironsides. 19-23 December, 1864; Porter to Welles, De­
cember 26, 1864, ORN 11: 254-55; NARG 24, Log of New Iron­
sides. December 21, 1864.
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thoroughly alarmed. Reinforcements were sent, though they 
were few because there were few to send.22 Federal volun­
teers exploded the powder boat on the night of December 23, 
1864, with no effect on Fort Fisher whatsoever, and on De­
cember 24 the fleet commenced its bombardment.23 The fleet 
carried 293 guns of IX-inch or larger caliber and included 
five ironclads: four monitors and New Ironsides.24
Porter planned for New Ironsides to lead the ironclads 
to a position 1,500 yards from Fort Fisher, about 500 yards 
from the beach, where she would anchor and "open fire with­
out delay." The larger wooden ships would then anchor 
forward of the ironclads about 2,000 yards from the fort, 
with a third line of wooden ships still farther out (Figure 
20).25 The fleet stood in toward Fort Fisher at daylight 
on December 24. New Ironsides set General Quarters at 9:06 
A.M., and at 11:30 A.M. Porter signalled to engage.
New Ironsides headed inshore and anchored some 2,000 
yards from the fort at 12:53 P.M. A ranging shot burst
22Report of Major General Whiting, December 30, 1864, 
OR ser. 1, 42, part 1: 994, 996.
23Selfridge, "Navy at Fort Fisher," 657; Grant, Per­
sonal Memoirs. 392-93; Anderson, By Sea and By River. 279- 
80; Porter to Welles, December 26, 1864, ORN 11: 254-60.
The Wilmington (NCI Daily Journal reported that the explo­
sion, which "shook the houses," was the Federals blowing up 
a ship which had run aground and could not get off. "Blowed 
Up." Wilmington Daily Journal. December 24, 1864, 2.
24Selfridge, "Navy at Fort Fisher," 662. A list of 
participating ships is in Porter's report, ORN 11: 254.
“General Order No. 70, ibid., 11: 245-47.
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short, so at 1:10 the ship steamed closer. A range between 
1,500 and 2,000 yards was better and she immediately com­
menced firing.2* Porter complimented Mew Ironsides for 
taking position "in the most beautiful and seamanlike man­
ner." The ship engaged the Confederate guns which fired on 
the fleet and they "were silenced almost as soon as the 
Ironsides opened her terrific battery."27 New Ironsides 
fired 646 rounds with such enthusiasm that Porter signalled 
repeatedly for the ships to "fire more deliberately."28 
The fleet shelled the forts for five hours but could do no 
more since the transports had not arrived. A few arrived at 
sunset, too late to land troops that day.
On Christmas Day the rest of the transports arrived, 
and Porter sent twenty-six ships and gunboats to help land 
troops. For this unopposed amphibious assault the Navy 
provided about 100 small boats to add to the 20 the Army 
brought. At 9:30 A.M., New Ironsides again steamed in to 
bombard the fort. On this day Porter reported the ships 
fired slowly, "only sufficient to amuse the enemy while the
26NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. December 24, 1864.
27Porter to Welles, December 26, 1864, ORN 11: 255.
Lamb averred, "The guns of Fort Fisher were not silenced." 
Due to limited ammunition, he had given orders to fire each 
not more than once every thirty minutes. Selfridge, "Navy 
at Fort Fisher," 657; Lamb- "Defense of Fort Fisher," 647- 
48. See also reports of Colonel Lamb, December 24, 1864, OR 
ser. 1, 42, part 1: 1003; December 27, 1864, ibid., 1004.
28NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. December 24, 1864.
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army landed," but New Ironsides still fired 416 rounds.29 
At sunset Porter directed her to remain in position during 
the night.
Meanwhile, Butler landed his men some four miles up 
the spit from Fort Fisher. After closing the fort, Butler 
decided it could not be taken.30 He reembarked most of his 
troops and sailed for Hampton Roads. The remaining troops, 
some 700, were reembarked by the fleet on December 27 and 
the Navy returned to Beaufort.31 New Ironsides left for 
Beaufort on December 28, arriving on December 29.32
During the bombardments, New Ironsides fired over a 
thousand heavy shell.33 The Navy was optimistic about its 
effect; New Ironsides' Log records, "Judging from the many 
fires & explosions in the fort and the severe fire of the 
fleet, it was evident that the fort was greatly injured or 
damaged inside."34 Despite the heavy expenditure of ord­
nance, however, little significant damage was done. The
29Porter to Welles, December 26, 1864, ORN 11: 256-57; 
NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. December 25, 1864.
30Butler to Porter, December 25, 2864, ORN 11: 251.
31Selfridge, "Navy at Fort Fisher," 657; Grant, Per­
sonal Memoirs. 393-94; Anderson, By Sea and By River. 279- 
80; Porter to Welles, December 27, 1864, ORN 11: 261. Ship- 
pen's chronology is wrong. Shippen, "Fort Fisher," 16-17.
32NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. December 28-29, 1864.
33Ibid., December 24, 1864; Radford to Porter, Decem­
ber 31, 1864, ORN 11: 275.
34NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. December 25, 1864.
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defenders suffered only three men killed and sixty-one 
wounded.35 Shells tore up the earthworks but did not pene­
trate any bomb-proofs or magazines, and only four guns were 
permanently disabled.36 Confederate repairs began as soon 
as the fleet left, and by mid-January at least three re­
placement heavy guns had been mounted.37
In return for her contribution, New Ironsides received 
no significant damage or casualties from the Confederate 
fire, although several shot cut up her topsides.38 Part of 
her immunity must be laid to the inadequate Confederate 
ammunition supply, which caused the fort's commander to 
restrict his firing.39 Although Confederate fire did some 
damage, most of the fleet's eighty-three casualties were 
caused by the bursting of 100-pounder Parrott guns.40
35Report of Surgeon Spyers Singleton, December 30,
1864, OR ser. 1, 42, part 1: 1008-1009.
3SReport of Colonel Lamb, December 27, 1864, ibid., 
ser. 1, 42, part 1: 1004; Report of Captain John C. Little, 
December 30, 1864, ibid., 1007-1008; Gragg, Confederate 
Goliath. 99.
37Extract from the official diary of Colonel Lamb, ORN 
11: 746-47.
38Shippen, "Fort Fisher," 15; Radford to Porter, De­
cember 31, 1864, ORN 11: 275. Shippen said the dispensary 
was deunaged, but that was in January 1865. NARG 24, Log of 
New Ironsides. December 24-26, 1864, and January 13, 1865.
39Lamb, "Defense of Fort Fisher," 647-48. The fort 
fired only 1390 rounds from forty-four heavy guns during the 
December 24-25 bombardment. OR ser. 1, 42, part 1: 1007.
40Porter to Welles, December 26, 1864, ORN 11: 256; 
Selfridge, "Navy at Fort Fisher," 662. An inquiry deter­
mined five guns burst and forty-five men were killed or
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The enemy had not hurt New Ironsides, but nature dealt 
her a heavy blow. Her rudder, partially disabled December 
30, received injuries on December 31 which put it completely 
out of commission. The outer rudder broke loose first and 
soon both outer and inner rudders were adrift. The rudder 
head was twisted off just above the blade. Although Radford 
rigged improvised steering gear consisting of a chain around 
the rudder, the ship's steering was impaired.41
Porter was irate at the failure to take Fort Fisher 
and Grant was distressed, not least because Butler had ig­
nored Grant's explicit instructions not to relinquish a 
foothold if he obtained one.42 Grant informed Porter he 
would send the same troops back with a different leader and 
selected Major General Alfred H. Terry to command the Army 
portion of the expedition. The troops reembarked on January 
6, 1865, and arrived off Beaufort on January 8.43 Delayed
wounded. Resolution of the House of Representatives, Jan­
uary 5, 1865, with endorsements, ibid., 11: 359-60.
41Radford to Welles, January 20, 1865, ibid., 11: 616. 
New Ironsides participated in the second attack on Fort 
Fisher with temporary steering gear. Radford to Porter, 
January 7, 1865, ibid., 11: 414. NARG 45, Entry 395, Sub­
entry 87, Radford to Porter, December 30, 1864, and January 
1 and 2, 1865; NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides, December 30- 
31, 1864.
42Porter to Welles, December 27, 1864, ORN 11: 261-62.
43Grant, Personal Memoirs. 2: 394-96. "Porter told 
Grant the fort could be had any time they sent a competent 
general to take it. The presidential election was over and 
the war was on the downhill slope, and it was suddenly real­
ized that Butler no longer need be handled with tongs. So 
Grant relieved him. ..." Bruce Catton, A Stillness at
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again by a heavy gale, the fleet got underway from Beaufort 
on January 12 and the first landings at Fort Fisher took 
place January 13.44 This time the Army had come to stay.
The Confederates saw the fleet's approach on January 
12 and sent again for reinforcements.45 Even with the 700 
men who arrived on the 13th, Colonel Lamb had only 1,800 to 
defend Fort Fisher and its outlying works.46 Porter's plan 
was similar to that used in December, but all the ships were 
closer to the fort, with the monitors engaging at a range of 
1,200 yards (Figure 2l).47 In addition, Porter formed a 
force of seamen to assist the Army troops.48
The ironclads steamed inshore to their anchorages 
early in the morning of January 13. At about 8:30 A.M. New 
Ironsides anchored and at 8:36 Fort Fisher "fired the first 
gun . . . which was immediately answered."49 The ships
Appomattox (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1954), 329.
44Porter to Welles, January 14, 1864, ORN 11: 432-33; 
Grant, Personal Memoirs. 2: 396; Selfridge, "Navy at Fort 
Fisher," 657-58.
45Report of General Braxton Bragg, January 20, 1865,
OR ser. 1, 46, part 1: 431-32.
46Lamb, "Defense of Fort Fisher," 647; Selfridge, "Na­
vy at Fort Fisher," 658, 661.
47General Orders 78, January 2, 1864, ORN 11: 425-27.
48General Orders 81, January 4, 1864, ibid., 11: 427. 
Selfridge said volunteers were called for, but this General 
Order required commanders to detail as many men as they 
could spare. Selfridge, "Navy at Fort Fisher," 658.
49NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. January 13, 1865.
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opened fire in a "spirited engagement" which soon made the 
fort "look very dilapidated."50 Lamb judged the fire of 
the ships was concentrated with the intent of destroying the 
landward defenses, and the fort suffered much more heavily 
than during the December bombardment.51
The Confederates were still short of ammunition, 
having received ncne between assaults, so Lamb imposed the 
same restrictions on firing as before.52 New Ironsides was 
again a target. "Our fire was returned very briskly, and we 
were struck more frequently" than in December, but the only 
significant damage was an X-inch shot which entered sick bay 
and smashed the dispensary.S3 Meanwhile, Terry's troops 
landed five miles up the spit from the fort. They moved 
south to a point three miles from the fort, then closed to 
two miles by 2:00 A.M. on January 14.54
After dark on January 13 the wooden ships withdrew to 
anchorage, but the ironclads remained to harass the enemy 
with sporadic fire. New Ironsides shifted anchorage at 9:30 
P.M., "The enemy having found the exact range of this ship
50Porter to Welles, January 14, 1865, ORN 11: 433. 
Porter timed the first shots from Fort Fisher at 7:30.
51Report of Major General Whiting, January 18, 1865,
OR ser. 1, 46, part 1: 439-40.
“Lamb, "Defense of Fort Fisher," 647-48.
“Shippen, "Fort Fisher," 17; NARG 24, Log of New 
Ironsides. January 13, 1865.
“Report of Major General Terry, January 25, 1865, OR 
ser. 1, 46, part 1: 396-97.
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during the day."55 Lamb noted that the defenders "could 
scarcely gather up and bury our dead without fresh casual­
ties," and it was impossible to repair the damage done to 
the land face of the fort.56
On January 14 the bombardment resumed, with the wooden 
ships returning to their positions during daylight. New 
Ironsides resumed firing at 11:00 A.M. when directed by 
Admiral Porter. Her target was Fort Fisher, but "at 1.30 A 
rebel gunboat in Cape Fear River attempted to shell our 
camp, when the fire of this ship's battery was directed to 
her with effect and she withdrew." New Ironsides also dis­
abled a "very troublesome" X-inch which had damaged her the 
day before.57 The Army landed artillery and moved down the 
river, or inland, side of the peninsula. By evening they 
were within a mile of the fort.58
The Confederates tried to stop the Federal troops with 
artillery but could not; "to fire from that [land] face was 
to draw upon the gunners the fury of the fleet." Only three
55NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. January 13, 1865.
This corroborates Shippen's anecdote. Shippen, "Fort Fish­
er," 18.
5SLamb, "Defense of Fort Fisher," 648; Whiting to Gen­
eral Robert E. Lee, February 19, 1865, OR ser. 1, 46, part 
1: 441.
57NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. January 14, 1865.
58Report of Major General Terry, OR ser. 1, 46, part 
1: 397.
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or four guns remained on the land face.59 Lamb repeatedly 
telegraphed General Braxton Bragg, in charge of defending 
Wilmington, to organize a counter-attack using the 6,000 
troops of General Robert Hoke's division. Bragg, believing 
the garrison could hold the fort and that committing Hoke 
risked losing the whole state, did not attack.60
New Ironsides remained in position without having to 
shift anchorage the evening of the 14th. Since she had 
fired over 2,300 rounds in two days, she loaded 518 Xl-inch 
shell from the U.S.S. Wilderness.61 New Ironsides resumed 
her bombardment at 7:16 A.M. on January 15, firing slowly 
and bursting her shells precisely, and continued all day.
Late in the morning, Porter landed his 1,600 sailors 
and 400 Marines north of the fort, in view from New Iron­
sides. He planned to have them assault the seaward side of 
the fort while the Army attacked the landward side.62 Af­
ter some delay, both attacks commenced at 3:00 P.M. New 
Ironsides ceased firing at 3:10 P.M. and at 3:27 saw that
59Lamb, "Defense of Fort Fisher," 648; Whiting to Lee, 
February 19, 1865, OR ser. 1, 46, part 1: 441.
60Lamb, "Defense of Fort Fisher," 648-49, 654; Report 
of Major General Bragg, January 20, 1865, OR ser. 1, 46, 
part 1: 433-34. Gragg, Confederate Goliath. 26-29, 59-60, 
99-101, 110-11, 117-20 for Lamb's difficulties with Bragg.
“NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. January 14-15, 1865.
“Porter to Welles, January 17, 1865, ORN 11: 439; Re­
port of Major General Terry, OR ser. 1, 46, part 1: 398.
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the sailors had been repulsed.63
The Navy assault failed when the defenders pinned the 
sailors down within 100 yards of the fort, but it occupied 
many Confederates and permitted the Army to gain a foothold 
on the northwest corner.64 In addition, three days of na­
val bombardment had disabled all but one heavy gun on the 
landward face of the fort.65
Once inside, the troops cleared each traverse in turn, 
the Confederates fighting stubbornly and making frequent 
counter-charges. About 350 reinforcements, comprising two 
South Carolina regiments of Hagood's brigade, arrived by 
steamer during the fighting but Navy gunfire drove the ves­
sel off before the rest of the brigade could land.66
Naval gunfire was decisive. In addition to destroying 
the fort's landward artillery and preventing reinforcement, 
the ships, especially the ironclads, supported the Army 
directly, firing on the traverses with "deadly precision"
“NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. January 15, 1865.
“Porter to Welles, January 17, 1865, ORN 11: 439-41; 
Lamb, "Defense of Fort Fisher," 650-51; Selfridge, "Navy at 
Fort Fisher," 659-60; Report of Major General Terry, OR ser. 
1, 46, part 1: 398-99. Porter blamed the Marines for the 
failure, but the sailors were poorly organized and armed for 
land combat. Lamb wrote, "Had the fleet helped their own 
column as they did afterward that of the army, theirs would 
have been the glory of victory."
“Lamb, "Defense of Fort Fisher," 648; Whiting to Lee, 
February 19, 1865, OR ser. 1, 46, part 1: 441.
“Lamb, "Defense of Fort Fisher," 649; Report of Gen­
eral Bragg, OR ser. 1, 46, part 1: 433.
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and breaking up defensive concentrations.67 Again New
Ironsides took the lead. Porter wrote.
His [Radford's] vessel did more execution than any 
vessel in the fleet, and even when our troops were 
on the parapet I had so much confidence in the accu­
racy of his fire that he was directed to fire on the 
traverses in advance of our troops and clear them 
out. This he did most effectually, and but for this 
the victory might not have been ours.68
In the evening, the fort's remaining defenders with­
drew south toward Battery Buchanan, expecting to cover their 
further retreat from there. They found the battery's Con­
federate Navy garrison already gone, the guns spiked and all 
the boats taken. New Ironsides' part in the battle ended 
when she ceased fire about 7:00 P.M., having supported the 
Army with a total of 2,783 main battery rounds and 113 
fifty-pounders.69 Battery Buchanan, the last remaining 
outpost of Fort Fisher, surrendered at about 10:00 P.M.70
In return for her vital contribution, New Ironsides 
received little damage. Radford reported that though the
67Lamb, "Defense of Fort Fisher," 652. The traverses 
are spaced so closely that the precision firing New Iron­
sides did would not be easy for modern fire control systems.
68Porter to Welles, January 28, 1865, ORN 11: 453.
Lamb agreed: "Just as the tide of battle seemed to have 
turned in our favor the remorseless fleet came to the rescue 
of the faltering Federals." Lamb, "Defense of Fort Fisher," 
652.
69NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. January 15, 1865.
70Lamb, "Defense of Fort Fisher," 653-54; Porter to 
Welles, January 15, 1865, ORN 11: 434-35; Reports of Major 
General Whiting, January 18, 1865, and February 19, 1865, OR 
ser. 1, 46, part 1: 440, 442.
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ship was often struck, "she has not been much hurt." Once 
again, no one aboard was injured.71 The fleet suffered 82 
killed, 269 wounded and 35 missing in the second attack, 
mostly in the ground assault on the fort.72
Upon departing Fort Fisher on January 17, 1865, New 
Ironsides returned to Hampton Roads, arriving off Fortress 
Monroe on January 18. The reason for her return was to 
repair her rudder at the Norfolk Navy Yard, but there was 
soon other work for her to do in the Hampton Roads area.
The Confederates had built three ironclads on the 
James River at Richmond, the Richmond. Fredericksburg. and 
Virginia II.73 They were both protected and restricted by 
obstructions in the James. In 1862, the Confederates 
blocked the James at Drewry's Bluff, six miles below Rich­
mond, to prevent the Union Navy from passing upriver and 
attacking the Confederate capital (Figure 22). Though the 
obstructions kept the Union ironclads from going upriver,
71A X-inch solid shot "badly smashed" one armor plate, 
and another came through the side forward of the armor. 
Radford to Porter, January 20, 1865, ORN 11: 616. NARG 52, 
Entry 22, Medical Journal of New Ironsides.
72Selfridge, "Navy at Fort Fisher," 662; Porter to 
Welles, January 17, 1865, ORN 11: 442-44. New Ironsides 
lost a former shipmate when Lieutenant Benjamin Porter was 
killed ashore. Selfridge, "Navy at Fort Fisher," 662; Por­
ter to Welles, January 15, 1865, ORN. 435.
73The Richmond was the first completed, in mid-1862. 
Scharf states July 1862; Still states the incomplete ship 
was towed up from Norfolk in May 1862 and completed six 
months later. Scharf, Confederate States N a w . 727; Still, 
Iron Afloat. 168-71. The others were commissioned in March 
1864, ibid., 170.
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Figure 22. Map of the James River from Chaffin's Bluff to City Point. (Official 
Records . . ,. Navies. 11, facing page 633.)
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they also prevented Confederate ironclads from attacking 
Union troops or shipping below Drewry's Bluff.
Despite the completion of the Richmond in 1862 to 
protect the city, President Jefferson Davis refused until 
May 1864 to permit a channel through the obstructions.74 
The Confederate ironclads finally passed the obstructions in 
late May 1864. By then there were several monitors in the 
James and it was too late for the Confederates to accomplish 
anything against the Union base at City Point.
Grant was still worried about his supplies. Not con­
fident of the Navy's ability to prevent a raid, he directed 
Butler to block the James at Trent's Reach, the northwestern 
anchor of Butler's defensive line across the Bermuda Hundred 
peninsula.75 Butler blocked the river on June 13, 1864, by 
sinking hulks filled with stones.76 Conditions in the 
James remained stalemated, with Confederate ironclads above 
Trent's Reach and Union ironclads below, until January 1865.
In mid-January 1865 the Confederates determined that a 
successful raid on City Point would relieve Union pressure
74Ibid., 169-71, 173; Parker, Recollections. 356-57.
7STrent's Reach was six statute miles west northwest 
of City Point as the crow flies but some seventeen miles up 
the James, and ten miles downstream from Drewry's Bluff.
"Map of the James River from Chaffin's Bluff to City Point," 
ORN facing 11: 663; Still, Iron Afloat. 176-77.
76Scharf, Confederate States N a w . 734-35; Still, Iron 
Afloat, 176-78, 180. In August, Butler began digging a canal 
across the Dutch Gap peninsula to bypass the Trent's Reach 
obstructions and give the Union a clear route to attack 
Drewry's Bluff. Although completed, it was never used.
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on Richmond. On January 23, heavy rain washed away some of 
the Trent's Reach obstructions, at a time when there was 
only one Union ironclad in the James, the monitor Onondaga. 
Taking advantage of the opening, a Confederate force com­
prised of the three ironclads, a gunboat, and four torpedo 
craft arrived at Trent's Reach that evening. The Freder­
icksburg . with the shallowest draft, could pass the obstruc­
tions but the other two ironclads grounded above them on a 
falling tide. Fredericksburg returned above the obstruc­
tions and the expedition was effectively over. Onondaga 
engaged the Confederates from a distance on the morning of 
January 24, causing some damage, but the Confederates re­
floated their ships on the rising tide and retired.77
The abortive attack caused consternation in the Union 
command. New Ironsides, which had steamed from Fortress 
Monroe to Norfolk on January 21, 1865, started up the James 
on January 25, her mission once again countering Confederate 
ironclads. After anchoring for the night, she continued on 
upriver, grounded briefly on Harrison's Bar, and anchored 
off Bermuda Hundred at 11:10 A.M. on January 26.78
Upon his arrival, Radford relieved Commander William
77Ibid., 183-86; Scharf, Confederate States N a w . 740- 
42; Parker, Recollections. 365-66. Commander William A. 
Parker (no relation to William H. Parker), the commander of 
the James River Division, was relieved at Grant's request 
for lack of aggressiveness. OR ser. 1, 46, part 2: 218.
78NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. January 21, 25, 26, 
1865. The river was so shallow that she later grounded 
while at anchor. Ibid., February 9, 1865.
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A. Parker as commander of the James River Division of the 
North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.79 There were frequent 
alarms and considerable small boat activity, but New Iron­
sides remained at Bermuda Hundred without major incident 
until February 17, 1865.80 Radford departed the ship on 
that date, hoisting his pennant as commander of the James 
River Division in U.S.S. Dumbarton. He left his Executive 
Officer, Lieutenant Commander Robert L. Phythian, in charge 
of New Ironsides as acting Commanding Officer.81
Phythian's first duty was to return New Ironsides to 
Norfolk for the repairs interrupted by the Confederate 
sortie. She left Bermuda Hundred at 7:30 A.M. on February
18, grounded again on Harrison's Bar, and later anchored for 
the night. She arrived at Norfolk at 4:30 P.M. on February
19. After offloading shot and shell on February 23 and 24, 
she proceeded on February 27 to the Navy Yard. She spent 
until March 3, 1865, offloading guns and carriages, and then
79Radford was ordered to report to Grant when he took 
command of the Division. By February 23, 1865, the command 
had been retitled the James River Flotilla. Radford to 
Porter, February 23, 1865, ORN 12: 48.
80For example, Radford telegraphed Welles on January 
29, 1865: "Deserters report rebel ironclads to come down 
again; all ready for them." Ibid., 11: 710. On February 6, 
New Ironsides' Log noted the rams were moving downriver. On 
February 22, "It is thought an attack will be made in a few 
days, or at any time." Radford to Captain E. T. Nichols, 
February 22, 1865, ibid., 12: 46.
81Radford to Porter, February 23, 1865, ORN 12: 48;
NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. February 17-18, 1865. Phy­
thian styled himself as "Commanding pro tern." NARG 19,
Entry 1072, Steam Log of New Ironsides. February 21, 1865.
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on March 6 offloaded powder. Finally, on March 9, her draft 
was reduced enough to remove the rudder for repairs.82
The Navy Yard completed the repairs and rehung the 
rudder on March 20, 1865. On March 20, 21 and 22, New Iron­
sides took in her guns and carriages and the spars she 
landed in October 1864. On March 23, Radford was officially 
detached, making Phythian the ship's Commanding Officer.83
By this time the war, as far as the Navy was con­
cerned, was over. The Navy Department was already trying to 
reduce expenses and there were no enemies left against whom 
New Ironsides could fight.84 On March 24, the ship took in 
powder and on March 25, she completed loading powder and 
shot. On March 27, the ship moved into Hampton Roads, and 
on March 28, she left Norfolk for the last time, bound for 
Philadelphia with the steamer U.S.S. Fahkee.85
New Ironsides arrived in Philadelphia on March 30,
82NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. February 18-March 9, 
1865. Report of Vessels at the Naval Station Norfolk for 
the week of March 11, 1865, NARG 45, Subject File, AR— Mis­
cellaneous Material Relative to Repairs, U.S. Ships, Box 
106; also weeks of March 18 and March 25, 1865.
83NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. March 23, 1865. On 
April 28, 1865, Radford relieved Porter as Commander of the 
North Atlantic Blockading Squadron. ORN 12: 129.
84The Secretary's letter was dated February 24, 1865. 
Report of the Secretary of the Navy. 1865 (Washington: GPO, 
1865) (hereafter SecNav rvearll. ix. "With the war coming 
to an end, however, Welles' ingrained sense of thriftiness 
reasserted itself." Niven, Gideon Welles. 506.
85NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. March 21-27, 1865? 
Captain E. T. Nichols, Senior Officer at Hampton Roads, to 
Porter, March 28, 1865, ORN 12: 86.
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1865, and anchored off the Philadelphia Navy Yard. The pace 
of operations was "normal peacetime:" the ship started to 
offload ammunition on Saturday, April 1, and completed the 
effort on Monday, April 3, rather than working on Sunday to 
finish the job. On April 5, she moored at the Navy Yard and 
sent her remaining stores ashore. At 9:45 A.M. on April 6, 
1865, New Ironsides7 commissioning pennant was hauled down 
for the last time.86
86NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. March 31-April 6,
1865.
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONTEMPORARIES AND COMPETITORS
New Ironsides was a successful ship, both in the eyes 
of Union and Confederate contemporaries and in the light of 
history. She proved herself in combat under severe condi­
tions and amply justified the pride of her builders by 
spending fifteen uninterrupted months off Charleston without 
the refit or repair periods granted to the monitors. Her 
gunnery was more effective than the monitors, and she could, 
as DuPont phrased it, keep the sea. She compared very fa­
vorably with her contemporaries, both monitors and foreign 
ironclads.
The monitor type was characterized by low freeboard, 
complete absence of sail power, and an armament consisting 
of a few heavy guns placed in closed, revolving turrets, 
whereas New Ironsides had high freeboard and a broadside 
armament.1 The most important difference between the two 
types was in freeboard, the vertical distance between the
definition from William Hovgaard, Modern History of 
Warships (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute Press, 
1971; reprint of 1920 edition), 27.
193
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water and the edge of the weather deck.2
John Rodgers, who commanded the monitors Weehawken and 
Dictator. wrote in 1864 an exposition of the virtues of the 
monitors. He noted that, while the monitors and the New 
Ironsides type each had "peculiar advantages" and both were 
needed,
When the Monitor class measures its strength against the 
Ironsides class, then, with vessels of equal size, the 
Monitor class will overpower the Ironsides class; and, 
indeed, a single Monitor will capture many casemated 
vessels of no greater individual size or speed. . . .3
Rodgers' analysis, based upon equal displacement, begs the
question of effectiveness. Compared to the monitors, New
Ironsides makes an excellent showing.
In resistance to damage, New Ironsides was the equal
of any monitor, despite her unarmored ends. She never had a
man seriously hurt in action.4 This was at least in part
due to the protection given by her solid plating, which gave
more resistance for the same total thickness of iron than
did laminated plate.5 Although the later monitors gained
2Gillmer, Modern Ship Design. 26, for a discussion of 
freeboard and its significance.
3John Rodgers to Welles, April 7, 1864, quoted in 
Johnson, John Rodgers. 220.
4Ensign Howard, mortally wounded by a shotgun blast 
from the David. was the only man killed by the enemy. Bel­
knap, "Reminiscent of the 'New Ironsides'," 64; NARG 52, 
Entry 22, Medical Journal of the New Ironsides. The ship 
did lose men to accidents and disease.
5Chapter 2, 42n above for modern results. Lenthall 
and Isherwood to Welles, June 10, 1862, found laminated 
armor "very inferior for equal aggregate thicknesses." NARG
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some advantage in protection from their eleven inch turret 
armor, their major protective advantage was their small 
target area. At Fort Fisher, for example, the monitors were 
"fired at a great deal" but seldom hit.6
When they were hit, the monitors sustained consider­
able damage. Their laminated armor required complex bolting 
and riveting to hold it together. Shot hitting the outside 
frequently sheared the bolts and caused the nuts to fly 
around inside like projectiles. In an engagement between 
the monitor Montauk and Fort McAllister on the Ogeechee 
River, Montauk suffered considerable damage of this kind.7
Of the seven monitors engaged in DuPont's attack on 
Charleston, at least four suffered severely from broken 
bolts.8 Passaic had the roof of her pilot house knocked 
loose and several bolts broken. Weehawken had thirty-six 
broken in the turret and "a good many" in the pilot house. 
Nantucket lost many bolts and Nahant had seventy-seven
19, Entry 49, 387. Lieutenant Commander E. Simpson, Com­
manding U.S.S. Passaic. to Welles, October 14, 1863: "Solid 
plates . . . only 4 [sic] inches thick, resist the impact of 
shot much better than the 5 inches of laminated iron. . . ." 
ORN 15: 38. See also Baxter, Ironclad Warship. 202-203.
6Porter to Welles, ORN 11: 602.
7Commander John L. Worden to DuPont, February 2, 1863, 
enclosing Second Assistant Engineer Thomas A. Stephens to 
Worden, February 2, 1863, ibid., 13: 630-32.
8Very, "Development of Armor," 396. Testimony at the 
Stimers Court of Inquiry is presented in Report . . . Ar­
mored Vessels. 61-73. Hunter, A Year on a Monitor. 51, de­
scribes injuries to the Nahant.
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broken in the turret and pilot house, one of which killed 
the quartermaster.9 Fabric or light iron screens had to be 
installed inside the turrets and pilot houses to protect the 
occupants. Even with the screens, casualties occurred; in 
August 1863 Dahlgren's fleet captain, Commander George W. 
Rodgers, was killed in U.S.S. Catskill by pieces of broken 
bolts.10
In speed, New Ironsides was at a slight disadvantage 
to most of the monitors. Dahlgren, who was favorably im­
pressed with the monitors, credited them with seven knots 
and New Ironsides with six to seven.11
The broadside battery was far more effective than the 
turret batteries of the monitors in providing a high volume 
of fire.12 The monitors had more flexibility, since New
9For Passaic. Captain Percival Drayton to DuPont,
April 8, 1863, ORN 14: 10; for Weehawken. John Rodgers to 
DuPont, April 8, 1863, ibid., 14: 12; for Nantucket, Comman­
der D. M. Fairfax to DuPont, April 8, 1863, with enclosures, 
ibid., 14: 18-20; for Nahant, Commander John Downes to Du­
Pont, April 8, 1863, ibid., 14: 22, and Hunter, A Year on a 
Monitor, 51-53.
10Report of Lieutenant Commander Charles C. Carpenter, 
August 17, 1863, ORN 14: 458.
11Dahlgren to Welles, ORN 14: 598. The Charleston 
monitors were rotated to Port Royal for maintenance and 
cleaning; New Ironsides was not. New Ironsides was coppered 
to prevent fouling, but during her first commission she suf­
fered from copper falling off in sheets. Turner to Smith, 
April 2, 1863, NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 449, 2: 7.
12"If the depth of water would only permit her to ap­
proach, I would sweep the ground clean with her powerful 
broadside." Dahlgren to Welles, July 30, 1863, ORN 14: 410.
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Ironsides could not fire except on the broadside.13 The 
monitors had essentially unlimited firing arcs. The Xl-inch 
guns of the New Ironsides were the largest which could 
practicably be handled and trained without the mechanical 
assistance provided by the turret.
Due to their powerful XV-inch guns, the Passaic and 
Canonicus classes of monitors would have been more effective 
than the New Ironsides in ship to ship combat in protected 
waters. Against such antagonists, the best tactic for New 
Ironsides would have been to close as rapidly as possible, 
accepting the chance of a disabling hit from the monitors' 
slow-firing XV-inch to come to a range where the smaller but 
far more numerous shot from her rapid-firing Xl-inch could 
tell. Once at close range she would have had an excellent 
chance of disabling the monitor turrets.14
The most significant difference between New Ironsides 
and the monitors was in freeboard. The early monitors had 
one to two feet of freeboard, and the trunnion axes of their 
guns were within five feet of the water. Even "seagoing" 
monitors such as the Miantonomoh class had a freeboard of
13New Ironsides could fire twenty degrees forward and 
abaft the beam. Chief Constructor Henry Hoover to Smith, 
March 31, 1863, NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 449, 1: 160.
14The monitor captains reported "much solicitude" for 
their turrets' "liability . . .  to cease to revolve" when 
struck. Joint Report of Officers Commanding Ironclads, May 
25, 1863, ORN 14: 214.
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only two feet seven inches.15
New Ironsides' freeboard was about thirteen feet and 
her gun port sills at least seven feet above the water. 
Depending on her loading, the trunnion axes of her guns were 
at least nine feet above water. The result was increased 
command for the guns and less interference from waves. In 
anything but protected waters, the low freeboard of the 
monitors left them unable to work their guns, placing them 
at a serious disadvantage.16
In addition, the Ericsson turrets of the monitors were 
in theory kept watertight by having the bottom of the turret 
plates bear against a brass ring set into the deck. The 
turret revolved around and was supported by a central spin­
dle, which was wedged up to permit the turret to turn. When 
the turret was so raised, there was a gap between the turret 
and the ring which permitted much water to enter. After the 
action at Charleston Captain Percival Drayton, commanding 
the Passaic. called this "a most serious evil” and said it 
required correction "if the turret is to be kept up [ready
lsHovgaard, History of Warships. 33; Gardiner, Fight­
ing Ships. 121.
16 "At times the sea would go over the turrets. . . ." 
Porter to Welles, on the transit to Fort Fisher, ORN 11:
601. Similarly, Radford to Porter, January 16, 1865: The 
monitors had "not only proved that they could ride out heavy 
gales at sea, but fight their guns in moderately smooth 
[emphasis added] weather, which has been doubted by many in­
telligent officers." Ibid., 11: 462.
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for action] in any but the smoothest weather."17
High freeboard also helps a ship maintain her speed, 
especially against a head sea, since with a low freeboard 
the bow is often buried in the waves and this increases the 
ship's resistance. The monitors suffered severely from 
this; although their motion was generally easy, they shipped 
dangerous quantities of water and could not make much head­
way.18 Due to her higher freeboard and better seakeeping 
New Ironsides could have maintained her speed better at sea. 
Being coppered, she could expect a longer useful time before 
bottom fouling would markedly reduce her speed.19
It was only in their shallow draft that the monitors, 
under the conditions of the Civil War, had a decisive advan­
tage. The monitors drew less than twelve feet of water; the 
New Ironsides about fifteen. Dahlgren's opinion was that 
ten to eleven feet was the "most convenient" draft and that
17Drayton to DuPont, April 8, 1863, ibid., 14: 11.
18Drayton, referring to John Rodgers' riding out a 
gale in Weehawken: "If he can get her along against a head 
sea comfortably and safely, she is a different concern from 
the Passaic." Drayton to DuPont, February 7, 1863, Hayes, 
DuPont Letters. 2: 425. Rodgers himself co-signed a report 
to Welles stating that the monitors "have been exaggerated 
into vessels capable of keeping the seas, and making long 
voyages alone." Joint Report of Officers Commanding Iron­
clads, May 25, 1863, ORN 14: 214.
19When foul, the monitors' speed was 3.5 or 4 knots. 
After cleaning, Montauk's speed improved from 3.5 to 6 
knots. Dahlgren to Welles, November 4, 1863, ORN 15: 79.
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anything more was too restrictive.20 During the Charleston 
campaign the light draft of the monitors made them the 
choice for inshore work, whereas New Ironsides was the only 
vessel suited for outside work.21 The psychological impact 
of the original Monitor aside, one reason the U.S. Navy 
built so many monitors and so few seagoing ironclads was 
that only ships of relatively light draft could reach the 
fighting.22
Dahlgren, who served both in New Ironsides and in
monitors while in action and was known as a "monitor man,"
summed up the discussion. He wrote,
Keeping in view the peculiar exigencies of the case, 
which required light draft and great ordnance power, it 
appears that the selection of the Department could not 
have been more judicious in preferring a number of moni­
tors to operate from a heavy frigate as a base.23
Together, they provided both the inshore punch and the off­
shore security required.
20Dahlgren to Welles, January 28, 1864, ibid., 14:
598. In a letter of August 22, 1863, to Gillmore, Dahlgren 
called her "powerful but most impractical . . . Her great 
draft prevents approach to the main object. . . . "  Ibid.,
14: 466.
21 "I have only one [ironclad] vessel which can do out­
side blockading duty. ..." DuPont to Welles, June 3,
1863, ibid., 14: 231.
22"So great was the need of light-draft ironclads 
suited for the immediate task . . . and so popular was the 
Monitor, cheap, novel, and fresh from her dramatic struggle, 
that the opportunity for building a high seas ironclad fleet 
was largely overlooked." Baxter, Ironclad Warship. 302.
23Dahlgren to Welles, January 28, 1864, ORN 14: 599- 
600. Dahlgren, who owed his admiral's stars and his command 
to Lincoln, firmly supported the Administration's position.
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In comparison with those European ships which were her 
contemporaries, New Ironsides also makes a favorable impres­
sion. All three were of the high freeboard type. Although 
the smallest of the three, New Ironsides7 armament and 
protection were the equal of either Gloire or Warrior.2*
In protection, New Ironsides7s chief defects were that 
her armor did not cover her bow and stern and that her deck 
armor was only one inch thick.25 As noted above, deck pro­
tection was not then particularly important in ship to ship 
combat. To avoid the weight of heavy deck armor, minimal 
deck protection was common to all early ironclads.26 
Against New Ironsides' one inch, Warrior carried 3/4 inch of 
iron deck plating and Gloire carried only 4/10 inch.27
New Ironsides had no armor above a single waterline 
strake for thirty feet forward and aft of the battery. Her 
soft ends were vulnerable but so were Warrior7s. Warrior, 
with no waterline belt, had only the 3/4 inch plating of her
“The rapid progress of naval architecture in the 
1860s and 1870s makes it necessary to compare ships of 
roughly similar date. Warrior. laid down in 1859, was com­
pleted in late 1861; Gloire, laid down in 1858, was com­
pleted in 1860. By the end of 1862, Great Britain had four 
ironclad ships completed and France had six.
“Dahlgren7s report to Welles, November 5, 1863, dis­
cusses these flaws, ORN 15: 99.
“Due to its large area, the one inch deck of New 
Ironsides weighed 170 tons, compared to 650 tons for her 
entire 4̂5 inch side protection. NARG 19, Plan 107-9-12H, is 
a listing of weights (reproduced as Appendix A).
“For Warrior. Lambert, Warrior. 72. For Gloire. Gar­
diner, Fighting Ships. 286.
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hull to protect her forward and aft of the 213 feet amid­
ships covered by her ih inch armor.28 Gloire was the only 
one of the three to have her sides completely covered with 
armor.29 Because of the unarmored areas of her wooden 
hull, New Ironsides would have been more likely to catch 
fire in action than Warrior or Gloire.
As a result of poor protection at the stern, rudder 
damage was another danger. Neither New Ironsides nor War­
rior had protection for their steering gear.30
A vulnerability common to all masted ironclads was 
dismasting. New Ironsides had her masts removed for most of 
her Civil War service, which eliminated the problem.31 Her 
masts might have been helpful for operations in the open 
ocean, however, and both Gloire and Warrior remained fully
28Parkes, British Battleships. 19; Lambert, Warrior, 
181. New Ironsides was armored over 74 percent of her 
length, Warrior over only 56 percent.
29Baxter, Ironclad Warship. 61; Parkes, British Bat­
tleships . 3. See also plates of Gloire and Warrior which 
accompany Russell, "Iron-Cased Vessels," Plates IV and V.
30Parkes, British Battleships. 18; Dahlgren to Welles, 
November 5, 1863, ORN 15: 99.
31New Ironsides made her first voyage with signalling 
masts which carried no sail. The full rig was reinstalled 
in September 1862 and again replaced by signalling masts in 
January 1863. The full rig was reinstalled in June 1864.
In October 1864, the topmasts and yards were removed, 
leaving only lower masts, and the full rig was restored in 
March 1865. NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. 5-7 September, 
1862; 29-31 January, 1863; 8 June and 12-13 October, 1864; 
and 21-22 March, 1865; Dahlgren to Rowan, June 1, 1864, 
Dahlgren Papers, Letterbook May-June 1864, 290.
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rigged throughout their careers.32 All three would have 
been liable to severe embarrassment in action by damage to a 
mast, because of the chance of fouling their propellers.33
In armament, New Ironsides was distinctly superior to 
the Europeans. Warrior's main battery gun was the smooth­
bore 68-pounder, a muzzle-loading weapon incapable of 
penetrating good 4% inch iron plate even at the muzzle.34 
Gloire's 16-centimeter rifled muzzle-loaders could barely 
pierce 4.7 inch plate at their muzzles.35 The Xl-inch 
Dahlgren firing 166-pound shot could penetrate 4*5 inches of 
iron at over 950 yards.36
32There were two reasons for re-masting New Ironsides 
for prolonged ocean service. First was seaworthiness? for 
Turner's pessimistic opinion, Turner to Welles, August 27, 
1862, Report . . . Armored Vessels. 30. Although the ship 
rode out gales without them, masts would have steadied her. 
Second, sails might have slightly increased her endurance.
33No masted ironclad sailed well. Unarmored ships 
carried from 6.15 to 13.9 square feet of sail per ton of 
displacement, whereas British ironclads carried about 3.25 
square feet per ton. Horsepower per ton was thus against 
armored ships. Parkes, British Battleships. 690.
34Very, "Development of Armor," 383. Theoretically, 
the 68-pounder with wrought iron shot could pierce 4% inch 
armor to 650 yards; in practice it could not. Theoretical 
penetration using PENETRA, a program to calculate armor 
piercing effect, using data from Lambert, Warrior, 86-87.
35Baxter, Ironclad Warship. 207-209, for armor tests; 
Gardiner, Fighting Ships. 286, for battery composition.
“Firing tests showed 4.5 inch armor with twenty inch 
wood backing was near the limit of penetration for the Xl- 
inch gun. Very, "Development of Armor," 402-404. Theoreti 
cal penetration from PENETRA with velocity from BALLISTA. 
Initial velocity extrapolated from Ordnance Instructions. 
Appendix B, xv. The Instructions permitted a thirty pound 
charge; ibid., Part III, 39, 53.
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Shell would, of course, be preferable to solid shot 
for inflicting damage to ships. In theory the 68-pounder 
shell could penetrate ih inch armor at 250 yards, which the 
Xl-inch Dahlgren could penetrate at 600 yards.37 It is 
extremely doubtful that any spherical shell could remain 
intact after penetrating armor. In practical terms, none of 
the weapons could penetrate 4% inch plate with shell.
One problem attributed to the Xl-inch was that its 
bulk would make it too heavy to handle at sea.38 Had the 
Xl-inch been mounted on an old-fashioned wooden carriage 
this might have been true, but with the positive control 
afforded by iron carriages this objection was overcome.
The only characteristic in which New Ironsides would 
have been at a disadvantage was speed. Her service speed of 
6 knots was well below the 12.5 knots claimed for Gloire and 
the 14-knot trial speed of Warrior.39 Either European ship 
could have caught or evaded New Ironsides at will. With a 
superior battery and equal protection, New Ironsides could 
discount any advantage the European ships would gain from 
their ability to control the range of a battle, but she
37Penetration for 68-pounder from PENETRA program; 
ordnance figures from Lambert, Warrior, 86-87. Penetration 
for Xl-inch from PENETRA; gun data from Ordnance Instru­
ctions. Appendix B, xv.
3SA British author called the Xl-inch an example of 
American folly. Andrew Lambert, Battleships in Transition; 
The Creation of the Steam Battlefleet 1815-1860 (Annapolis: 
United States Naval Institute Press, 1984), 92-93.
39Gardiner, Fighting Ships. 7, 286.
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could not pursue an enemy who desired to break off action.
Since New Ironsides was originally built to counter 
Confederate ironclads, specifically the Virginia. a direct 
comparison is in order. New Ironsides was clearly superior 
in all areas. First, New Ironsides was a seagoing ship, 
Virginia strictly a smooth water vessel.40 Although their 
speeds were similar, New Ironsides' engines were reliable; 
Virginia's were decidedly not.41
Virginia's four inch armor, in two layers of two 
inches each, was only 63% as effective as New Ironsides' 
solid 4% inch plating. New Ironsides' armor would have been 
proof against the Confederate ship's battery.42 Each ship 
had a ram and neither was very handy, but New Ironsides' 
protection below the waterline was of iron three inches
40William H. Parker, a Confederate who commanded a 
wooden ship in the Monitor-Virginia battle, observed, "rVir­
ginia! would have foundered as soon as she got outside Cape 
Henry. She could not have lived in Hampton Roads in a mod­
erate sea." Parker, Recollections. 288.
41New Ironsides' maximum speed was 6h knots; Vir­
ginia's six to eight. Still, Iron Afloat. 25. A lieutenant 
in Virginia stated, "We could not depend upon [the engines] 
for six hours at a time." John Taylor Wood, "The First 
Fight of Iron Clads," in The Opening Battles, vol. 1 of 
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. Robert Underwood John­
son and Clarence C. Buel, eds., (New York: Castle Books, 
1956; reprint), 694.
42For Virginia, Still, Iron Afloat. 20. Monitor's 
eight inch laminated armor [ (l2x8)1/2=2.83], which Virginia 
could not pierce, was equal to Virginia's four inch armor 
[ (22+22)1/2=2.83]. Either was only 63 percent as effective as 
New Ironsides' solid armor (2.83/4.5=0.629).
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thick and Virginia's only one inch.43 In addition, New 
Ironsides drew only fifteen feet of water against Virginia's 
twenty-two feet, and could have employed the same tactic of 
withdrawing to shallow water as did Monitor.44
Withdrawal would not have been required, since New 
Ironsides' decisive superiority was her armament. Her bat­
tery of fourteen Xl-inch Dahlgren guns and two 150-pounder 
Parrott rifles was much more powerful than the mixed bag of 
six IX-inch Dahlgrens, two 6.4-inch and two 7-inch Brooke 
rifles mounted by the Virginia.45 The Xl-inch Dahlgren 
guns carried by New Ironsides were the same as those mounted 
in Monitor, which did not seriously damage Virginia. By the 
time New Ironsides was commissioned, however, the Bureau of 
Ordnance had approved the use of larger powder charges in 
them, which would have improved penetration.46
Monitor's two slow-firing Xl-inch guns, using fifteen
43Virginia's Executive Officer, Lieutenant Catesby ap 
R. Jones, noted, "We are least protected where we most need 
it. The constructor should have put on six inches where we 
now have one." Quoted in ibid., 23.
44Ibid., 26, for Virginia's draft.
45Ibid., 22, for Virginia's battery.
4SThe thirty pound charge doubled muzzle energy. Had 
Monitor used wrought iron shot instead of standard cast 
iron, she could have penetrated Virginia's armor with a 
fifteen pound charge. Monitor did not use her wrought iron 
shot because they were out of round, making the risk of 
jamming while loading too great. Very, "Development of 
Armor," 388.
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pound powder charges, did some damage to Virginia.47 Mew 
Ironsides' far more rapid gunnery, employing the thirty 
pound powder charge, would have been decisive.48 The re­
port of the October 17, 1862, examining board on the gun 
carriage problem shows that New Ironsides' unmodified bat­
tery, although not as effective as it later became, could 
easily have carried her through an action with the Virginia.
47Still, Iron Afloat. 34.
48New Ironsides could fire 360 rounds per hour; Moni­
tor 2 rounds every seven to eight minutes or about 16 per 
hour. For New Ironsides. Dahlgren to Welles, January 28, 
1864, ORN 14: 598; for Monitor. Wood, "First Fight," 701.
The Executive Officer of the Monitor noted the labor of 
working the guns. Samuel D. Greene, "In the 'Monitor' Tur­
ret," in The Opening Battles, vol. 1 of Battles and Leaders 
of the Civil War. Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence C. 
Buel, eds., (New York: Castle Books, 1956; reprint), 723-25.
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CHAPTER TEN 
SEAGOING IRONCLADS: FAILURE OF HILL
Large seagoing vessels were planned from the beginning 
of the U.S. Navy's ironclad construction program, when the 
original Ironclad Board recommended that the smaller experi­
mental vessels it approved be followed by "a more perfect 
system of large iron-clad sea-going vessels of war."1 Nu­
merous seagoing ironclads were proposed and several projects 
actually commenced, but only three "seagoing" ironclads were 
finished during the Civil War. Of the three, only two saw 
action and of those two, only New Ironsides could actually 
have fought another ship at sea.
As a seagoing ironclad in a coastal and riverine war, 
New Ironsides did yeoman service but gained few headlines.
In the absence of a seagoing enemy her seakeeping ability, 
the major advantage she had over the monitors, was 
discounted and her disadvantages emphasized. There was, 
however, a considerable body of wartime opinion in the Navy 
Department that realized that monitors were deficient in any 
but protected waters.
More seagoing ironclads were proposed in March 1862,
1Report . . . Armored Vessels. 5.
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when John Lenthall, Chief of the Bureau of Construction and 
Repair, and Benjamin Isherwood, Chief of the Bureau of Steam 
Engineering, broached a project to Secretary Welles. Their 
design was for "frigate built, iron steamships . . .  of a 
size larger than any vessel we now possess."2 That same 
month they also proposed to convert the wooden screw frigate 
Roanoke to a seagoing ironclad with four turrets, each con­
taining two guns. The Navy specified solid 4^ inch plates 
instead of less effective but readily available laminated 
armor. This delayed the project and Roanoke was not fin­
ished until June 1863.3
In the spring of 1862, what was to become the "Monitor 
craze" was not fairly begun, and the design of the ironclad 
fleet was not yet firmly set. In March 1862, an editorial 
in the New York Times argued strongly for large ironclad 
ships, saying, "No small vessel can be fast, and carry her 
armor and armament . . . to be fast, they must be large."4 
In addition to the Lenthall-Isherwood proposal, in April 
1862 William H. Webb of New York sent a model of a "Steam
2Joint Committee, "Light Draught Monitors," 111. For 
a discussion, Sloan, Isherwood. 53.
3Ibid., 55-56. The ship was badly overweight and was 
completed with only three turrets. Gardiner, Fighting 
Ships. 120; Alden, "Forty Years Too Soon," 252-63.
4"Large and Small Iron-Clad Ships," New York Times. 
March 22, 1862, 4. The comparison was between Monitor and 
the Stevens Battery, an ironclad of 5,000 tons begun by Rob­
ert L. Stevens in 1842 but never completed. Baxter, Iron­
clad Warship. 48-52, 211-19.
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Battery" to the Department, and discussions about his vessel 
continued into the summer of 1862.5 This ambitious design, 
which resulted in the Dunderberg, was for a wooden-hull 
casemated ironclad of about 7,000 tons.
The contract for the Dunderberg was signed on July 3,
1862, seven weeks before the commissioning of the New Iron­
sides.6 The detailed specifications were approved on 
August 27, 1862, too soon to incorporate any lessons learned 
from the Merrick ship.7 Dunderberg was to have a broadside 
armament of eight Xl-inch Dahlgren guns, plus two turrets 
each equipped with two XV-inch guns. Her armor above the 
main deck was to be solid 4% inch iron, and from the main 
deck to five feet below the load waterline was to be 3̂5 
inches, tapering to 2h inches. The machinery would propel 
her at fifteen knots on a draft of not more than twenty feet 
six inches. Webb was to complete the ship in fifteen months
5This may be the model shown in Edwin L. Dunbaugh and 
William duBarry Thomas, William H. Webb Shipbuilder (Glen 
Cove, NY: Webb Institute of Naval Architecture, 1989), 95.
6Smith to Webb, August 8, 1862, NARG 45, Entry 464, 
Subject File, AD— Ironclads, Box 51, typescript, NWR, 2634: 
367; Gregory to Lenthall, October 31, 1862, National Ar­
chives, Record Group 19, Entry 64, Letters Received from 
Superintendents Outside of Navy Yards, Box 1, 1: 171.
Experience with New Ironsides was later incorporated 
into some facets of the design. Webb to Smith, March 11,
1863, NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 449, 1: 128; Henry Hoover to 
Smith, March 31, 1863, ibid., 1: 160.
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for $1,250,000.8
Dunderberg. the only seagoing broadside ironclad other 
than New Ironsides, was never completed for the U.S. Navy. 
The ship proved to be too ambitious a project, beset with 
delays and major design changes, and the Civil War ended 
before she was launched. In 1867, Webb bought her back from 
the Navy and sold her to France.9
In October 1862, Lenthall and Isherwood advertised for 
bids on a seagoing ironclad of 7,300 tons, to have an iron 
hull and a broadside battery. The project received consid­
erable criticism, much of it due to partisan attacks on 
Isherwood. They issued a revised proposal for a casemated 
vessel of 8,000 tons in March 1863.10 Merrick & Sons sub­
mitted a design which would have mounted ten XV-inch guns.11
8Details from an "Historical Statement" prepared in 
1900. Lieutenant L. H. Chandler, "Memorandum for the Chief 
of the Bureau of Ordnance," March 26, 1900, NARG 45, Entry 
464, Subject File, AD— Ironclads, Box 51.
sThe turrets were eliminated but her final armament of 
two XV-inch and four Xl-inch made her undergunned. Ibid. 
Webb's partisans blamed the delay on the Government, but the 
problem was the continual addition of "improvements." Dun- 
baugh, William H. Webb. 92, 110-13; Gardiner, Fighting 
Ships. 119, 287.
10Sloan, Isherwood. 61. Sloan states, "It was not un­
til the end of the year [1862] that private builders began 
tentative negotiations with the department concerning a 
large, sea-going ironclad." The March 1862 proposal appar­
ently does not meet his definition of "large." For a copy 
of the March 12 advertisement, G. W. Tatham to Lenthall, 
March 30, 1863, NARG 19, Entry 71, Box 3, 1: 165.
“Drawings and specifications of this vessel, which 
would have displaced over 11,000 tons, are in NARG 19, Bu- 
Ships Plan 80-9-2.
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Merrick & Sons proposed a 3,500 ton follow-on design 
similar to New Ironsides on June 13, 1863. This ship, an 
iron hull, ironclad steamer equipped with four masts for 
sail power, appears to be a smaller version of the earlier 
8,000 ton design. With its higher length to beam ratio and 
twin screws, it would have corrected some of the propulsion 
and maneuvering faults of the New Ironsides. This 3,500 ton 
ship would have carried four XV-inch Dahlgren guns in a 
casemate, with a pilot house atop each end.12
The ship was never built because Merrick & Sons' price 
was too high for the Navy. The original proposed price was 
$1,950,000, but with the Government's additions it went up 
to $2,400,000. When the Bureau objected and asked Merrick & 
Sons to recalculate, it increased again to $2,404,000.13
Although this figure seems exceptionally high compared 
to the original prices for New Ironsides ($780,000) or Moni­
tor ($275,000), it reflects not only the increased size of 
the vessel but the advance of prices due to inflation and 
the scarcity of materials for shipbuilding in general.14
12This ship would have been 325 feet long and 54 in 
beam, with a draft of seventeen feet. Lenthall to Welles, 
July 23, 1863, NARG 19, Entry 49. Drawings are in NARG 19, 
BuShips Plan 80-9-1. Although her measurement tonnage was 
3,500, her displacement would have been over 5,300 tons.
13A detailed description and rationale for the price 
is in Merrick & Sons to Lenthall, September 7, 1863, NARG 
19, Entry 71, 5: 131.
14For materials, see Cramp's comments (Chapter 2); 
testimony by Chief Engineers Hoyt and Wood, Joint Committee, 
"Light Draught Monitors," 35, 64-65; Erastus W. Smith to
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By comparison, the pre-Civil War frigate Roanoke cost 
$820,000 to build in 1856.15 During the War, the cost of 
building commercial ships rose 60 percent.16
As an example of the increased cost of armored ships, 
the Navy Department between March and June 1863 contracted 
for twenty "light draft" monitors. Designed by Chief Engi­
neer Stimers, each was to carry two Xl-inch Dahlgren guns in 
a single turret. The contract price was $386,000 apiece. 
During construction the ships were modified repeatedly and 
the modifications aggregated some $100,000 per vessel. When 
the first were launched they were seriously overweight, and 
most were modified or rebuilt for another $80,000 each.17 
Thus, vessels little superior to the original Monitor cost
William H. Webb, November 7, 1864, National Archives, Record 
Group 19, Entry 186, Records Relating to Claims, Subentry 
137, s.v. Dunderberg. Smith said materials prices had ad­
vanced 76 percent and mechanics' wages 83 percent.
15Alden, "Forty Years Too Soon," 252.
16K. Jack Bauer, A Maritime History of the United 
States (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988), 
288.
17Testimony of Donald McKay, builder of the Nanset, 
Joint Committee, "Light Draught Monitors," 43. McKay would 
charge $586,000 to duplicate Nanset. ibid., 42. Testimony 
of Nathaniel McKay, builder of Squando. ibid., 29. Tunxis 
was to be altered for $115,000. Testimony of Rear Admiral 
Gregory, ibid., 76. Raising Nanset's sides would cost 
$86,000; for other ships Wood gave the cost of "raising up" 
as $55,000 to $80,000, and Gregory estimated $55,000 to 
"more than $90,000," ibid., 45, 64, 76.
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twice as much to build.18
Part of the increase in asking price for armored ships 
was due to the growing sophistication of shipbuilders as 
they learned more about the material with which they had to 
work. Thomas F. Rowland of the Continental Works contracted 
to install the port lids of the Galena for ten cents per 
pound. He found the amidships ports cost almost fifty cents 
per pound for labor to install, and those at the stern cost 
nearly $1.00 per pound for labor alone. He wrote, "Until we 
have had more experience in this country in forming and ap­
plying these heavy plates, I, for one, don't care to tackle
it at any price that I dare at present name."19
In late 1863 the Navy Department advertised for more
seagoing ironclads but none was built, apparently because of
the extremely high cost. In December 1863, Merrick & Sons 
proposed a seagoing broadside design of 7,100 tons costing 
$4,300,000.20 In January 1864, Otis Tufts of Boston pro­
posed a ship 380 feet long and 61 feet in beam, to carry
18The "light drafts" were to carry two Xl-inch Dahl- 
gren guns in one turret, the same as Monitor, on a displace­
ment of 1,175 tons, close to Monitor's 987 tons. Figures 
from Gardiner, Fighting Ships. 119, 123.
19T. F. Rowland to Wm. E. Everett, May 15, 1862, NARG 
19, Entry 71, 2: 172.
20Sloan, Isherwood. 61-62. Even Merrick & Sons tired 
of unrequited proposals. On January 23, 1864, they wrote 
Lenthall they did not plan to answer his advertisement for 
proposals for a large ironclad. NARG 19, Entry 70, 1: 24.
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four XV-inch Dahlgrens in caseinate and cost $3,160,000.21 
Others proposed ships costing as much as $6,948,000 and 
requiring up to three years to complete.22
Still another follow-on design was that of Charles H. 
Cramp, who said in 1897 that he proposed building two more 
ironclads of "similar type" to the New Ironsides, presumably 
with wooden hulls.23 He planned to improve the ships by 
using twin screws and "increasing the efficiency of the 
armor." He asserted, "At that time [1863], what was known 
as the 'MONITOR craze' was in full blast and, notwithstan­
ding the excellent all-around performance of the 'IRONSIDES' 
she remained the only seagoing broadside iron-clad in the 
Navy."24 By 1864 ultimate Union success was becoming clear 
but war weariness was growing in the North. The investment 
of time and money required to build a large seagoing iron­
clad was no longer politically or militarily practical.
The "Monitor craze" was a drawback to those in the 
Navy Department, particularly Lenthall and Isherwood, who
21This started as a 3,500 ton proposal but grew to
5,400 tons. Tufts to Lenthall, January 4, 1864, NARG 19, 
Entry 71, 4: 4. For a larger Tufts design, Smith to Welles, 
December 26, 1862. NARG 45, Entry M518, Roll 18: 91.
22Sloan, Isherwood. 61-62.
23Cramp, [Contemporary Club], 3-4; Joint Committee, 
"Light Draught Monitors," 39, 42-43, 76, 96-97.
24Cramp, [Contemporary Club], 9. For a discussion of 
the psychological roots of the "Monitor craze," Earl J.
Hess, "Northern Response to the Ironclad: A Prospect for the 
Study of Military Technology," Civil War History 31 (1985): 
126-43.
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supported the building of seagoing high freeboard iron­
clads.25 After the Monitor-Virginia engagement, Fox became 
an ardent supporter of Ericsson and Welles capitalized po­
litically upon the Monitor's success.26 Other influential 
officers such as Admirals Dahlgren and Porter were strong 
monitor supporters as well. Grudgingly admitting that New 
Ironsides was "better suited for attacking fortifications 
under certain conditions," Porter believed she would have 
stood no chance in a ship-to-ship engagement with a monitor. 
After the Monitor-Virginia battle, he wrote, ". . . there 
was no longer, as regarded the Monitor system, a pin to hang 
a doubt on.”27
To the unbiased, that lack of doubt did not survive 
the rough handling the monitors received in DuPont's Char­
leston attack. The Department's enthusiastic espousal of
25Cramp and Merrick climbed on the monitor bandwagon. 
Gardiner states Cramp contracted for the light-draft Yazoo 
on March 2, 1863, (Gardiner, Fighting Ships. 123), but Ben­
nett assigns Yazoo to a Merrick contract and states Cramp 
built Tunxis for Reamy, Son & Archbold. Bennett, Steam 
N a w . Appendix B. Cramps' history says the firm built Yazoo 
and does not mention Tunxis♦ Cramp's Shipyard. 16. Merrick 
& Sons was the contractor for Yazoo. Merrick & Sons to 
Lenthall, NARG 19, Entry 71, 4: 337.
26Sloan, Isherwood. 66. Belknap wrote that Welles and 
Fox "pinned their faith to the Monitor class of iron-clad." 
Belknap, "Siege of Charleston," 187. "Welles, though more 
objective about the monitors than Fox, steadfastly supported 
his Assistant Secretary." Niven, Gideon Welles. 437.
27David D. Porter, The Naval History of the Civil War 
(Seacaucus, NJ: Castle, 1984; reprint of 1886 edition), 362. 
Dahlgren expressed his preference in Dahlgren to Welles, 
January 28, 1864, ORN 14: 598-600.
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the Monitor type undoubtedly contributed to the acrimony 
when that attack failed. In the emotionally charged atmo­
sphere of the war, the blame for failure had to be placed 
either upon the ships themselves or their employment. The 
Department had thrown in its lot with the "monitor men" and 
DuPont was the commander. It is thus understandable that 
DuPont officially bore sole blame for the failure, although 
clearly both ships and leader were flawed.
Pro-monitor prejudice was evident outside the Depart­
ment as well. By December 1862, the same New York Times 
which had so strongly supported large ironclad ships in 
March 1862 was calling the proposed seagoing ironclads 
"Another Job." The New York Times wrote, "We are threatened 
with two 7,000-ton ships, iron-clad in a manner which the 
whole practice of Europe and America has proved defective, 
at four million two hundred thousand dollars a-piece."28
Writing in 1883, Lieutenant Edward Very was critical
of the monitor proponents. He stated,
. . .  so great was the glamor cast over the monitor 
type of ships by the defeat of the Merrimac [sic] 
and the name of Ericsson, that although steering- 
gear was deranged and turrets were jammed in every 
general action, the spindle-turret with its pilot 
house mounted on top was retained unaltered even in
28"Another Job," New York Times. December 25, 1862, 4. 
The editorial continued, "If that is not bad enough, we may 
add that the designs of hull and machinery were made by the 
Bureaux of Construction and Steam-engineering."
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the monitors rebuilt in 1874.29
Instead of regarding DuPont's attack on Charleston as a test 
of the ships so that their weak points could be remedied, 
"there was a demand— not only implied, but expressed, in 
official language and the most positive terms— that the 
shortcomings of the monitors should not be made known, in 
order not to give encouragement to the rebels." Because 
these serious faults were not corrected, the monitor type 
"never passed the age of swaddling-clothes" in the United 
States.30
Besides Dunderberq and New Ironsides, the other "sea­
going" ironclads built by the U.S. Navy during the Civil War 
were of the low freeboard monitor type.31 The Miantonomoh 
class included four 3,400-ton, wooden-hulled monitors, de­
signed by the Bureau of Construction and Repair and built in
29Very, Development of Armor," 399. DuPont, comment­
ing that the government sent "untried machines . . . all 
received on Mr. Ericsson's dictum," noted that these "novel­
ties" were tested "against the most thoroughly and scientif­
ically defended place in America. ..."  DuPont to H. W. 
Davis, May 3, 1863, Hayes, DuPont Letters. 3: 77.
30Very, "Development of Armor," 400. Welles wrote Du­
Pont that since many of the official reports detailed the 
"imperfections, or supposed imperfections, of a class of 
formidable vessels of our service," their publication would 
"discourage our friends" and encourage the rebels. ORN 14: 
62. Accordingly, Welles refused to publish them.
31Roanoke was to be a high-freeboard seagoing vessel 
but was overweight when completed and capable only of harbor 
service. Sloan, Isherwood. 56-57; Gardiner, Fighting Ships, 
120; Alden, "Forty Years Too Soon," 257-59, 261-63.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
219
Navy Yards.32 Their armament was four XV-inch guns in two 
turrets. U.S.S. Monadnock of this class saw some action but 
the other three were not completed until after the War's 
end. Although they were reasonably effective in combat, 
they were not particularly successful in the open sea.33
U.S.S. Dictator was an iron-hulled Ericsson design, of
4,400 tons displacement and carrying two XV-inch guns in a 
single turret. After her completion in November 1864, she 
set out to join the assault on Fort Fisher but had to return 
to port because of engineering difficulties.34
Puritan, another iron-hulled Ericsson design, was to 
carry one turret with two XX-inch guns on her 4,900 tons.
She was never finished, nor were the four wooden-hulled 
ships of the 5,660-ton Kalamazoo class, a Bureau design.35
The seagoing monitors were contracted for in 1862 and 
1863, some very soon after the original Monitor's action
32Gardiner, Fighting Ships. 121; Bennett, Steam Navy. 
Appendix B.
33Monadnock rounded Cape Horn and Miantonomoh crossed 
the Atlantic, but neither was particularly habitable at sea 
and their performances were "achieved at great price of 
human labor and suffering . . . Full confidence in the sea­
worthiness of monitors does not exist yet. . . . "  Frank M. 
Bennett, "Reconstructed American Monitors," Journal of the 
American Society of Naval Engineers. August 1897, 529. Ben­
nett served in Amphitrite (ex-Tonawanda), which had been 
completely rebuilt under the guise of repairs. Conditions 
aboard the original ship must have been even worse.
34Gardiner, Fighting Ships. 121; Johnson, John Rod­
gers. 268-73, 275-78. Dictator's propeller shaft bearings 
were too short to support the shaft without overheating.
3SGardiner, Fighting Ships. 122.
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with the Virginia. Even taking into account the difficul­
ties of obtaining material and skilled labor in the wartime 
United States, they, like the other seagoing ironclad pro­
jects, were not pushed with the vigor which attended the 
construction of the coastal and "light-draft" monitors. A 
major reason lay in the changing international situation.
In 1861, there was considerable European approval of 
the Confederate cause, especially in England. English 
sympathy for the Confederacy was partly due to a romantic 
feeling for the South as the underdog and partly due to Eng­
land's need for Southern cotton for her textile mills. The 
Union blockade was a constant irritant and incidents such as 
the "Trent Affair" exacerbated the situation.36 The Trent 
episode ended in an American apology, and the feeling in the 
U»S, that war with England must be avoided for the time "for 
the plain reason that now we are unable to meet it."37
This did not mean that war with England must be 
avoided for all time. Welles wrote in 1862, "We shall how­
ever have a day of reckoning with Great Britain for these 
wrongs [the Alabama's depredations], and I sometimes think I
360n November 8, 1861, James M. Mason and John Sli­
dell, Confederate commissioners to Great Britain and France, 
were forcibly removed from the British mail packet Trent.
The affair inflamed British public opinion. Shelby Foote, 
The Civil War; A Narrative. Fort Sumter to Perrwille (New 
York: Random House, 1958), 139-40, 156-63.
37Attorney General Edward Bates, quoted in Bruce Cat- 
ton, Terrible Swift Sword (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 
1963), 116.
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care now how soon that reckoning comes."38 Yet if the 
reckoning had come in 1862, the Union would have been poorly 
prepared to meet it. The U.S. Navy was in no condition to 
compete with the Royal Navy. Maintaining and tightening the 
blockade of the South was difficult enough; if each blockad­
ing squadron had to be protected against the British fleet 
it would have been impossible. Welles rightly concluded 
that ironclads that could fight at sea were needed.
The Confederacy had no seagoing ironclads, nor the 
means to build or buy more than a few, and the failure of 
DuPont's attack on Charleston showed the Confederates could 
have done only minor damage to Northern ports defended by 
forts and coastal monitors. After it became clear Confeder­
ate ironclads could not venture to sea, the only remaining 
opponents for U.S. seagoing ironclads were European.
Welles obviously thought the European threat was sig­
nificant. In December 1863 he wrote,
If I go forward and build large and expensive 
vessels, I shall be blamed for extravagance, partic­
ularly if peace takes place. On the other hand if I 
should not build, and we have war with England or 
France, I shall be denounced for being unpre­
pared. . . .  A strong navy will deter commercial 
nations from troubling us, and if not troubled, we 
need no strong and expensive navy.39
The seagoing ironclad projects which were approved, includ­
ing both low and high freeboard types, show that Welles
38Welles, Diary, entry for December 29, 1862, 1: 207.
39Ibid., entry for December 26, 1863, 1: 436.
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fully supported a seagoing Navy able to protect the country 
from foreign intervention. As the threat from Europe dimin­
ished, so did his support for these expensive ships.
Writing in his diary after the War, Welles noted that 
when Dunderberq was laid down, "We had a large defensive 
force, but not as many and formidable vessels as we should 
need in the event of a war with a maritime power." Dictator 
and Puritan could break up any attempted blockade, "but we 
could not cruise with them." Dunderberq was intended for 
that purpose. Welles wrote, "In view of what was being done 
by England and France . . .  I felt that we might need such a 
vessel." He felt that three vessels were sufficient; al­
though "I have rejoiced that I did not yield to the appeals 
[by Fox and others] for more. . . .  I feel assured I did 
right in ordering rDunderberq! to be built."40
Thus, the seagoing ironclads of the U.S. Navy failed 
of their wartime promise. The main reason was a change of 
heart by the British and to a lesser extent the French.
This reversal of British sympathy was based upon a growing 
realization of Confederate failure as manifested by Antie- 
tam, Gettysburg and Vicksburg, upon a recovering textile 
industry, and upon the Emancipation Proclamation. One ef­
fect of improving U.S. relations with Great Britain was that 
on September 3, 1863, the British government issued orders
40Ibid., entry for July 24, 1865, 2: 340-41. See also 
Niven, Gideon Welles, 506.
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to prevent the sailing of two seagoing ironclad rams which 
Laird and Company were building for the Confederacy.41
The "Laird Rams" might have caused the U.S. Navy a 
serious, although not overwhelming, problem. The British 
decision to prevent their delivery removed both the 
immediate threat to the blockade and the long-range threat 
of war with England. As the prospects of war at sea de­
clined, so did the urgency with which seagoing ships were 
constructed.
The vessels the Navy needed immediately to defeat the 
Confederacy took precedence: shallow draft armored ships 
which could operate in large numbers in the shallow harbors 
and rivers of the Confederacy, instead of a few, expensive 
oceangoing ships which could meet European ironclads on 
equal terms at sea. As Welles wrote, "I was accused of not 
having a navy of formidable vessels. I had vessels for the 
purposes then wanted. "42
Matters might have changed had New Ironsides, rather 
than Monitor, met Virginia in combat. Much of the enthusi­
asm for the monitors was generated by the original Monitor's
41 Ephraim D. Adams, Great Britain and the American 
Civil War (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1957), 2: 116-51; Allan 
Nevins, The War for the Union. The Organized War. 1863-1864 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), 480, 483-87, 494- 
503. For Confederate projects in France, Lynn M. Case and 
Warren F. Spencer, The United States and France: Civil War 
Diplomacy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1970), 427-80.
42Welles, Diary. entry for July 24, 1865, 2: 341.
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battle with the Virginia; what might have happened had New 
Ironsides. rather than Monitor. reaped "the glamor cast over 
the monitor type" from that engagement? Given the urgent 
need for many shot proof, shallow draft ships which could be 
constructed quickly, small armored ships would still have 
been built, but they might have been the Isherwood-Lenthall 
"Bureau" design rather than the Ericsson "monitor" 
design.43 The publicity from a successful single ship ac­
tion would have dramatically improved the Navy's chances of 
building more seagoing, high freeboard ironclads like those 
later proposed by Merrick, Cramp and others.44
43The "Bureau" design, by Lenthall and Isherwood, 
would have had solid plate armor, twin screws and two tur­
rets, compared to the "monitor" design which had laminated 
armor, a single screw and one turret. Sloan, Isherwood. 58.
44Robert Albion concurred; "In many ways, it was un­
fortunate that the New Ironsides was not completed in time 
to acquire the prestige of 'stopping' the Merrimack. Like 
her European counterparts, she would have been a useful 
nucleus for a general-purpose seagoing fleet. ..." Robert 
Greenhalgh Albion, Makers of Naval Policy 1798-1947 (Annapo­
lis: United States Naval Institute Press, 1980), 198.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
CONCLUSION
New Ironsides was the United States Navy's first essay 
at building a seagoing, high freeboard ironclad. Imperfect 
in some ways like any prototype, overall she was highly 
successful. Her high freeboard design was squarely in the 
European mainstream. She should have been followed up, both 
during the war and more deliberately afterward; the lessons 
learned from her construction and wartime service should 
have provided invaluable instruction for U.S. designers.
She was not followed up, for reasons discussed below. By 
the time twenty years later that the U.S. again built sea­
going armored ships, the lessons she could have taught were 
obsolescent.
During the Civil War, the "Monitor craze" was taken 
for granted. The decision to build an entire fleet on a 
single basic design, inconclusively tested in a single ac­
tion— to place most of the country's naval eggs in a single 
basket— was accepted as a foregone conclusion. The "Monitor 
men," led by Gustavus Fox, effectively denied the United 
States Navy the strategic and tactical benefits of more
225
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ironclads like New Ironsides.1
The New Ironsides type offered significant tactical 
advantages, both in offensive power and in seakeeping abil­
ity. Before quick-firing guns were developed, the only way 
to increase volume of fire was by multiplying the number of 
guns engaged, so the broadside ship's large battery and the 
rapidity of her fire made her superior. New Ironsides could 
put over twenty times as much weight of metal on target in 
an hour as the original Monitor and at least ten times as 
much as the later classes of monitors with their mixed XI- 
and XV-inch guns. Off Charleston, New Ironsides fired more 
shots than all Dahlgren's monitors put together, and despite 
her lack of XV-inch guns threw over forty-four percent of 
the total weight of Union Navy metal.2 While a single ship 
was tactically less flexible than multiple ships (and more 
would be sacrificed if she were lost), a broadside ship 
could concentrate fire to achieve an effect that monitors 
acting jointly could not.
While the large battery and high volume of fire of the 
New Ironsides type was a great tactical advantage in pro­
jecting power ashore, the ship's high freeboard and ability 
to fight at sea could have been even more vital to the Union
*As Belknap stated, regarding the New Ironsides and 
monitor types, "Both classes of iron-clads were incomparable 
for their special purpose, but unfortunately for the coun­
try, the Monitor class had the most potent countenance of 
the Navy Department." Belknap, "Siege of Charleston," 188.
2Based on figures from Dahlgren's report, ORN 14: 596.
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strategically. The ironclads the Confederacy was building 
overseas, such as the "Laird rams," could fight in the open 
ocean while the monitors could not. Cramp's two follow-on 
high-freeboard ships of the New Ironsides type would have 
greatly improved the Union's strategic position at rela­
tively small cost.
The demonstrated superiority of the New Ironsides
against shore fortifications offers tantalizing "what-ifs."
There were other ports, such as Wilmington, Mobile, and New
Orleans, where the Union might profitably have employed New
Ironsides good seakeeping qualities, invulnerability and
*
firepower. Her draft, although greater than that of the 
monitors, was up to two feet less than that of unarmored 
ships which mounted batteries less capable than her own.3 
The two additional ironclads which Charles Cramp proposed to 
build to the New Ironsides design could have permitted ear­
lier neutralization of Fort Fisher, potentially shortening 
the war by choking off supplies to the Army of Northern 
Virginia.
Economy was another consideration in favor of more 
ships of the New Ironsides design. In relative terms, each 
of the two guns of the original Monitor cost $137,500 to put 
afloat; the sixteen guns of the New Ironsides only $50,815 
each. If the price of the original New Ironsides doubled to
3New Ironsides drew fifteen feet, Hartford drew seven­
teen feet two inches, Brooklyn drew sixteen feet three 
inches.
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account for inflation and modest improvements, a follow-on 
New Ironsides would still have cost only $102,000 per gun.
By contrast, the monitor Passaic cost $211,585 per gun. The 
light-draft monitors, contracted at $193,000 per gun, final­
ly cost from $265,000 to $324,000 per gun; the "seagoing" 
double-turreted monitors Miantonomoh and Monadnock, $245,000 
and $327,700 per gun.4 In absolute terms, for each three 
useless light-draft monitors, the Navy could have had at 
least one more follow-on New Ironsides.
While the situation in 1863 was not as desperate as 
during the first year of the War, speed of construction was 
still a consideration. Of the twelve seagoing ironclads 
built for the Union, only three (including New Ironsides! 
were completed during the war. The New Ironsides design, a 
proven one, could have been repeated more easily and built 
more quickly than new ships designed from the keel up.
Despite her advantages, New Ironsides received little 
attention in Europe, and British discussion of the naval 
aspects of "the American war" was predominantly monitor- 
oriented.5 This is not surprising for several reasons.
First, monitors were novel. Second, their low free­
board and revolving turrets fit in with ideas already
4Figures based on Bennett, Steam N a w . Appendix B.
sSome examples are John Bourne, "On the American Sys­
tem of Turret Ships," Transactions INA 7 (1866), 131-43; 
Jasper Selwyn, "On Armoured or Iron-clad Ships— Their Ad­
vantages and Defects," Journal RUSI 8, no. 30 (1864), 81- 
104; Tyler, "Spithead and Harbour Defence," 139-47.
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advanced in the Royal Navy by Captain Cowper Coles. Third 
and most important, in high freeboard seagoing ironclads the 
Europeans were already ahead of New Ironsides. Although she 
compared well with the first British and French ironclads 
(the Warrior and Defence classes in England and the French 
Gloire and Couronne and the Magenta class), by the end of 
the Civil War New Ironsides was obsolescent, eclipsed by 
newer European designs.
Despite the general lack of attention to New Ironsides 
herself, Europe recognized the value of high freeboard. 
Ironclad development was far from homogenous among the Euro­
pean powers but the tendency toward high freeboard designs 
is unmistakable. By the end of the 1860s, few low freeboard 
designs were being built, and most of those were unsuccess­
ful at sea. British attempts to combine low freeboard with 
masts and sails came to an abrupt end when H.M.S. Captain 
foundered in 1870. In France, the mastless monitor Tonnerre 
nearly capsized as a result of a sharp turn to port. Even 
the British "breastwork monitors," nominally "low freeboard" 
ships but with a raised superstructure, had almost twice the 
freeboard of American monitors and carried their guns four­
teen feet above the water.6
By 1870, high freeboard for good gunnery and sea- 
keeping was recognized as an important element of ironclad
6For Captain. Parkes, British Battleships. 137-43; for 
Devastation and her four feet six inch freeboard, ibid., 
195-202? for Tonnerre. Hovgaard, History of Warships. 37.
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design. In this vital respect, New Ironsides was well ahead 
of the monitors. Despite this head start, the seagoing 
ironclad was poorly followed up in the U.S. Navy. During 
the Civil War, the Navy's advantages of wartime urgency and 
free-spending Congresses notwithstanding, the service was 
unable to build more ships like the New Ironsides, the only 
seagoing ironclad design proven to be successful. After the 
war the situation deteriorated.
Sailing ships and smoothbore ordnance changed little 
in two centuries, but iron ships, steam machinery and rifled 
ordnance changed from year to year.7 In this environment, 
an evolutionary construction program was mandatory for any 
navy that wanted to maintain its relative power. Yet with 
the end of the Civil War the U.S. Navy's immediate need for 
armored warships also ended, and politically popular re­
trenchment struck hard at the Navy's shipbuilding programs.
Retrenchment began even before the end of the war, 
when it was clear the Confederacy was close to defeat. In 
February 1865 Welles directed squadron commanders to reduce 
expenses.8 By July 1865, the blockade was reduced to about 
30 ships, from 471 in January 1865, and by December 1865, 
the improvised wartime Navy was gone.
The Navy's budget was almost $117 million for fiscal
7Peter Padfield, Guns at Sea (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1974), 57-69, 111-16, 137-43.
8Navy Department circular letter dated February 24, 
1865, SecNav 1865. ix; Niven, Gideon Welles. 506-507.
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year 1865 and its expenditure during the War about $72.5 
million annually. The United States budget deficit was $974 
million in 1865 and its total national debt was over $3 
billion, not to mention the damage inflicted upon both North 
and South by the War.9 There was no surplus of funds which 
could conveniently be used to continue the evolution of the 
ironclad, and Congress was unwilling to take money from 
elsewhere for the purpose.
Several things compounded Congressional parsimony.
Even before the War ended, antipathy to the Administration 
was expressed in politically motivated investigations of the 
Navy Department. Welles and Fox came under heavy fire from 
legislators intent on settling old scores. Among them was 
Radical Republican Congressman Henry Winter Davis of Mary­
land, a close friend of Rear Admiral DuPont and deadly 
political enemy of the Francis Blair family, whose "violent 
assaults" Welles noted in his diary.10 Congressman Elihu 
Washburne of Illinois considered even Welles' much-reduced
9For budget, SecNav 1865. xxxi-xxxii. For deficit and 
debt, Andrew McLaughlin and A. B. Hart, eds. Cyclopedia of 
American Government (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1914), 2: 
16.
10Welles, Diary, entry for July 24, 1865, 2: 341; Wil­
liam E. Smith, The Francis Preston Blair Family in Politics 
(New York: Da Capo Press, 1969), 2: 255, 263. For Davis' 
relations with other Republicans, Niven, Gideon Welles. 435, 
438-39. Davis died in December 1865.
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budget to be excessive.11
Congress's attitude was that the Navy was good enough. 
In Congressional debate in 1865, Senator James W. Grimes of 
Iowa said of the monitors, "For harbor defense, the purpose 
for which they were originally devised, they are unap­
proached by anything yet invented by the ingenuity of man," 
and in 1865 his attitude was still justified.12 At the end 
of the Civil War, the United States possessed the world's 
largest ironclad fleet. Within a strictly limited sphere, 
the coastal waters of the United States, the United States 
Navy was superior to any possible invader.
Given the economic climate of retrenchment and Con­
gressional satisfaction with the country's naval power, the 
multitude of leftover monitors eliminated any political or 
financial support in the Congress for evolutionary develop­
ment of naval architecture of the sort accomplished in 
Europe. The armored ships needed to extend U.S. naval power
“Sloan, Isherwood. 133-41. A discussion of the "Pol­
itics of Decline" is in William Scott Peterson, "The Navy in 
the Doldrums: The Influence of Politics and Technology on 
the Decline and Rejuvenation of the American Fleet, 1866- 
1886" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illi­
nois at Urbana-Champaign, 1986), 10-43. Albion avers,
"There was money enough, if intelligently spent, to have 
secured an adequate Navy." Albion, Naval Policy. 199.
“Congressional Globe. 38th Cong., 2d Sess., February 
17, 1865, 866. Grimes, generally a friend of the Navy, also 
said, "The trouble about the monitors has arisen from the 
fact that their friends have claimed too much for them while 
their enemies have too greatly undervalued them." Senator 
Benjamin F. Wade of Ohio called vessels like New Ironsides a 
failure.
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beyond the coastal area never joined the fleet.13 As a 
result, the local superiority of 1865 had completely evapo­
rated ten years later.14
Congressional economic arguments against seagoing 
ships were bolstered, not opposed, by the strategic theory 
of the day. In this pre-Mahan era, U.S. Navy strategy may 
be simplistically described as coastal defense and commerce 
raiding. It rested on two premises: first, commerce raiding 
would wreck an enemy's commerce and tie down his navy in 
attempts to protect what little shipping remained to him, 
and second, fortifications supplemented by coastal (or even 
harbor) defense ironclads could protect the coastline and 
ports from invasion and bombardment.15 Seagoing ironclads 
were not vital to the Navy's strategic vision.
When the range of guns was only a few hundred yards, 
the strategy of harbor defense had validity. To damage a
13The Navy built ten seagoing monitors and two broad­
side ironclads. New Ironsides and the five monitors of the 
Miantonomoh and Dictator classes were eventually completed. 
The broadside Dunderberq was sold to France in 1867 and five 
monitors of the Puritan and Kalamazoo classes were broken up 
on the stocks. Gardiner, Fighting Ships. 119, 122.
14In 1874, Commodore Foxhall Parker wrote, "What could 
be more lamentable . . . than to see a fleet armed with 
smooth-bore guns, requiring close quarters for their devel­
opment, moving at the rate of four and a half knots an hour? 
What inferior force could it overtake, or what superior one 
escape[?] ..." Foxhall A. Parker, "Our Fleet Maneuvers in 
the Bay of Florida," Proceedings USNI 1, no. 8 (1874): 168- 
69.
15Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of Amer­
ican Naval Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1946), 80-82.
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seaport city, an enemy ship had to enter its harbor, passing 
or destroying its fortifications. Once past the shore 
batteries, the enemy ship would be at a qualitative disad­
vantage against a harbor defense vessel, which in theory 
could concentrate thick armor and heavy guns on a small, 
shallow draft hull. The harbor defense vessel had no need 
for speed or endurance to seek the enemy, since the enemy 
had to enter the harbor to achieve his objective, and its 
shallow draft permitted it to move freely where the seagoing 
enemy could not. In fact, many American harbors could not 
be entered at all by deep draft European ironclads.
With improvements in gunnery came a divergence between 
theory and practice. As gun ranges increased, ships could 
inflict damage at dramatically greater distances. The ocean 
area from which the enemy could damage a seaport, and thus 
the area which the defender had to deny to the enemy, 
increased geometrically.16 The harbor defense vessel could 
no longer rely upon meeting a seagoing opponent in protected 
waters. With its tactical advantage of shallow draft thus 
nullified, its slow speed prevented it from reacting fast 
enough to cover the enlarged area and its poor seakeeping 
prevented it from meeting the enemy at sea.
Lenthall and Isherwood foresaw this. In their March
1SA graphic depiction of this growth, from the coast 
artillery view, may be found in Emmanuel R. Lewis, Seacoast 
Fortifications of the United States; An Introductory History
(Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1970), 13.
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1862 letter on seagoing ironclads, they argued that it was 
"cheaper, more effective, and more sustaining of the na­
tional honor" to protect the nation's coasts "by keeping 
command of the open sea." Although harbor defenses could 
keep an enemy from entering a port, "they could not drive 
him from its gates." They concluded it was better to fight 
at the threshold than on the hearthstone.17
Surprisingly, the strategy of coastal defense and 
commerce raiding remained in vogue despite the experience of 
the Civil War. In that conflict the South used that stra- 
tegy, partly by intention and partly because Southern 
resources were inadequate to do much else. The Confederacy 
built forts and ironclads for coastal defense and raided 
Union commerce using fast wooden cruisers. The dominant 
Union Navy enjoyed freedom of action and hampered its 
enemies' warmaking by blockade. Union armies which 
maintained contact with the coast could be supplied or evac­
uated. The weaker power tried to protect its coastline and 
to force the stronger to capitulate by commerce raiding.
As in the War of 1812, the weaker power failed. Coas­
tal defense and commerce raiding were strategic failures.
The Union won command of the sea and denied its use to the 
Confederacy.18 This lesson of strategic failure, dearly
17Lenthall and Isherwood to Welles, March 17, 1862, 
reprinted in Joint Committee, "Light Draught Monitors," 111- 
12.
18Sprout, American Naval Power. 160-64.
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bought, was not applied to post-War naval construction.
The "line-engineer controversy" involved Lenthall and 
Isherwood and provided another reason for failure to develop 
the seagoing ironclad. Although the evolution for which the 
Bureau chiefs agitated was necessary to maintain the U.S. 
Navy's relative position, development was disturbing to 
older naval officers. When peace came, parsimony joined 
conservatism to impel a return to the "conventional" Navy—  
the sailing Navy.
Although a detailed discussion is beyond the scope of 
this work, the conflict was between the "line" officers (who 
navigated, fought and commanded ships) and the naval engin­
eers.19 With steam propulsion, a split developed between 
the men who fought and those who operated the ship. The 
result was greater status for engineers and a relative de­
cline for line officers. Predictably, the line reacted. 
Since the influence of the engineers came from their en­
gines, the line officers set out to reduce the importance of 
steam. Ironclads, full of machinery and dependent on steam, 
were prime targets. Since Isherwood was anathema to senior 
line officers, it is not surprising that his seagoing
lsFor a fuller discussion, see Sloan, Isherwood. 189- 
212; Karste l, Naval Aristocracy. 65-69, and Elting E. Mori- 
son, Men. Machines and Modern Times (Cambridge, MA, and Lon­
don: The MIT Press, 1966), 114-18.
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ironclad projects did not meet with their favor.20
The superiority of high freeboard ships for seagoing 
action and New Ironsides' demonstrated effectiveness in 
action against shore fortifications were insufficient to tip 
the postwar balance in favor of seagoing ironclads. Sea­
going armored ships needed powerful sponsorship and 
unanimity within the Navy, to overcome objections to their 
cost and prod Congress into action. In the absence of spon­
sorship, the Navy was unable to persuade Congress that money 
for ironclads would be well spent.
By failing to develop the seagoing ironclad the United 
States forfeited the advantages it might have gained over 
the European navies from its extensive combat experience.
The lessons learned from the Civil War were largely lost and 
deficiencies in industrial base, ship design, personnel ex­
perience, and tactics inevitably followed. The gap between 
American and foreign practice widened year by year until 
when naval building recommenced in the 1880s it was extreme­
ly difficult to cross.
Thus New Ironsides, the precursor of the seagoing, 
high freeboard battleship, had no direct descendant in the 
United States Navy. No other Union ironclad could have done 
what she did, whether it was protecting the blockaders off
20All the most senior Navy officers were line offi­
cers. There were factions in the Engineer Corps, pro- and 
anti-Isherwood, and the latter short-sightedly allied with 
the line. Sloan, Isherwood. 210-11; also 133-41, 189 ff.
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Charleston during the stormy early months of 1863 or sup­
porting the Army at Fort Wagner and Fort Fisher. Her bright 
promise and brilliant career were neglected in the post-War 
reaction, and the U.S. Navy's best opportunity to build a 
seagoing ironclad fleet was Jost for a generation.
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EPILOGUE
The night of Saturday, December 15, 1866, was windy in 
Philadelphia, and the cold rain borne on the northeast wind 
made a stove a welcome fixture. Shortly after eight 
o'clock, Frederick Frederickson, a shipkeeper at the League 
Island Navy Yard, made his evening rounds. He attended to 
the coal stove in the engine room of the New Ironsides, and 
then to the stoves on the other four ships in hir charge.
On his return to New Ironsides at 10:25 P.M., he 
reached the gun deck on his way below when he smelled smoke. 
He saw smoke coming from the lower deck hatches, but could 
not find the fire and returned ashore to give the alarm.
The watchmen tried to fight the fire while the duty officer, 
Acting Ensign William A. Stannard, was called. He, with 
Second Assistant Engineer Absalom Kirby, roused the watch 
and sent messengers to his superiors.
Stannard and Kirby located the fire on the berth deck 
and hold, aft of the engine room, but the bucket brigade 
they formed was handicapped by choking smoke, too few men 
and too few buckets. By the time the steam fire engines 
from the Shiffler, Franklin and Southwark fire companies 
arrived, it was too late— the fire was out of control. The
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ship was towed to shoal water, where she burned to the 
water's edge and sank.1
The Philadelphia papers on the seventeenth were full 
of the news. "DESTROYED11 Sad End of an Invincible War 
Ship." said the Philadelphia Inquirer. The Philadelphia 
Public Ledger noted that the ship, "considered the best 
iron-clad in the American Navy," was "an especial favorite 
with Philadelphians." All the papers agreed with the wit­
nesses who testified at the Navy's preliminary inquiry— the 
fire must have been the work of an incendiary. The quarter- 
inch iron of the engine room bulkhead made it impossible 
that the pine wood behind it could catch fire from the 
stove.
The investigating board, headed by Captain James Mad­
ison Frailey, reached the same conclusion. In their report, 
forwarded to Secretary Welles on December 27, 1866, they 
stated the fire "did not originate from any fire or light 
authorized or known to be on board," and the Commandant of 
the Navy Yard, Rear Admiral Thomas Selfridge, agreed.2
The endorsers at the Navy Department were not so
xRear Admiral Thomas 0. Selfridge, Sr., to Welles, De­
cember 17, 1866, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, 
Naval Historical Foundation Collection, Papers of Thomas 0. 
Selfridge, Sr., "Copies of Letters to Hon. Secretary of the 
Navy, Bureau of Yards and Docks, and Bureau of Construction 
&c., 1866-'68, from U.S. Navy Yard Philadelphia," no. 419, 
addresses the tow.
2Frailey was the officer responsible for the inactive 
ironclads and Selfridge was his immediate superior.
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charitable. One Bureau chief noted that the suppositions of 
the witnesses concerning incendiarism were "not sustained by 
a single fact," and that the fire organization and apparatus 
were very defective. The gun deck ports and hatches were 
standing open as well. Another Bureau chief noted that the 
testimony showed there were only four or five persons on 
board forty minutes after the fire had started, and that the 
General Orders governing fire fighting and the proper con­
duct of the watch had all been issued two days after the 
fire. The Department's consensus was that the stove had set 
the wooden backing of the engine room bulkhead on fire, and 
that the ship could have been saved had the Navy Yard's fire 
organization been adequate.3
Whatever the cause, New Ironsides was gone. During 
the Civil War, New Ironsides was in action more days than 
any other vessel of the Navy. Admiral Porter once wrote 
that she had a reputation for having been hammered more 
thoroughly than any vessel that ever floated.4 That com­
ment can stand as her epitaph. The Navy received its 
money's worth in the New Ironsides.
3The investigations, both preliminary and formal, are 
in NARG 45, Subject File, HF— Fires and Explosions, Box 178. 
The Philadelphia Inquirer story occupies the front page of 
Monday, December 17, 1866; the Philadelphia Public Ledger's 
story is on page one of the same day. The Philadelphia 
Daily Evening Bulletin ran its story on page 12 of the De­
cember 17, 1866 edition.
4Porter, quoted in Bennett, Steam N a w . 273.
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY
Despite her seagoing superiority and successful wartime 
service, there has been little written about New Ironsides. 
The primary reason has been overwhelming concentration on 
the monitors. Historians tend to dismiss New Ironsides, if 
they mention her at all, as an old fashioned design com­
pletely outclassed by the revolutionary monitor type. Noth­
ing succeeds like success; after the Union won the war, the 
defects of the monitors and the wartime controversies about 
them paled alongside their glorious victories. As the moni­
tors quickly passed into obsolescence, the legend of the 
brave little "cheesebox on a raft" remained.
The small amount of historical literature associated 
with the New Ironsides is operationally oriented, of the 
"untarnished gold on the sleeves of our heroes" school. The 
major secondary sources for the New Ironsides comprise four 
articles. George E. Belknap's 1379 "Reminiscent of the 'New 
Ironsides' Off Charleston" and Edward Shippen's 1889 "Fort 
Fisher— December, 1864, and January, 1865" were published by
242
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United Service Magazine.1 They are first-person reminis­
cences, the former by the Executive Officer and the latter 
by the assistant surgeon. The third is a chapter in a 1903 
book by Frederic S. Hill, and the fourth, which probably had 
the widest circulation of any, was a section in Robert W. 
Neeser's 1926 series on "Historic Ships of the Navy," pub­
lished in the United States Naval Institute Proceedings.2
Belknap's "Reminiscent of the 'New Ironsides'" is not 
simply a personal narrative. His recounting of the events 
of DuPont's Charleston assault includes a critique of the 
battle as well as a description of conditions in the New 
Ironsides. He briefly discusses ironclad policy and con­
cludes the Navy should have built fewer monitors and more 
armored frigates:
The same energy, expended early in the war in build­
ing a fleet like the 'Ironsides' class, that was put 
forth in constructing the monitors, would have led 
to the capture of Charleston, Mobile and Wilmington 
early in '63, and the Confederates would have been 
cut off entirely from the supplies carried in by the 
blockade-runners, and the enormous expense of block­
ading those ports would have been saved.3
Belknap saw combat both in New Ironsides and in
1George E. Belknap, "Reminiscent of the 'New Ironsides' 
Off Charleston," United Service Magazine, o.s., 1 (January 
1879): 63-82; Edward Shippen, "Fort Fisher— December, 1864, 
and January, 1865," United Service Magazine, n.s., 2 (July 
1889): 11-25.
2Frederic S. Hill, Twenty-six Historic Ships (New York: 
G.P. Putnam, 1903); Robert W. Neeser, "Historic Ships of the 
Navy— New Ironsides," Proceedings USNI 52 (1926): 2443-51.
3Belknap, "Reminiscent of the 'New Ironsides'," 79.
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monitors; after leaving New Ironsides, he commanded the 
monitor Canonicus. His article is the best available source 
from which to gain an appreciation of New Ironsides' contri­
bution to the Civil War, at least through 1864, but it is 
still generally limited to shipboard events and observations 
and does not extensively discuss any larger issues.
Shippen's work on Fort Fisher is more personal and 
anecdotal than Belknap's article and includes a bare minimum 
of information descriptive of the ship. About half of the 
article deals with the fighting on land and the author's 
subsequent tour of the captured fort. The article draws no 
conclusions in any area. It shows the lapse of years be­
tween action and recollection in errors of date and detail.
Both Hill's and Neeser's articles are essentially 
operational histories. Each commences with a description of 
the ship and continues, in more or less detail, with a 
chronological narrative of the ship's career.
Hill's 1903 effort is the longer and more detailed of 
the two, but includes much information about the operations 
off Charleston, the siege of Charleston and the attack on 
Fort Fisher which does not relate directly to the New Iron­
sides.4 The work draws heavily upon Belknap's articles.
Hill errs in several constructional and operational details, 
including the ship's dimensions, the design of her pilot
4It is easy to believe this matter is padding to fill 
up Hill's chapter on New Ironsides to respectable length.
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house, and the dates of her decommissioning and destruction. 
He does not evaluate her performance and draws no conclu­
sions about her impact upon ironclad development.
Neeser's 1926 article is also devoid of evaluation. 
More accurate in his description of the ship than Hill, he 
depends less overtly upon Belknap. The dates he assigns for 
Captain Turner's relief from command and the ship's destruc­
tion by fire are incorrect.
There are two less-well-known secondary sources, one 
an article and one a section of a book, which deal primarily 
with the ship's construction. The article, which would have
9
had only limited circulation, is an 1867 editorial entitled 
"The U.S.S. Armored Frigate New Ironsides," which appeared 
in the Journal of the Franklin Institute.5 This anonymous 
editorial, a good source of design and constructional de­
tail, appears to have been written by someone closely con­
nected with Merrick & Sons. In his book, A Year on a Moni­
tor. Alvah F. Hunter states that the author was J. Vaughn 
Merrick. Because of the Merrick family's close connection 
with the Franklin Institute, the statement is credible.6 
In keeping with the nature of the Journal, the article is
5[J. Vaughn Merrick], "Editorial. The U.S.S. Armored 
Frigate New Ironsides," Journal of the Franklin Institute.
3d ser., 53, no. 2 (February 1867): 73-81.
6Samuel Vaughn Merrick, J. Vaughn Merrick's father, 
helped to found the Franklin Institute and served as its 
President from 1841 to 1853. J. Vaughn Merrick was elected 
to the Institute's Board of Managers in 1863 and served as 
President from 1868 to 1869.
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technical, focused upon the design and construction of the 
ship. It has just sufficient discussion of New Ironsides' 
operations to support the author's contention that the ship 
was successful.
The book passage is Charles H. Cramp's address to the 
Contemporary Club of Philadelphia, which appears in Augustus 
C. Buell's 1906 book, The Memoirs of Charles H. Cramp.7 
This address, apparently given in 1897, contains valuable 
material on the ship's design and construction. The printed 
version is longer than the typescript, a copy of which is in 
the Belknap Papers. Cramp makes observations on the course 
of the Navy's ironclad program, but only to discuss in pas­
sing the "Monitor craze." He makes some errors of chron­
ology in his discussion, but this can be attributed to a 
lapse of thirty-five years between the events and the recol­
lections.
The Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships is a 
widely distributed tertiary source, apparently compiled from 
secondary sources including Neeser. The brief historical 
sketch given is purely narrative but contains numerous
’Augustus C. Buell, The Memoirs of Charles H. Cramp 
(Philadelphia and London: J. P. Lippincott Co., 1906), 63- 
71. I have used the typescript where possible since Buell's 
reputation for scholarly accuracy is not without spot.
Allan Nevins wrote, referring to another Buell book, "When 
his sources ran thin, Mr. Buell calmly manufactured new 
ones." Allan Nevins, from The Gateway to History, quoted in 
The Historian as Detective: Essays on Evidence, ed. Robin 
Winks, (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1969), 201-202.
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errors, especially of chronology.8
Among primary sources, the most valuable for New Iron­
sides ' design and construction is National Archives Record 
Group 71, Records of the Bureau of Yards and Docks. Little 
of Merrick & Sons' correspondence has survived. According­
ly, the several series of Yards and Docks letters provide 
almost all of the primary information available about the 
original proposal and the evolution of the design during the 
construction period. Other entries contain the contract for 
the ship and the record of the Government's financial deal­
ings with the contractor.
There is little about the ship in Record Group 19, Re­
cords of the Bureau of Ships, since the Bureau of Ships' 
predecessor bureaux (Steam Engineering; Construction, Equip­
ment and Repair; and Construction and Repair) were not di­
rectly involved in her construction. The Plan File, also 
part of Record Group 19 but housed at the National Archives 
Cartographic Branch, contains plans of the ship and of her 
novel gun carriages but not of her machinery. This lack is 
made up by a very complete set of plans for U.S.S. Wyoming's
8United States Navy Department, Naval History Division. 
Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships 8 vols. (Wash­
ington: GPO, 1959-81), 5: 58-59. Hereafter DANFS. For 
example, DANFS states the ship joined the squadron off Char­
leston on January 17, 1863, but that was actually when she 
reached Port Royal. She served as DuPont's flagship only 
for the April attack. The dates given for her departure 
from station and her recommissioning in 1864 and her de­
struction by fire in 1866 are incorrect. Since these errors 
match those Neeser makes, the editors of DANFS probably used 
Neeser's material without checking it.
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machinery, of which New Ironsides' was a duplicate. Record 
Group 19 also contains New Ironsides7 Steam Logs.
Record Group 24, Records of the Bureau of Personnel, 
includes the Deck Log for the ship's entire commissioned 
service, an incomplete series of Muster Rolls, and individu­
al Records of Officers. Record Group 45, Office of Naval 
Records and Library, contains much material in the "Old 
Navy" Subject File. It also contains Captain Radford's let­
ter books and the Squadron Letters for the ship's service in 
the North and South Atlantic Blockading Squadrons.
Considerable information, generally scattered, about 
New Ironsides is found in other groups. Record Group 52, 
Records of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, contains the 
ship's medical journals. Record Group 125, Records of the 
Judge Advocate General (Navy), includes several Courts 
Martial and Courts of Inquiry which involve officers of the 
New Ironsides. Record Group 74, Records of the Bureau of 
Ordnance, has valuable but well-scattered information about 
the ship's ordnance difficulties.
Two noteworthy sources for information on the ship's 
early active service are the Thomas Turner papers in the New 
York Public Library and the diary of Acting Master John M. 
Butler in the Western Reserve Historical Society. The 
Turner papers applicable to New Ironsides comprise his let­
ter book for the period of his captaincy. John Butler was a 
junior officer aboard the ship. His diary, from January 1,
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1863, until his detachment in May 1863, gives a revealing 
although biased view of life aboard New Ironsides during the 
period of DuPont's attack on Charleston.
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APPENDIX A
SPECIFICATION OF HEIGHTS AND DISPLACEMENT
From National Archives/ Record Group 19, Plan 107-9-12H. 
"Specification of Iron Plated Steamer proposed to the Navy 
Department by Merrick & Sons of Philadelphia. 1861."
Weight of Hull, 230 feet long
Tons
1965
" " 4 1/2 inch iron plating 650
" 1 " deck 170
Armament & Ordnance Stores 100
Eng.ines, Boilers, Machinery and 
Water in Boilers 300
Coal 300
Chains. Same as "Lancaster" 60
Anchors " " " 13
Water and Tanks, Same as "Wyoming" 20
Boats 4
Masts, Spars and Sails. Bark rig. 40




165 Men and appendages 15
Wood for Cooking 5





At 14 feet load line, exclusive of Keel 4015
Surplus Displacement 187
To these "as designed" weights, the increased battery 
added 301 tons, the armored bulkheads 110 tons, and the
269
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pilot house 16.5 tons. The additional men and their 
"appendages" added 29 tons, and the increased storage for 
fresh water another 51 tons. The total with other additions 
and deletions, was 495 tons beyond that initially estimated. 
This included a deduction of 40 tons for masts and rig­
ging.1 The full sail rigging was discarded for pole masts, 
but was returned after the ship's initial trials.
burner to Merrick & Sons, September 22, 1862, NARG 
71, Entry 5, Box 448, 2: 79.
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APPENDIX B 
SALVAGE AND FINAL DISPOSITION
New Ironsides was sold for "removing or wrecking and 
recovering" the property in her. On March 22, 1867, adver­
tisements were placed requesting bids to purchase her "as she 
lies."1 All of the original bids were rejected, but a late 
bid from the Atlantic Submarine Company of New York was ac­
cepted in May 1867.2
The company soon started work. Loose plating and fit­
tings were removed and sold, and Atlantic Submarine made at 
least one progress payment to the Government.3 Her boilers 
were salvaged between 1867 and late 1868 and were offered for 
sale separately by Merrick and Sons, apparently after being
National Archives, Record Group 19, Entry 405, Pro­
posals and Advertisements of Sales, 48.
2The Government was to receive one-third of the value 
of the salvaged material. NARG 19, Entry 71, 7: 40, 43,
118. The correspondence with the Atlantic Submarine Company 
is with George D. Norton and F. W. Beers. They later sold 
their interest; in late 1867 David Boyd, Jr., purchased what 
was left of the ship. "The New Ironsides Again Afloat," New 
York Times. December 5, 1868, 2.
3A payment of $5,000 was received on June 28, 1867. 
NARG 19, Entry 71, 7: 119.
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reconditioned.4 Finally, the hull was raised using pontoons. 
Chains were run under the ship and connected to the pontoons 
at low tide. When the tide rose, so did New Ironsides.
After she was refloated, tugs towed her upriver by stages, 
and she was eventually beached and broken up.5
4In an advertisement of August 1869, Merricks' offered 
the boilers of the New Ironsides "taken from her wreck." 
"Advertisement for One or More (4 in all) Horizontal Tubular 
Boilers" (Figure 8).
5"Again Afloat," 2.
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